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ABSTRACT
Business transfers and accompanying business changes are a focal point for
the tension between the protection of rights of employees, including their property
rights in the job and their "right to meaningful participation, and the interests of
management in achieving its economic objectives effectively. A comparison of the law
in the United States, South Africa and the United Kingdom can cast the divergent
interests, which become conspicuous during corporate reorganisations, into bold relief,
and suggest how those interests can be reconciled.
This study shows that conventional labour law with its emphasis on voluntarism
has not been able to resolve the basic conflict between the economic demands for
restructuring and rationalisation (one of the main consequences of the global
economy), and the social demands for workers' protection. By arguing that collective
bargaining has never succeeded in effectively mitigating the power of management
over the workforce, pluralist support of voluntarism is criticised.
The main point that emerges from the comparison of the way in which the three
countries deal with the phenomenon of structural business changes and the effect of
such changes on workers, is that law, even though its effectiveness to bring about
major changes in an industrial relations system is limited, can make some difference.
Law can intervene in labour relations to set standards and lay down procedures for the
exercise of managerial prerogative; specifically, law can introduce the values of liberal
society into the workplace, such as rationality, fairness, and respect for individual
rights. This study shows how, through the introduction of some of these values,
legislation for the protection of workers' acquired rights, can provide a solution to the
tension between managerial prerogative and employees' rights.
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information
derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Introduction
Mergers and sales of businesses, workplace closures (complete or partial),
plant relocations, subcontracting or other company reorganisations can have
devastating effects on workers. The erosion of job security and the eradication of
collectively bargained protections can leave displaced workers in a vacuum which
traditional labour law with its emphasis on voluntarism is less and less able to fill.
Conventional labour law has not been able to resolve the basic conflict between the
economic demands for restructuring and rationalisation (one of the main conse-
quences of the global economy), and the social demands for workers' protection.
When the UK Government was confronted with the European Community's
Directive on the Safeguarding of Employees' Rights in the Event of Transfers of
Undertakings, 1 the question regarding the need for legislation to protect workers in
the case of business transfers was seriously debated. 2 Previously, similar questions
had emerged with regard to the enactment of the law on unfair dismissal, 3 the
Redundancy Payments Act, 4 and some provisions of the European Community's
Directive on Collective Redundancies.5
In the United States, the minimal protection provided by the law and its
shrinking ability to lessen the impact of business reorganisations have compelled
unions to develop strategies to deal with the trend of corporate mergers, takeovers,
1 Council Directive 77/187/EEC (O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 61) 26 (1977)).
2SPJ Bob Hepple, "Workers' Rights in Mergers and Takeovers: The EEC Proposais, 5 Indus. U. 197
(1976) and "Council Directive of February 14, 1977, on the approximation of the laws of the Member States,
relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or
parts of businesses,' 6 Indus. U. 106 (1977); "The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment)
Regulations," 11 Indus. U. 29 (1982). The UK Government's rather hostile reception of the Acquired Rights
Directive is also discussed in P.L Davies and M.R. Freedland, Labour Legislation and Public Policy 577-580
(Oxford 1993).
3The law on unfair dismissai was planned by the Labour Government after the publication of the
Donovan Report, Report of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations, para. 545,
Cmnd. 3623 (1968) but was enacted by the Conservative Government in 1971 (Industrial Relations Act
1971)(now Part V of the EP(C)A 1978).
4Redundancy Payments Act 1965 (now EP(C)A Part VI).
5Council Directive 75/129/EEC (O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 48) 29 (1975)).
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reorganisations and closures. 6 Given the well documented decline in union
membership, it is imperative that such a discussion should extend to workers who are
not unionised and to entire communities.
In South Africa a similar discussion has taken place, especially in the context
of workers' relationships with employers in a non-racial South Africa, and the future
role of collective bargaining in economic reconstruction.7
A comparison of the law in the United States, South Africa and the United
Kingdom can cast the divergent interests, which become conspicuous during
corporate reorganisations, into bold relief, and suggest how those interests can be
reconciled. The similarities in the industrial relations systems in the three countries are
striking: the major premises in all of them are that employees sell their labour power
in a free exchange, that employers exercise ultimate control over the productive
processes, and that employees are expected to accept the employers' management
and decision-making powers. Business transfers and accompanying business
changes are a focal point for the tension between the protection of rights of
employees, including their "property rights" in the job and their "right to meaningful
participation, and the interests of management in achieving its economic objectives
effectively.
In the UK the acquired rights legislation, derived from the 1974 social action
programme of the EC, and perceived by employers and some Governments with
much suspicion, disappointed the expectations of those who wanted to see greater
job security. However, since 1989 judicial activism in the European Court of Justice
has appeared to expand the scope of the EC Directive, and legislative amendments,
introduced in the UK after the European Commission had begun infringement
proceedings because of the failure of the UK to fulfil its obligations, 8 also promise to
broaden the scope of application of the UK legislation. Although major weaknesses
6Laiji conferences have induded a discussion of the subject of workplace dosures and company
reorganizations, for example, the AFL-CIO LCC Video Conference (June 23, 1989) and the Twenty Second
Teamsters Lawyers Conference, New Orleans, Louisiana (September 19, 1989).
7See, e.g., COSATU's publication Political Economy: South A/rica in Crisis (Johannesburg 1987).
81n 1992 the European Commission produced a report criticising aspects of the UKs Regulations.
(Commission Report to the Council on progress with regard to the implementation of Directive 77/187/EEC
relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or
parts of businesses, adopted on 2 June 1992.) The UK Government gave an undertaking to amend the
law and, in November 1992, introduced the Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Bill (TURER) into
Parliament.
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remain, partly because in the UK there is no legislation to support the appointment of
workers' representatives, the acquired rights legislation has brought about some
change (albeit not radical) in employees' job security and has introduced some curb
on the way in which management approaches business reorganisations.
Acceptance of an arbitrary right to hire and fire in the USA, leaves employees
in most instances with very lithe job security. Collective organisations have operated
under a legal system which gives employers a far-reaching prerogative, and as a
result, have not been able to protect employees' employment opportunities. The
Courts have restricted bargaining subjects so as to limit the participation of employees
in most decisions which involve capital mobility and investments, and which may
imperil or destroy the job security of employees. 9 In such cases an employer is
obliged to bargain with a union about the effects of the decision, but this only serves
as a palliative to mitigate the harsh consequences to some extent.'° Under the
successorship doctrine an employer who takes over a business may incur an
obligation to bargain with a union, 11 and under restricted circumstances, to honour
some of the provisions of a collective agreement. 12 Yet, such an employer retains
an almost unlimited discretion to eliminate employees' jobs.
In South Africa, the introduction of a broad unfair labour practice definition has
placed some curbs on the power of an employer to effect individual or mass
dismissals.' 3
 Moreover, a degree of industrial democracy has been introduced in the
form of consultation about fundamental business decisions.' 4
 But the shackles of
the common law restrains legal thought in the case of employees who are faced with
a change of employer, and renders job security elusive.15
The main point that will emerge from the comparison of the way in which the
9Fibreboard Coip. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) and First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452
U.S. 666 (1981).
10See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
11NLRB v. Bums International Secunty Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
12Hova,d Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint &ecutive Board, 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
' 3The definition of an unfair labour practice in sec. 1 of the Labour Relations Act was inserted by sec.
1(f) of the lndustriai Conciliation Amendment Act 94 of 1979.
14See, e.g., Hadebe v. Romatex Industrials Ltd., (1986) 7 LL.J. 726 (Ic.).
15The leading case is Ntu!i v. Haze/more Group t/a Mus grave Nursing Home, (1988) 9 l.LJ. 709 (l.c.).
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three countries deal with the phenomenon of structural business changes and the
effect of such changes on workers, is that law, even though its effectiveness to bring
about major changes in an industrial relations system is limited, can make some
difference.
The sections of this chapter following immediately will briefly account the
development and current thinking about law and industrial relations in the USA, South
Africa and the UK The values and assumptions which have permeated thinking about
the labour market in many industrialised countries, including the UK, USA and South
Africa, and which have influenced the law in the area of business transfers, will then
be considered. These values and assumptions can best be described by utilising the
pluralist model of management-labour relations. Against the background of this model
judicial decisions can be analysed for their approach to the relationship between
collective bargaining and management control. Moreover, the pluralist model provides
a basis for an evaluation and assessment of the scope and function of collective
bargaining as well as the extent and form of management control in the workplace.16
By arguing that collective bargaining has never succeeded in effectively
mitigating the power of management over the workforce, pluralist support of
voluntarism will be criticised. The reason why voluntarism never really came close to
redressing the basic unequal distribution of power stems from a misconception of the
role of legal institutions in shaping the labour market and a failure to recognise that law
can be a powerful social force responsible for creating the labour market's main
characteristics. With the shortcomings of the pluralist model in mind, the argument
will be proferred that the law can be used to contribute to equity and efficiency. These
goals require a focus for the law broader than unions and collective bargaining. An
expanded role for the law involves intervention in labour relations to set standards and
lay down procedures for the exercise of managerial prerogative; it entails, specifically,
the introduction of the values of liberal society into the workplace, such as rationality,
fairness, and respect for individual rights. It will be shown in detail how acquired rights
legislation's greatest strength can be in providing a solution to the tension between
managerial prerogative and employees' rights through the introduction of certain of
these values.
' 6See A. Goldsmith, 'The Management-Control Collective Bargaining Relationship: Three Models, 24
Osgoode Hall U. 775, 776 (1986) (models can have descriptive and normative significance).
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Law and industrial relations in the United States
Labour law in the United States, like that in Britain, has been moulded within
the Nvoluntarist tradition. Unlike Britain, however, American legislation provides
support for collective bargaining but at the same time restricts collective bargaining as
a means to regulate terms and conditions of employment. Moreover, legislative forms
of employment protection are largely lacking. Any suggestions for new forms of legal
intervention are usually overruled by concerns to reduce employers' costs, to lower
high unemployment and to create greater flexibility with regard to workplace
organisation, technology and mobility of workers. As yet, the expression of these
concerns has not resulted in clear solutions to the underlying problems, and it is
therefore appropriate to look critically at aspects of legalism,' 7
 its achievements and
limitations in the United States, and at policies of flexibility which entail a very limited
role for the law in industrial relations.
Initially, American trade unions were committed to legalism, based on the
favourable experience during the period of the Wagner Act. The unprecedented
membership growth which unions enjoyed at this time was, however, a result not only
of legislation but of an exceptional conjunction of events. The whole political and
social climate -- Roosevelt's re-election in 1936, the Supreme Court decision in Jones
and Laughlin which upheld the constitutionality of the Wagner Act, and the relative
prosperity of 1937 -- was conducive to unionisation and to counteracting the power of
large corporations. During recent decades the context of American labour law has
altered fundamentally due to social and legislative changes. Business pressure and
public alarm gave rise to the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin Acts which contained
various legal controls outlawing previously legitimate organising practices. Structural
changes in the economy have slowed the growth of sectors in which unions were
strongest -- transportation, construction and manufacturing -- and have spurred
employment growth in industries such as trade, finance and insurance, services and
Government. As yet, unions have not been able to establish significant bases in these
fast growing areas of the economy.
Legalism has been held in check by Government policies promoting labour
17 Legalism is used here in broadly the same sense as juridiflcation, a term Which was defined by Jon
Clark in a review as 'a process (or processes) by which the state intervenes in areas of social life (industrial
relations, education, family, social security, commerce) in ways which limit the autonomy of individuals or
groups to determine their own affairs. In the most general terms it is about the relation between state and
society, and the balance between their relative influence on the way human beings conduct their lives.'
(Jon Clark, 'The Juridification of Industrial Relations: A Review Article,' 14 Indus. Rel. J. 69, 71 (1985).)
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market flexibility and generally including two strategies: partial abstention by the
Government from setting basic labour standards, and encouragement of decentralised
collective bargaining. 18 While the first of these techniques is commonly regarded as
a close relative of deregulation, the second technique, by contrast, is achieved in the
United States through regulation, and was to a large extent implicit in the legal
framework established by the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts. Decentrailsed collective
bargaining is the norm since an employer's legal duty to bargain is usually located at
plant or company leveL The duty to bargain has been circumscribed by decisions of
the Courts and of the National Labour Relations Board, which restricted coverage of
collective agreements by excluding from the employer's duty to bargain subjects like
the relocation of plants and resources, the subcontracting of work, and even, in some
instances, the introduction of unilateral changes in terms and conditions of employ-
ment. 19 Labour standards have been further undermined by the possibility of
relocating plants to the southern and western regions of the country which have not
been unionised. Workers who are not covered by collective bargaining agreements -
- and these include more than eighty percent of the workforce -- work under the
doctrine of employment at will, without significant federal job protection legislation and
with very little legislation of this kind at state level. Workers outside the unionised
sectors therefore experience a great deal of job insecurity. Common law approaches
used to develop exceptions to the rule of employment at will, do not amount to a
systematic repudiation of the doctrine.20
In short, the American system is characterised by a void in minimum
employment standards resulting from the absence of social regulation of terms and
conditions of employment, and the elimination of collective bargaining in important
areas and sectors of the labour market. The general absence of social regulation of
terms and conditions of employment has found a striking manifestation in plant
closures, relocations and mass economic layoffs. While most industrial democracies
have legislation to deal with these phenomena which have occurred with increasing
frequency in recent years and caused similar problems everywhere for workers and
' 8Simon Deakin, Legal Change and Labour Market Restructuring in Western Europe and the US, 16
New Zealand J. Indus. Rel. 109, 111 (1991).
19J. Atleson, Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law (Amherst, Massachusetts 1983).
20Common law limitations on employment at will include the interpretation of promises of job security
as terms of the contract of employment, and a number of public policy exceptions.
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their communities, the United States has shown a reluctance to adopt legislation
requiring prior notice or consultation, or providing benefits for workers. Only a few
state and local laws offer very limited protection to workers.
An important reason for the lack of legislative response to the problems of
major economic adjustments, can be found in the ideology of private ownership and
property rights which, in the United States, is strongly influenced by notions worked
out during the 19th century. This explains the reluctance on the part of the legislature
to accept limitations on the right' of owners of businesses to shut down or relocate
for economic reasons, or to require consultation before reaching business decisions.
Flexibility is imposed on workers, without affording their representatives an opportunity
to be involved in discussions of substantive questions of flexibility. 2' The benefits of
the apparently enhanced flexibility which the American system has achieved are open
to question, especially since social divisions have been increased between unionised
workers in full-time employment who are covered by collective agreements, and
workers in non-unionised sectors. At the lowest end of protection are part-time and
temporary workers who have no effective route towards more secure employment.
Mobility and adaptability have not been achieved by policies of deregulation which
neglect the importance of effective training to provide mobility and, more severely, the
devastating effects of unemployment and the spread of poverty.
Ironically, the prevailing ideology, far from aiding businesses, may actually
harm both businesses and workers. In an analysis of ideology and national
competitiveness in nine countries, Lodge and Vogel pointed out that, in general,
countries with a coherent communitarian ideology are coping better with foreign
competition than the United States with its highly individualistic free-market ideol-
ogy. For workers and businesses to do better, existing policies based on a
seemingly outdated ideology need to be re-evaluated. What is clearly called for is a
re-evaluation to facilitate long-term planning for economic health. For the labour
movement in the US a role in imaginative planning will demand a vision, not as narrow
interests goups, but as associations which seek to improve community lives with a
21 pare in this regard most of the systems of continental Europe where one technique of enhancing
flexibility through collective bargaining has been the involvement of unions and employers' associations with
Government in the adoption of laws on the substantive questions of flexibility. See A. Lyon-Caen & L
Manucci, "The State, Legislative Intervention and Collective Bargaining: A Comparison of Three National
Cases,' 1 Int'l J. Comp. Lab. L & Indus. Rel. 87-107 (1987).
IdeoIogy and National Competitiveness: An Anaysis of Nine Countries 321 (George C. Lodge & Ezra
F. Vogel eds., Boston, Massachusetts 1986).
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special concern for those who are powerless as individuals." 23 The role of law in
achieving an increase in individual freedom and welfare should be seriously
considered.
Law and industrial relations in the UK
In the British voluntary tradition the argument has always been offered that legal
regulation should play a secondary role in comparison with voluntary regulation,
mainly in the form of collective bargaining between management and trade unions.
Traditionally, British law played a limited role with regard to the protection of workers
and support of trade unions, in part because trade tinions themselves viewed the law
as an instrument of the establishment which largely advanced the interests of the
powerful and wealthy. This view resulted in a conscious •aversion to legislative
intervention" and an "almost passionate belief in the autonomy of industrial forces."24
Collective bargaining in the UK originated and developed without significant legal
intervention, unlike the USA where unions only achieved a level of recognition by
employers after the implementation of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. The
explanation for the absence of legal mechanisms to require employers to bargain with
trade unions was given in terms of the theory of collective laissez-faire, which implied
a limited role for the law in the field of industrial relations. To this the British
Government has added deregulation as a political slogan even though the facts point
to a growth in legal regulation in many areas.25
A trend towards statutory regulation became obvious with the development of
statutory employment protection such as the Contracts of Employment Act 1963, the
Redundancy Payments Act 1965 and the Industrial Relations Act's provisions on unfair
23Lawrence E. Rothstein, Plant Closings: Power, Politics, and Workers 60 (Dover, Massachusetts 1986).
24	 Kahn-Freund, "Labour Law" in Law and Opinion in England in the Twentieth Centuiy 221, 224
(Morris Ginsberg ed., London 1959).
Areas affected by legal regulation include those in which the UK had to comply with EEC law such
as Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations (regulated in the UK by S.l. 1981 No.
1794) and Equal Pay (Amendment) Regulations 1983 (Si. 1983 No. 1794), but also areas such as statutory
sick pay (introduced by the Social Security and Housing Benefits Act 1982 and extended by the Social
Security Act 1985), the right to time off work for ante-natal care (EP(C)A sec. 31A, inserted by EA 1980 sec.
13) and occupational pension schemes (Social Security Act 1985).
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dismissal. These legal changes were the result of an economic and social crisis,
characterised by industrial conflict and low productivity. They were aimed at reforming
the existing practices of collective bargaining but reflected a consensus that a system
of free collective bargaining was desirable to regulate and determine conditions of
employment.
With the election of the Conservative Government in 1979, social policy for the
promotion of collective bargaining was reversed and statutory measures to facilitate
its extension were withdrawn. However, as far as support for collective bargaining was
concerned, deregulation did not imply a return to a policy of collective laissez-faire.
The law continued to regulate aspects of industrial relations such as industrial action,
trade union government and the rights of individual employees. At present, legislation
in Britain gives employees various rights which enable them to challenge managerial
decisions to terminate the employment relationship, or to make the loss of a job more
palatable, and concerns both substantive individual rights of workers and procedural
aspects of collective bargaining, most notably in the form of a trade union's rights to
information and consultation in the case of collective redundancies27
 and transfers
of undertakings.28
The British Government has, for the most part, claimed to support a theory of
legal abstention or voluntarism and not to be intervening in the labour market, but
justified pieces of legislation such as the Employment Acts of 1980 and 1982 first on
the basis of safeguarding individual freedom, and second as measures "to improve the
operation of the labour market by providing a more balanced framework of industrial
relations." This second type of reasoning shows an acceptance of the views of F.A.
During the mid-1970s when legislation was beginning to touch on many aspects of employment and
industrial relations, observers were able to conclude that there was an "indubitably fundamental and
irreversible trend" towards legal regulation of industrial relations (R. Lewis, The Historical Development of
Labour Law," 14 Brit. J. Indus. Rel. 1, 15 (1976)) and that the increase in collective labour law as well as
employment protection legislation provided "definite, justifiable principles which were to affect the patterns
of industrial relations conduct." (Ferdinand von Prondzynski, "The Changing Functions of Labour Law," in
Industrial Relations and the Law in the 1980s 179 (P. Fosh and C.R. Littler eds., Aldershat, Hants, England
1985).)
27	 99-107 of the EPA 1975 were essentially an implementation of the EC's Directive on Collective
Redundancies 75/129/EEC (O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 48) 29 (1975)).
Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981, which was an implementation
of the EC Directive on Safeguarding Employees' Rights in the Event of Transfers of Undertakings
77/187/EEC (O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 61) 26 (1977)).
Norman Tebitt, Secretary of State for Employment, speaking during the Second Reading of the
Employment Bill 1982, 17 Pad. Deb., H.C. (6th ser.) col. 741 (8 February 1982).
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Hayek who considered trade unions to be TM economically very harmful and politically
exceedingly dangerous", 30 and observed that they were using their power in a way
which was Nrapidly destroying the economic order.N31 On the whole, Government
policies have been directed at the traditional practice of collective bargaining with the
object of relieving the labour market of the distorting influences of collectivism. These
policies have involved extensive privatisation of public corporations and strongly
unionised local authority services, the decentralisation of collective bargaining to the
level of the corporation or the plant where union strength during times of unemploy-
ment is relatively weak, and legislation restricting the freedom to organise, to bargain
and to strike.32 In particular, Government policy led to the repeal of the statutory
procedure which unions could invoke to secure recognition for bargaining pur-
poses, thus removing the foundation of the statutory structure for the encourage-
ment of collective bargaining. Recognition as the crucial step in the development of
the bargaining relationship and the securing of trade union rights became a voluntary
process. By withholding recognition, it has become possible for employers to avoid
statutory duties including disclosure of information for collective bargaining pur-
poses and consultation over redundancies or over proposed transfers of a
bus iness.
Because of this action by Government and other factors such as fundamental
changes in technology and the labour market, particularly the increase in service
30F.A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 272 (Chicago 1960).
31 F.A. Hayek, 3 Law, Legislation and Liberty 144 (Chicago 1982). However, this explanation has been
mostly concealed by primarily forwarding the libertarian argument - legislation is needed to combat the
coercive power of unions which restrains individual freedom - and the Government has preferred not to refer
to the economic power of trade unions, nor to state the economic aims of legislation expressly. In terms
of public relations, to gain acceptance for its policies, the Government's tactics have been successful. By
diverting attention away from the economic, and social objectives of legislation, the odious consequences
of the type of legislation have often gone unnoticed. Most notably, the proclaimed protection of the
freedom of the individual under the law frequently runs counter to the safegu&ding of workers' interests in
the employment relationship.
B.A. Hepple, The Harmonisation of Labour Law in the EEC: A British Perspective, 6 Recht der Arbeit
348, 349 (1989).
33EA 1980.
'EPA 1975, sec. 17(2).
EPA 1975, sec. 99(1).
Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981 (S.l. 1981 No. 1794),
Regulations 10 and 11.
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industries and the growth of a 'marginal' workforce, union density has declined and
collective regulation has had a smaller impact. Collective bargaining practices have
not been able to keep pace with changes in the organisational structure of business
and have been affected by the general economic decline and high level of unemploy-
ment. The future is uncertain, but Lord Wedderburn's vision of a future in which
'regulation is inescapable' seems very plausible, for the context for tomorrow's labour
may be more desperate than that of previous years'.37
Law and industrial relations In South Africa
The South African Labour Relations Act, based on a voluntarist model of
industrial relations, broadly promotes the practice of collective bargaining. Amending
legislation introduced in 1979, was generally regarded as heralding a new era, not
because it constituted a break with existing practices in industry, but because of its
extended objective of institutionalising conflict in the economy by creating a uniform
system of labour regulation. At the time of its introduction black workers were
excluded from the institutions and procedures of industrial legislation. The exclusion
was regarded as undesirable both by multinational corporations who, experiencing
pressure due to their involvement in South Africa, pushed for labour reforms which
would reflect internationally acceptable standards, and by established unions who
acted with a similar self-interested motive but with a narrower agenda. Established
unions felt the constraints which the system of registration and participation in
industrial councils imposed upon them, as compared to emerging black unions which
could act in unrestrained fashion and make extravagant demands which appealed to
a broad base of workers. Unions who were already operating within a system of
labour regulation wished to retain their existing rights, but see all unions subjected to
the same statutory discipline.
The Government contemplated the risks of regulatory action, but calculated that
a uniform system of labour regulation would not entail inordinate costs to industry.
Moreover, regulation could promote orderly union formation and collective action, and
by and large fit in with the Government's own design of controlling and gradually
37Lord Wedderburn, The Worker and the Law 861 (3d ed. London 1986).
Act 28 of 1956.
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incorporating some of the ostracised elements of society. The legislation adopted
was a combination of statutory defences and incentives; it made provision for the
registration of unions to make them eligible for membership of established bargaining
forums, the industrial councils, and it incorporated the requirement of a mandatory
conciliation phase to gain access to the Industrial Court. In terms of the Act, unions
were allowed to organise and to act collectively, but the actions and aims of unions
could be supervised in the final instance by the Industrial Court.
Unions responded to the amended labour laws with scepticism and hostility.
One commentator expressed the reasons for labour's reaction as follows:
'Registration and the widened possibilities for legalism contained within it will further tend
to bureaucratise unions, will further remove the union from the control of the workers.
The insidious effects of the South African industrial relations system are not enshrined
in the operation of industrial councils but in the tradition of legalism arid anti-organisation
which it has nurtured."4°
Suspicion and opposition were normal responses to initiatives from a legislator who,
in the political field, had established a tradition of merciless state repression. And yet
it soon became clear to unions that, in the field of industrial relations, the law could
be used as a strategic tool and provide them with significant leverage. Official
sanction of the principle of freedom of association allowed unions to organise more
extensively and to gain more members. 41 A procedural change to the law on 1
September 198242 which granted the Industrial Court the power to decide whether
parties ought to be given status quo relief in the event of disputes over dismissals,
changes to employment terms and alleged unfair labour practices, induced the trade
union movement to make serious and extensive use of the law." The status quo
provision was intended to prevent unilateral action by restoring the employment and
Clive Thompson, Trade Unions Using the Law, in Law and Social Practice 335,336-7 (Hugh Corder
ed., cape Town 1988).
40M. Nicol, Legislation, Registration, Emasculation, 5 S. Afr. Lab. Bull. (Nos. 6 & 7) 44, 56 (1980).
41 Membership of unregistered trade unions grew by some 500% from the beginning of 1980 to the end
of 1981 (according to the National Manpower Commission Report for the period 1 January 1982 to 31
December 1982, RP 45-1983).
42ln terms of sec. 8 of the Labour Relations Amendment Act 51 of 1982.
Sec. 43. of the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956.
"From 1979 until the beginning of 1982 the Industrial Court made only 10 unfair labour practice
determinations. In 1983, 110 status quo applications and 22 unfair labour practice determinations were
instituted, and in 1985 the figures rose to 529 and 228 respectively. See K Jowell, 0f Invention and
Intervention: Collective Bargaining after Wiehahn, 3 Indicator 14 (1986) (Publication of Centre for Applied
Social Sciences, University of Natal, Durban).
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bargaining position which had prevailed previously, pending settlement through
conciliation or adjudication. Unions realised that the law held advantages for them in
the settlement of their immediate disputes with employers; unions also became aware
of the opportunity created by the open-ended status quo and unfair labour practice
definitions, to argue that these concepts be interpreted in accordance with accepted
international legal norms.45
The Industrial Court's interpretation of the statutory concepts formed the basis
of new statutory rights for workers and worker organisations. Arguments based on the
International Labour Organisation's standards regarding termination of employment
were accepted by the Court when it developed its unfair dismissal jurisdiction, and by
the same token overturned arbitrary action by the empIoyer. Similarly, the Industrial
Court has introduced guidelines for employers who dispense with redundant labour
for reasons of recession or technological change. 47 Although the Court has not been
able to address the problem of the economy's incapacity to provide sufficient jobs,
and has not provided for job security, it has effectively mitigated some of the harsh
consequences of employment loss. In terms of its statutory brief to promote industrial
peace and welfare, the Court has striven to balance the cost savings of an employer
who dispenses with surplus labour, with the charges which this practice foists on the
wider society.
For all the Court's intervention to establish labour standards, it has always
placed a high premium on autonomous sanctions in the collective bargaining process,
and has not been able to escape the ubiquitous tension between judicial intervention
and abdication. Since the introduction of the unfair labour practice definition the Court
has been vexed by the problem of defining the perplexing boundary between
autonomous action and legal enforcement. Most notably, this problem manifested
itself with regard to recognising a duty to bargain. For many years the Court, clinging
to peculiar notions of voluntarism, refused to make an order that a party was to
45This argument will be strengthened considerably by the inclusion in the new Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa 1993 under the chapter on fundamental rights (Chapter 3), the right of every
person to fair labour practices (sec. 27(1)). Chapter 3 of the Constitution must be interpreted in accordance
with accepted international legal norms.
The development of the unfair dismissal jurisdiction can be traced back to the case of MAWU v. Stobar
Reinforcing (PLy.) Ltd., (1983) 4 I.LJ. 84 (l.C.).
47See, e.g., Shezi v. Consolidated Frame Cotton Corporation Ltd., (1984) 5 lU. 3 (l.C.); GWU v. Dorbyl
Marine (PLy.) Ltd., (1985) 6 lU. 52 (l.C.).
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negotiate in good faith. However, within a decade after South Africa's modern
labour law had come into being, it was firmly established and accepted by all the
members of the Industrial Court that the Act empowered the Court to impose
bargaining duties in appropriate circumstances. Recognition of a duty to bargain,
of course, only raises the more perplexing questions of deciding whether bargaining
rights should be extended to both minority and majority unions,5° and of determining
both the scope of the bargaining agenda and the appropriate bargaining unit or
level.5 ' The latter question has acquired greater substance due to a change in the
balance of forces on the ground: unions which have become more powerful at industry
level wish to secure bargaining at that level while employers, concerned about union
strength, production flexibility and adaptability in increasingly competitive domestic and
global markets, resist this situation. Questions such as these will no doubt
continue to vex the Court in the years ahead.
In this transitional stage of South Africa's history the institution of collective
See, e.g., BCAWU v. Johnson Tiles, (1985) 6 LU. 210 (l.C.) and MAWU v. Hait, (1985) 6 I.LJ. 478
(l.C.).
4 rhe Labour Appeal Court has sanctioned in general terms the duty to negotiate with a representative
trade union (See Sentraal-Wes Ko-op (Bpk.) v. FAWU, (1990) 11 l.LJ. 977 (LA.C.)). The Industrial Court
has stated categorically (in SAC7WU v. Maroc Caipets & Textile Mills (P4'.) Ltd., (1990)11 l.UJ. 1101, 11 04E
(l.C.)):
Let it at once be said that, despite some eaiiier decisions to the contrary, it is clear that
this [C]ourt today unequivocally recognises the existence of an enforceable duty upon
all employers to bargain with trade unions representative of their employees, in respect
of all matters concerning their relationship with those employees.
Both the Appellate Division and the Supreme Court have recognised the wide sweep of the unfair labour
practice definition which impacts on voluntarism in collective bargaining. See, e.g., Consolidated Frame
Cotton Coiporation Ltd. v. The President, Industrial Cowt, (1986) 7 l.LJ. 489 (A.D.) and Trident Steel (Ply.)
Ltd. v. John N.O., (1987) 8 I.LJ. 27 (W.LD.).
50The Act appears to favour bargaining systems which operate on majoritarian principles. See
Ramolesane v. Andrew Mentis, (1991) 12 I.LJ. 329 (LA.C.), and also S.4 Association of Municipal
Employees v. Pretoria City Council, 1948 (1) S.A. 11, 17 (T.). But of. Veldspun (P4i.) Ltd. v. ACTWUS4,
(1992)13 I.LJ. 41 (E.). The Court has at times endorsed a "pluralisr approach, and required an employer
to bargain with any union which is 'sufficiently representative of employees in a bargaining unit. See, e.g.,
SACCAWU v. Southern Sun Hotel Corp. (P4'.) Ltd., (1992) 13 LU. 132 (l.C.) and MWU v. East Rand Gold
& Uranium Co. Ltd., (1990)11 I.LJ. 1070 (l.C.). An extreme case of multi-unionism was advanced in two
cases decided under the now repealed 1988 unfair labour practice definition. See National Baking and
Allied Workers Union v. BB Cereals (P4'.) Ltd., (1989)10 l.LJ. 870 (l.C.) and RTEAWU v. Tede!ex (P4'.) Ltd.,
(1990) 11 l.LJ. 1272 (l.C.). it can be argued that these decisions now carry little, if any, weight.
51 See, genereity, S. Bendix & SM. Swan, The Collective Bargaining Structure in South Africa: An
Appraisal of the Present System,' 2 Indus. Rel. J.S. Afr. 1 (1982). The authors compare the advantages
and disadvantages of centrahsed and decentralised bargaining to illustrate that the two systems are not in
conflict.
52See Clive Thompson, 'Collective Bargaining,' in [1991] 2S. Afr. Hum. Rts. & Lab. L Y.B. 271, 278 (M.
Robertson ed., Cape Town 1992).
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bargaining and the Courts' role in the process will remain under stress and is likely to
change fundamentally. Clive Thompson has described the 'increasingly painful path
of transition ' as one which is characterised by widespread discord at the plant and in
industry. On the shopfloor 'the relationship between most parties is highly adversarial
and distinctly unproductive. The peace obligation remains as elusive as meaningful
worker participation in the enterprise. The Labour Court's inconsistent decisions
have added to the uncertainty of the parties, and the Court has not always been able
to extract lasting values from the evanescent statutory regime.
Inevitably the labour arena is influenced by policies of the Government, which,
at present, focus on deregulation TM and privatisation. A future Government, in
which the African National Congress is bound to play a forceful role, might be more
concerned with redistribution of wealth and an enlarged role for the state. The broad
concern of labour, which is supported by a growing consensus to democratise society,
is to extend democratic structures beyond the political process to industry and the
economy. Trade unions are anxious to impact upon economic policy decisions, such
as employment creation, inflation, economic growth, investment, income policy,
training and productivity, either at national political level or in some type of tripartite
forum in which employer associations and unions participate with Government
officials.	 Generally, extending the frontiers of industrial democracy means
Clive Thompson, 'Collective Bargaining,' in [1991] 2 S. Air. Hum. Rts. & Lab. L. V.8. 271, 272 (M.
Robertson ed., Cape Town 1992).
54Deregulation has been advanced by the Government as a policy which would encourage growth and
stimulate small business. Various strategies have been used to achieve these policy objectives, including
encouragement of local authorities to streamline their by-laws, administrative processes and legislation. An
important piece of legislation was the Temporary Removal of Restrictions on Economic Activity Act of 1986.
In addition, as part of the general trend of deregulation, the Department of Manpower has granted an
mci-easing number of exemptions from industrial council agreements, which left workers in small, poorly
organized undertakings with low wages and poor working conditions. The union movement's response
to policies of deregulation involved arguments for nationalisation and centralisation. See Dick Usher,
'Developments in the Trade Union Movement,' [1991] 2 S. Afr. Hum. Rts. & Lab. L. V.8. 291, 297-8 (M.
Robertson ed., Cape Town 1992).
Unions have fiercely opposed the privatisation of state industries such as the steel industry, transport
services, health services, posts and telecommunications, mainly because the practice is seen as
discrimination against those who, for political reasons, had been denied services in the past. Privatisation
also meant a reduction in job opportunities at a time when unemployment figures were rising. See Dick
Usher, 'Developments in the Trade Union Movement, in [1991] 2 S. Afr. Hum. Rts. & Lab. L Y.B. 291 (M.
Robertson ed., Cape Town 1992).
Tripartite forums which operate at present include the National Manpower Commission, which was
restructured in August 1992 to comprise one third business, one third labour and one third Government
representatives, and the National Economic Forum comprising business, labour and Government
(continued...)
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expanding the areas of economic decision-making which are negotiated by labour and
capital. In pursuit of this agenda, it is essential to probe the possibilities of legislative
intervention and legal reform.
Pluralist model
The overview of law and industrial relations in the USA, the UK and South Africa
on the whole indicates the failure of voluntary regulation to bring about a more equal
distribution of power or to introduce standards of industrial justice in the workplace.
A better understanding of how this failure occurs can be gained from looking at the
pluralist model of industrial relations. The pluralist model expressly recognises a
divergence of legitimate interests and objectives within the workplace. Management's
primary interest is in running the business in the most efficient manner whereas
employees are concerned with maintenance of employment security. While competing
interests give rise to conflict, pluralists stress that this conflict is tolerable only within
certain limits and that differences should be reconciled and conflict restrained in order
to achieve industrial peace in the public interest.57 Reconciliation and restraint is
possible since an industrial relations system creates an ideology or commonly shared
body of ideas and beliefs which helps to bind the system together. Shared
assumptions about the nature of the enterprise and a mutual necessity to survive
constrains the amount of conflict.
The pluralist emphasis on limited workplace conflict makes it essential that
collective bargaining should occur only in those instances where a widespread basic
consensus can be found which may yield to a compromise or synthetic solution.6°
Alan Fox suggets that an acceptable and workable compromise can only be reached
(...continued)
representatives, which was launched in October 1992 after extended negotiations between the three parties.
For unions the forum provides an opportunity to participate in decisions affecting the economy.
57me idea of industrial peace is based upon the assumption that there is a public interest common to
a plurality of interest groups within a society. See A. Flanders and H.A. Clegg, The System of Industrial
Relations in Great Britain 318, 322 (Oxford 1954). The Webbs, shortly after the turn of the century
mentioned intervention by a democratic state in industrial disputes in the interest of the community as a
whole. S. and B. Webb, Industrial Democracy xxvii, 813-4, 823 (London 1902).
John Thomas Dunlop, The Industrial Relations System (New York 1958).
See A. Goldsmith, "The Management-Control Collective Bargaining Relationship: Three Models," 24
Osgoode Hall U. 792 (1986).
60Alan Fox, Beyond Contract 264-5 (Salem, New Hampshire 1974).
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if each party limits its claims and aspirations to a level which the other finds sufficiently
tolerable. The compromise which Fox refers to implies containment of the substantive
aspirations of employees to marginal improvements in their lot, s not for eliminating
private property, hierarchy, extreme division of labour, and the principles and
conventions which support great inequalities of wealth, income, and opportunities for
personal fulfilment.N6l According to Fox, pluralists accept as natural and inevitable
that trade unions should pursue limited and readily negotiable objectives.
The thought that unions must limit their aspirations is expressed in somewhat
different terms by Clegg when he argues that a trade union, while it must oppose,
must not Navoid responsibility at all costs. He insists that it is necessary for a union
both to oppose and to agree. By limiting union aspirations, pluralists do not
envisage joint regulation by management and labour as a major change in the
organisation of industry in the fundamental distribution of power and control, and
pluralistic mechanisms must be valued only as means for resolving marginal
discontents and disagreements. Within the boundaries of the rules established by
the parties to govern the workplace, it is foreseen that Nthe great battles over
conflicting manifestos will be replaced by a myriad of minor contests over comparative
details.
The pluralist exegesis of an industrial relations system suggests that collective
bargaining intrudes to some extent on the prerogatives of unrestrained manage-
ment. According to Cox, collective bargaining serves to substitute a rule of law for
absolute authority. 67 At the same time the relationship between managerial authority
and collective bargaining remains uncertain, and pluralist writers often emphasise that
management has some Nreserved rights, inherent rights, exclusive rights which are not
°11d. at 278.
Id. at 278.
H.A. Clegg, Industrial Democracy and Nationalization 28-30 (Oxford 1951).
'Id. at 281-2.
C. Kerr, J.T. Dunlop, F.H. Harbison and C.A. Myers, Industrialism and Industrial Man 290-1
(Cambridge, Massachusetts 1962).
See David E. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement,N 61 Calif. L Rev. 663,
721-22 (1973).
A. Ccx, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947,N 61 Harv. L Rev. 1, 1 (1947).
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diminished or modified by collective bargaining. Goldberg regards management's
inherent rights as including determination of "the product, the machine to be used, the
manufacturing method, the price, the plant layout, the plant organization, and
innumerable other questions." 69 Feller ascribes management's retained rights to the
nature of the modern industrial enterprise and admits that the scope of the union's
input is limited from the start: "management and union are not coordinate partners in
administration."70
The area of retained management rights is one of the areas of contradiction
within the pluralist model which ultimately skews the outcome of collective bargaining
toward management. Despite recognition of the collective bargaining process and the
aura of industrial justice surrounding it, pluralist assumptions as implemented in the
case law, impose severe limitations on unions to express their needs and to participate
with management in making the industrial decisions which affect workers' lives. The
assumption that management has absolute discretion to make crucial decisions
destroys the illusion of initial parity in the negotiating process and reinforces the
asymmetry of power in the employer-employee relationship.
The basic paradox in the pluralist approach as set out above is that it starts
from the premise of a conflict of interest within the employment relationship but
proceeds to emphasise marginal digressions and limited divergences, compromise
and consensus. Along the path from conflict to consensus union interests are
diminished in various ways, while management prerogative to pursue its aims is
accommodated. Although collective bargaining law acknowledges the justice of
worker participation in industrial decisions affecting their lives, this participation is
carefully controlled and restricted. In the discussion which follows it will become clear
how pluralist values and assumptions find expression in collective bargaining law and
influence the nature of the relationship and the degree of shared decision-making
between the parties.
A. Goldberg, "Management's Reserved Rights: A Labor View," in Management Rights and the
Arbitration Process 118, 123 (J. McKelvey ed., Washington 1956)(A publication of the National Academy
of Arbitrators).
id. at 123.
70David E. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Baigaining Agreement," 61 Calif. L Rev. 663, 770
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Law as a source of power
Pluralist theory occupies a middle view between extreme theoretical positions
regarding the power which can be imputed to the law. The extremes range from
materialist social theory to theories of deregulation. While materialist theory such as
traditional Marxism ascribes to the law the responsive but uncreative role of sustaining
and protecting existing social and economic practices, deregulation theorists,
seemingly aware of the powerful force of the law, wish to prevent it from aiding the
collective forces in society. More central but more ambiguous than either of these
positions is pluralism which accedes to a limited but rather emasculated role for the
law. In this section it will be argued that pluralism and other theories which eschew
the use of the law to introduce social justice in the employment relationship are
inadequate. The point is the simple one that law can influence the labour market. If
this is accepted, as it was in the European Community's social policy which inspired
regulation in the case of business transfers, the more important question can be
considered concerning the principles in terms of which the law should regulate.
The voluntarist argument for a system of free collective bargaining as the
primary source of regulation, 7' is based on the assumption that battles in the work
place need to be "carried on in a fair and equal way and that an equilibrium of
social forces should therefore be attained. Legal intervention is usually allowed to the
extent that it is necessary to redress the inequality of bargaining power. However, the
analysis of the pluralist model above shows that the law operates in a way that
collective bargaining is unable effectively to constrain the exercise of managerial
prerogative. The restrictive operation of the law is clearest in the case of the United
States, where the law is apparently used to promote collective bargaining, but is
carefully controlled to prevent unions from questioning decision-making. 73 Fox has
71 See, e.g., Kahn-Freund's Labour and the Law (P.L Davies and M. Freedland eds., 3d ed. London
1983). Kahn-Freund believed that "the main object of labour law has always been...to be a countervailing
force to counteract the inequality of bargaining power which is inherent and must be inherent in the
employment relationship" (at 18). But the impact of the law is "secondary if compared with the impact of
the labour market (supply and demand) and...with the spontaneous creation of a social power on the
workers' side to balance that of management (at 19). "As a power countervailing management, the trade
unions are much more effective than the law ever has been or can ever be' (at 21).
See the statements made by the American judge Oliver Wendell Holmes in a dissenting judgement
in the Massachusetts Supreme Court in the case of Vegelahn v. Gunter, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (1896).
73The restrictions upon mandatory subjects of bargaining can be found in the National Labor Relations
Act sec. 8(a)(5) and 8(d), 29 U.S.C. sec. 158(a)(5) and 158(d) as interpreted in First National Maintenance
Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
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argued that there is an illusion of a power balance which rests on the 'continuing
acceptance by the less favoured of social institutions and principles which support
wealth and privilege. '74 This acceptance is to a certain extent forced upon them by
the official condemnation of any challenge to the basic social and political structures
as being contrary to the 'public interest', an oft-used but murky term which conceals
a clear bias for the established order.
The failure of the law to redress inequality of bargaining power is not due to
some basic passivity or impotence to intervene in industrial relations, but rather to its
active support of the power of capital through the concept of private property and
contract. Contrary to traditional Marxist materialist theory which maintains that
economic and social practices and conditions determine the form and content of the
law, and that the law acts somewhat passively to perpetuate existing productive
relations, it is possible to argue that the imbalance of power in the employment
relationship originates in the contract of employment and the legal principle of freedom
of contract. The freedom to conclude employment contracts, while always an illusory
freedom for wage earners, has legitimised the employer's exercise of power and an
unlimited managerial prerogative to direct labour under the contract. Contract,
essentially, expresses the employer's superior bargaining power. The development
of substantive standards of employment protection, such as those establishing a
degree of protection against dismissal, including protection in the case of transfers of
undertakings, can be seen as a way to counteract the employer's boundless freedom.
Procedural regulation has a similarly important function, not in setting standards to
which contracts must conform, but in establishing processes for making standards and
for resolving disputes with regard to employment standards. This kind of 'auxiliary'
regulation can open up avenues for participation that enable employees to influence
business decisions, such as a decision to transfer control, which have far-reaching
consequences for their future employment, since the decision may lead to a new
employer adopting policies that affect them adversely.75
Theories of deregulation generally deny that substantive or procedural
74Alan Fox, industrial Relations: A Social Critique of Pluralist Ideology,' in Man and Organization 211
(J. Child ed., London 1973).
75P.L Davies, 'Acquired Rights, Creditors' Rights, Freedom of Contract, and Industrial Democracy,' 9
V. B. Eur. L 21, 22 (1989) points out that even if existing rights were fully protected, a new controller might
implement personnel and manpower policies different from those adopted by the old controller which would
result in the future development of terms and conditions of employment, of non-contractual conditions and
even of job opportunities in a way that was adverse to the interests of the employees.
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regulation serves any legitimate purpose, and express concern that such regulation
amounts to unjustified expropriation of employers' property rights. Among those who
are critical of labour law regulation, Hayek is most influential, condemning all social
legislation which aims 'to direct private activity towards particular ends and to the
benefit of particular groups. '78 Trade union power, according to Hayek, is one of the
important causes of high unemployment and inflation! 1' A similar reproach of
legislative support for unions is found in the work of a scholar such as Posner who
argues that unions engage in "rent-seeking' activities which allow them to extract a
monopoly rent from employers, to the detriment of consumers and the unem-
ployed.78 In the view of deregulation theorists, the solution to mass unemployment
requires the removal of all forms of labour-market regulation which impedes the free
flow of goods and services.
A critique of policies of deregulation which focus upon the need for greater
"flexibility' of employment and for the removal of 'rigidities' in the labour market, is
offered by Mueckenberger and Deakin. Instead, they argue for re-regulation which
implies the 'reconstruction of existing legal and institutional structures, in order to
achieve an increase in individual freedom and welfare within a network of collective
security and participation." 79 Their main criticism concerns the notion, implicit in all
theories of deregulation, that economic relations take place in a "state of nature'
which is independent of all but the most basic or minimal forms of state regulation.'80
They point out convincingly that all causes of market failure are not exogenous to the
market but do sometimes lie within the economic process itself. Efficiency might
therefore occasionaly require public policy intervention. Furthermore, markets allow
for concentration of private economic power which may be highly coercive, especially
since such economic power is supported by the private law of property and
76FA Hayek, 1 Law, Legislation and Liberty 141-42 (Chicago 1973).
1'1'F.A. Hayek, 1980s Unemployment and the Unions. Essays on the impotent price structure of Britain
and monopoly in the labour market 18 (2d ed. London 1984).
78Rk Posner, 'Some Economics of Labor Law,' 51 U. Chi. L Rev. 988 (1984).
79Ulrich Mueckenberger and Simon Deakin, 'From Deregulation to a European Floor of Rights: Labour
Lv, Flexibilisation and the European Single Maiket' 3 Zeitschrft fur ausiandisches und intemationales Arbeits-
und Sozialrecht 153, 154 (1989).
801d. at 177.
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contract.8' This form of legal regulation may have greater coercive potential than any
form of labour or social legislation.82
The private law of property and contract underwrites the strong position of
shareholders in relation to labour's wage-dependent, propertyless state. If one
perceives the labour market's main characteristics - relative insecurity and inequality -
not as being a state of nature, but as being created by legal and social institutions,
then it should be apparent that the introduction of social regulation can lead to a
labour market with different properties, such as equity and efficiency. An expanded
role for the law can affect the power relations between capital and labour, and, within
limits, aid free collective bargaining in finding a solution to the problem of market
power. Social legislation can be efficient in that it recognises the mutual dependency
of employer and employee in the employment relationship and the need for the
employee to feel part of the firm as an incentive to perform better.
The fear and aspirations of employers and employees since the latest
amendments to legislation regulating transfers in the UK support the understanding
that law and social power are interrelated, not separate, and that law can be a source
of power in industrial relations. The effect of the law in the small but important area
of business transfers strengthens the insight that, as much as the legal rules defining
private property generally give owners of capital the choice to put it to productive use
or not, legal rules influence the relative strength of labour. However, recognising the
potency and relevance of the law, does not mean that law can immediately change the
demands and aspirations of labour and capital. Many examples of legal intervention
provide proof of difficulties in changing the relative power of social forces. The
reasons for a large body of "ineffective law" will be considered in the next section.
Ineffective law
The use of law to promote collective bargaining can appear ineffective in legal
systems governed by the philosophy of industrial pluralism. This apparent inability of
the law to control the social forces of capital and labour can be observed most clearly
81 1n the UK this translates into "judge-made common law". Id. at 182.
RId. at 179.
asln this sense one could probably utilise the phrase "the political preconditions of economic
performance", a phrase which Mueckenberger and Deakin use when they make the sociological observation
that regulation is an inevitable precondition of the existing mode of production. Id. at 192.
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in the United States with regard to the legal duty to bargain, but also in South Africa
where a similar duty has been introduced through legal interpretation and is now
widely recognised. Likewise, legislation which was not designed to promote collective
bargaining, but as statutory rights for individual employees, can at times appear
impotent. An example can be found in some of the statutory rights accorded to
individual employees in the United Kingdom.
In the United States, legal controls that restrict the bargaining power of unions,
frustrate the hopes of employees and grant management freedom to exercise
autocratic power over the workforce. Although the law ostensibly diminishes inequality
of bargaining power, employees remain in a subordinate position with regard to
employers' capacity to make investment decisions or to dispose of capital. Collective
bargaining, which takes place in terms of the legislative duty to bargain in good faith,
has never succeeded in making significant inroads into the area of managerial
prerogative. Bargaining is restricted to terms and conditions of employment, but an
employer can refuse to bargain about the so-called permissive subjects of bargaining,
which include strategic economic decisions. The cause of the law's ineffectiveness
has been ascribed to the complex legal procedures required to enforce the duty to
bargain, TM
 and to the esteem in which the law holds the legal rules which define the
concept of private property and guarantee the free disposal of capital. The duty to
bargain is limited on the assumption that employees should have no say in strategic
business decisions and should not be able to encroach too far on managerial
prerogative. Similarly, in South Africa expression of union needs and aspirations have
been limited in accordance with pluralist assumptions which render employee interests
insginificant in comparison to dominant employer concerns. Collective bargaining in
Britain, operating without legal support but under the same assumptions, is restricted
indirectly by the scope of a union's liability to actions for an injunction and damages
if the union's demands fall outside the statutory list of permissible topics.
Legal restrictions, therefore, inhibit collective bargaining but the picture is more
complicated. Collective bargaining is also inhibited by practical considerations.
Successful bargaining takes place within a framework which allows demands to be
supported by the threat of industrial action. Mobilisation to make this a serious threat
84CIyde W. Summers, industrial Democracy America's Unfulfilled Promise, 28 Clev. St. L Rev. 29
(1979).
Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, secs. 178, 218.
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can be achieved when the subject is of immediate concern to workers, for instance
wages and hours, but becomes more difficult in the case of issues which are vague
and less immediate, such as investment policy or pension benefits; managerial
prerogatives over matters such as these are often left untouched.
Legal regulation of collective bargaining suffers from an even more fundamental
problem caused by labour market segmentation. Official support for collective
bargaining has failed altogether to benefit the increasing number of employees who
work in the so-called secondary labour market, characterised by small-scale industries
with little job security and low pay. There are grounds for serious misgivings that
law can ever promote the practice of collective bargaining to a notable extent in the
secondary labour market.
Considering the problems of regulating collective bargaining, one would expect
the regulation of employee rights to be more susceptible to successful legal solutions.
Positive legal rights and duties in many areas now directly regulate matters which
were once entirely within the sphere of managerial prerogatives, or left to collective
bargaining N ,87
 and research has shown that the introduction of such rights has had
a major impact on management behaviour. For instance, the incorporation of natural
justice and due process into the law of dismissal has influenced employers to make
decisions Nafter a reasonably careful investigation following a fair procedure.ss There
have also been suggestions that the effect of individual employment legislation is not
confined to individual employees, but indirectly, the norms and values of such
legislation influence collective bargaining where it occurs. Most likely, the interaction
between legal and voluntary regulation takes place in a way which was described by
Dickens et al. as follows:
voluntarily agreed norms and procedures are not replaced necessarily by legal ones, but
rather their form and operation may be modified and informed by an awareness of the
legal provisions and their operation.es
M.J. Piore, 'Notes for a Theory of Labor Market Stratification,' in Labor Market Segmentation (R.C.
Edwards, M. Reich, and D.M. Gordon eds., Lexington, Massachusetts 1975).
87B. Hepple, "Individual Labour Law," in Industrial Relations in Britain 393 (G.S. Bain ed., Oxford 1983).
B. Hepple, "Individual Labour Law,' in Industrial Relations in Britain 393, 411 (G.S. Barn ed., Oxford
1983) and 'The Fall and Rise of Unfair Dismissal' in Legal Intervention in Industrial Relations 79 (W.
McCarthy ed., Oxford 1992). See also L Dickens, M. Jones, B. Weekes and M. Hart, Dismissed: A Study
of Unfair Dismissal and the Industrial Tribunal System 252 (Oxford 1985).
L Dickens, M. Jones, B. Weekes and M. Hart, Dismissed: A Study of Unfair Dismissal and the
Industtiai Tribunal System 252-3 (Oxford 1985).
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These positive evaluations of the influence of regulatory individual rights should
be encouraging to lawyers who would like to believe that the law is able to bring about
a radical transformation in the conduct of labour relations. However, their impact may
not have been as meaningful as intimated and it is significant that the present
Government which is excessively concerned with the burdens on management, has
not consistently opposed this development. The lack of strong opposition to (albeit
not uncritical approval of) the extension of employment protection may be suggestive
of its value and there are scholars who have been sceptical of the protection which this
legislation purports to offer. Two of the redundancy legislation's proclaimed objectives
are now generally regarded as mythical: the compensation for workers who lose their
jobs through no fault of their own has not been enough to make up for consequential
losses, or to encourage occupational and geographical mobility to any notable
extent.9° The overall achievements of the statutory redundancy payments scheme
have been unimpressive, and although increased productivity through reduced staffing
is often noted as one of its accomplishments, 91 many redundancies would probably
have come about without statutory intervention, as a result of economic pressures
alone. In general it has failed to enhance job security. Similarly, the unfair dismissal
legislation falls short of its stated aim of improving job security, as is apparent from the
low incidence of re-employment which follows complaints of unfair dismissal, and
in many instances appears to do no more than attach a price to the traditional right
to fire. Procedural fairness is not always required and judicial approval has been
given to arbitrary dismissals if these are proved to be for a substantial reason, for
example, in the case of workers who refuse to go along with business reorganisations
in the interests of increased efficiency.
This outcome can be explained in terms of the overall objective of the
legislation which has as much relevance for securing employment rights as for
90See R.H. Fryer, The Myths of the Redundancy Payments Act, 2 Indus. U. 1 (1973).
Lewis, Twenty Years of Statutory Redundancy Payments in Great Britain 31 (Leeds-Nottingham
Occasional Papers in Industrial Relations 1987).
L Dickens, M. Jones, B. Weekes and M. Hart, Dismissed: A Study of Unfair Dismissal and the
Industrial Tribunal System 111 (Oxford 1985).
Bob Simpson, 'British Labour Relations in the 1980s: Learning to Live with the Law,' 49 Mod. L Rev.
796, 804 (1986).
The leading case is Ho!Iister v. N.F.U., [1979] I.C.R. 542 (CA.). See J. Bowers and A. Clarke, Unfair
Dismissal and Managerial Prerogative: A Study of 'Other Substantial Reason', 10 Indus. U. 34 (1981).
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advancing managerial efficiency and stimulating capital mobility. The approach of
tribunals which administer the law has given undue weight to policy considerations
which show a strong concern for the realisation of managerial economic designs and
the promotion of business, and has restricted the effectiveness of employment
protection rights to offer individual protection. In part this may be ascribed to the
continuing influence of the common law on their way of thinking, in part to a
managerialist approach towards the exercise of a discretion. Traditional common law
concepts constitute the basis in which much of the employment legislation is rooted
and which shapes judicial opinion. This explains the difficulties which the Courts have
experienced in applying the concept of "employee" to a wide range of working
relationships which are not easily characterised as involving notions of control or
subordinated seMce. In addition, Courts tend to exercise their discretion by
defering to management's dominance within the workplace and by subordinating the
issue of workers' rights to those of workplace efficiency and harmony, without
empirical support for their decision 97 and without any detailed enquiry as to
practicability. The adoption of an adversarial, rather than an inquisitorial, approach in
most Courts does not contribute towards a realistic assessment of the situation. A
reason for the limited effect of "positive" law is therefore the failure of tribunals to take
into account a complicated reality which might give substance to the rhetoric of
Many scholars of different viewpoints have been concerned that the employment protection laws are
interpreted according to a tradition which does not recognise their purpose. See, e.g., P. Davies and M.
Freedland Labour Law: Text and Materials 361-71 (2d ed. London 1984); B. Hepple, "Individual Labour
Law," in Industrial Relations in Britain Chap. 16 (G.S. Bain ed., Oxford 1983) and "Restructuring
Employment Rights," 15 Indus. U. 69 (1986); H. Collins, "Market Power, Bureaucratic Power and the
Contract of Employment," 15 Indus. U. 1 (1986), and "Corporatist Discipline and Capitalist Control," 11
Indus. U. 170 (1982); H. Forrest, "Political Values in Individual Employment Law," 42 Mod. LRev. 361
(1979); Lord Wedderburn, "Labour Law: From Here to Autonomy?," 16 Indus. U. 1, 4-22 (1987).
This also explains the judicial approach to unfair dismissal and the reluctance to order re-employment.
Traditionally Courts refused to order specific performance of a contract of employment for reasons that had
to do with the inability to supervise effectively such an order, and with the rule of mutuality - if an order of
specific performance could not be made against an employee since this would amount to compulsory
labour then it could not be made against an employer either. This rule has endured, even though the
contract of employment has never operated between two equal parties, and the phantom of the common
law still lurks behind judicial interpretations of the legislative provision which empower tribunals to order re-
employment. (This provision came into effect in 1976. See sec. 68 EP(C)A 1978.) ft is reinforced by a
general belief, informed by the attitudes of employers more than those of employees, that re-employment
will not work (L Dickens, M. Jones, B. Weekes and M. Hart, Dismissed: A Study of Unfair Dismissal and
the Industrial Tribunal System 111-122 (Oxford 1985)).
97Dickens et al. commented after considerable research regarding the viability of re-employment that
"even using employer-based criteria what evidence there is cannot be seen as supporting the general isation
that re-employment will not work" (L Dickens, M. Jones, B. Weekes and M. Hart, Dismissed: A Study of
Unfair Dismissal and the Industrial Tribunal System 122 (Oxford 1985)).
55
workers' rights. The troubling feature of the tribunals' approach is that employer
opposition alone determines their perception of reality, and they are unwilling to
consider the whole picture of good industrial practice.
The same tension which can be observed in the UK statutory provisions on
unfair dismissal and redundancy, is also evident in legislation for the protection of
workers in the case of business transfers. The legislation raises two important issues.
The first concerns the transfer of acquired rights, both individual and collective; the
second, participatory arrangements that give employees the opportunity to influence
the decision to transfer control. In both these matters an evident tension exists
between the protection of the rights of employees, including their "property rights" in
the job and their right to meaningful participation, and the interests of management in
achieving its economic objectives effectively.
When the Transfer Regulations were first enacted in the UK they only seemed
to add to the existing body of legislation which had proved ineffective in altering the
social patterns of interaction in industry and influencing workers' power. For many
years after the UK had adopted legislation with regard to the protection of workers in
the case of business transfers, an analysis to determine the extent to which workers'
interests were actually protected against what management often considered a basic
prerogative to make structural business changes, led through a path filled with
obstructions and surrounded by barricades. The legislation seemed to produce the
same results as had been noticed with regard to the unfair dismissal and redundancy
enactments. Law that initially appeared to provide extensive protection for
employees against managerial decisions which affected the context of their
employment and their employment security turned out to be largely ineffective.
In 1991, the European Commission commenced infringement proceedings
against the UK on the ground that the Regulations did not comply with European
standards, and in November 1992 the UK Government introduced the Trade Union
Reform and Employment Rights Bill (TURER) into parliament, which was enacted in
1993. It can be expected that the legislative amendments will provide enhanced
See Steven 0. Anderman, "Unfair Dismissals and Redundancy," in Labour Law in Britain 415-445
(Roy Lewis ed., Oxford 1986) and Labour Law: Management Decisions and Workers' Rights 171-181
(London 1992).
Commission Report to the Council on progress with regard to the implementation of Directive
77/187/EEC relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings,
businesses or parts of businesses.
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protection for workers affected by business transfers. The amended legislation
supports the view that the ineffectiveness of the law was not due to some inevitable
restraint or impotence, but was caused mainly by the way in which the legislation was
drafted and weak sanctions. It cannot be expected, however, that the intrinsic dual
policy considerations which used to characterise the law for the protection of workers
in the case of business transfers will disappear. The tension between protecting
workers' rights and permitting managerial prerogative operates over a large front of
labour legislation and is suggested by the close connection of the law on transfers with
the law of redundancy and dismissals. The strain of maintaining the delicate balance
in terms of the dual motive for employment protection legislation is demonstrated
across this whole spectrum. Even though the latest amendments to the law can be
expected to work more effectively to express values of fairness and provide for the
relative welfare of employees, the delicate balance can become distorted in several
ways. To counteract the common bias in the interpretation of the Courts in favour of
the traditional privilege of employers to dispose of capital freely, it is necessary to
perceive distinctly the principles on which a more effective legal instrument to grant
employees rights is based. The rest of this chapter will be constructed on the
premise, implicit in the social policy of the EC, that legislation for the protection of
workers in the case of structural business changes can have a powerful influence; it
will explain the principles upon which the law operates and address the challenge
which more effective protection of workers' rights poses for considerations of business
efficiency.
Legislative Intervention for the regulation of business transfers
The regulation of business transfers does not signify a break with the pluralist
tradition and may not vest workers with sufficient power to challenge the rights of
owners of capital to dispose of it freely.' 	 For example, the legislation in the EC
does not promote collective bargaining in a meaningful way. It does not deal with the
complex legal procedures needed to create and supervise a duty to bargain and which
'°°Compare the restriction upon mandatory subjects of bargaining under the National Labor Relations
Act sec. 8(a)(5) and 8(d), 29 U.S.C. sec. 158 as interpreted in First National Maintenance Coip. v. NLRB,
452 U.S. 666 (1981).
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have frustrated the aspirations of American employees. 10' In this negative vein, the
law does not display great power to alter the social forces of capital and labour.
However, the law's particular value is intervention where collective bargaining has
failed. The inadequacy of the coverage of collective bargaining intimates that law may
have an important and influential role which extends far beyond the confined role
which pluralists generally ascribe to it, namely that of promoting collective bargaining.
The legislation under discussion provides one example of law introducing an element
of industrial justice into the employment relationship.
Hugh Collins has argued that in the modern corporation the power of
management derives primarily from the effective exercise of bureaucratic power and
that labour law's primary focus must not bear upon market power but must be a
review of the exercise of bureaucratic power as a source of domination. 102 While
market power Nrests on a belief in the legitimacy of entitlements to the fruits of the use
of property and skills, ... stable bureaucratic power requires a belief in the legitimacy
of the authority exercised through the hierarchical structure.'° 3 The exercise of this
authority gives rise to most of the regular conflicts at work, which are not necessarily
conflicts between employees and the owners of capital, but rather conflicts between
employees and management which wields the powers of decision-making. Collins's
perspective allows the values of democracy, legality and fairness, advocated in political
society, to be introduced in the workplace to replace the practice of domination.
Acceptance of the values of liberal society in the workplace dictates that the
autocratic power exercised by management over the workforce should not go
unchecked. The most apt method for the control of managerial power is legal
regulation and review of private bureaucratic power, on the same principles as judicial
review of executive governmental power through administrative law. This function of
the law, while recognising that bureaucratic decision-making has to be subject to a
measure of control, accepts this form of organisation 's legitimacy and value. It is
accepted that bureaucratic hierarchies have the advantages of efficiency and
rationality; within a bureaucratic power structure problems of co-ordination, supervi-
101p. Davies and M. Freedland, Labour Law 202-5 (2d ed. London 1984); P. Weiler, Promises to Keep:
Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 Harv. L Rev. 1769 (1983); C.W.
Summers, "Industrial Democracy: America's Unfulfilled Promise," 28 Cleveland State L Rev. 29 (1979).
'°2H ugh Collins, "Against Abstention ism in Labour Law," in Oxford Essays in Jurispwdence 92-93 (John
Eekelaar and John Bell eds., Oxford 1987).
'°31d. at 92.
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sion, transmission of information and adaptation to changing market circumstances
are more easily dealt with.
Control of the exercise of bureaucratic power therefore acknowledges the
effectiveness of bureaucratic structures to deal with a variety of problems. Following
Collins's suggestion to draw upon the analogy of judicial review in administrative law,
control would take place with the object of ensuring that managerial prerogative is
exercised In accordance with the Rule of Law and with fair standards of decision-
making. 104 The standards which apply to the exercise of managerial prerogative
should accordingly reflect principles of rationality, fairness and respect for individual
rights. In introducing such standards, the legislation for the protection of the acquired
rights of workers shows its greatest strength.
A better understanding of the nature of the power exercised by management
over the workforce makes it possible to see the focal point of acquired rights
legislation as control over managerial prerogative. With this focus in mind, it remains
to examine the finer points of the applicable standards. Respect for the rights of
employees is manifested in several ways: the prohibition against dismissal for reasons
of a transfer supports the transfer of acquired rights and demonstrates respect for the
dignity of the individual by limiting the grounds for disciplinary action; the requirement
of consultation contributes towards a fair procedure. The standard of rationality is
reflected in the exemption which allows employers to dismiss employees for
economic, technical or organisational reasons which entail changes in the workforce.
This permits the exercise of power if the employer can demonstrate that it furthers the
economic interests of the enterprise and contributes towards efficiency. As long as
the Courts apply a strict criterion of rationality, abuse of power can be prevented.
Rationality also relates to the pertinent and controversial question whether acquired
rights should be protected in the case of insolvent businesses. The type of rational
standards to be applied in situations of insolvency will be discussed.
As much as judicial review of the exercise of managerial prerogative can
contribute towards infusing the esteemed values of liberal society into the workplace,
it has one serious defect: it is not supported by the kind of democratic structures, such
as a democratically elected parliament, which, in Government has final control over
acts of the executive. Collective bargaining has hardly lived up to the ideal of
democracy since negotiations are conducted in private and do not really provide shop-
'°41d. at 96.
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floor workers with the opportunity of self-determination. To remedy the lack of
democracy in the context of employment, Collins suggests that attention should be
paid to existing practices in industrial relations. 1 °5 The final section of this chapter
will consider whether the more recent development of consultative committees in large
enterprises approaches a more complete standard of democracy.
1.	 Respect for the rights of employees: automatic transfer of rights and the
prohibition against dismissal
The standards which apply to the exercise of managerial prerogative should,
first of all, reflect respect for individual rights. The importance of this value derives
from the fact that workers have a vital interest in their employment, not only because
of the wages or salaries which are needed to support themselves and their families,
and the associated benefits which the job often provides, but because of the time that
workers spend in the workplace and the defining influence that this has on their
personalities and relationships. Business transfers often result in major restructuring
of corporate strategy and operations which enhances the value of shareholders' equity
but which places great pressure on the labour market and leads to a corrosion of
workers' interests. While recognising that the global economic climate places
enormous pressure on businesses to cut costs and to increase productivity in order
to compete in an intense market environment, there is no reason to accept complete
managerial authority as part of the natural order of things. As important as the
concerns for maximisation of productivity and efficiency of the overall economy, are
the concerns for the immediate and severe distress which the development of
corporate strategies can inflict upon workers and their families. Legislation can give
some recognition to the interests of these important stakeholders in the firm by
safeguarding employees' rights in the event of a transfer.'°6 Even though the
regulation of transfers, operating within general judicial constraints, will encounter
similar problems as other pieces of employment protection legislation, it can offer
some level of protection to employees from managerial decisions to effect business
changes and afford them some participation in the affairs of the enterprise, It can
intervene to some extent to prevent arbitrariness when the corporate firm exercises its
'°5!d. at 98.
106This is the aim of the Acquired Rights Directive as explained in Foreningen at Arbejdsledere I
Danmark v. Daddy's Dance HaIIA,S, [1989] 2 C.M.LR. 517. 524 (E.C.J.).
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considerable power of control over the time and activities of human beings, or when
a Government effects its policies and operations. Managerial prerogative assumes an
unusual meaning when the term is applied to Government practices such as
privatisation, but there is no ground for allowing the exercise of power to go
unchecked when it results in a substantial deterioration in the terms and conditions of
employment of employees.
2.	 Rationality: economic, technical and organisational reasons for dismissal;
Insolvency
The introduction of legal provisions to safeguard acquired rights and terms of
employment, while signifying a "major step toward the preservation of workers'
rights", 107 might seem easily justifiable in labour law. "After all", Davies asks,
"whatever freedom it might be thought the existing controller should appropriately be
given to impose unilateral changes in terms and conditions of employment, can there
be any sensible argument for giving the new controller a greater freedom?"°8
 It
does not take a very radical frame of mind to agree with Davies that justice seems to
suggest that, whatever balance is struck between employment protection and
managerial prerogative, this balance should be maintained when there is a transfer of
control. It does not appear reasonable to allow a new controller greater freedom of
action than the predecessor in a transfer situation. However, at least two counter-
arguments have been raised against this seemingly tenable justification, calling for
rational standards to be applied in transfer situations.
One counter-argument suggests that operations like mergers, takeovers or
amalgamations should not be unduly burdened and that capital concentrations should
not be impeded since they can make an important contribution to the maintenance of
employment.109 A related and strong counter-argument applies in insolvency
situations. If the automatic transfer and automatic protection against dismissal
provisions are applied in the context of insolvencies, it may cause a transferee to pay
less for the transferred undertaking, or not to purchase the undertaking at all, with two
107Report of the Committee on SociaJ Affairs and Employment (the Yeats Report)(Eur. Pan. Doc. (Corn.
No. 384) para. 3 (1974)).
109P.L Davies, "Acquired Rights, Creditors' Rights, Freedom of Contract, and Industrial Democracy,
9 Y.B. Eur. L 21, 22 (1989).
109See the Opinion of the Economic and Sociai Committee on the proposed Directive, O.J. Eur. Comm.
(No. C 155) para. 1.3, 25 (7 November 1975).
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possible consequences. First, it may actually be prejudicial to the interests of
employees as a whole and lead to Na serious risk of general deterioration ifl working
and living conditions, contrary to the social objectives of the Treaty."° Second, it
may treat employees more favourably than other creditors of the insolvent undertaking.
It is possible, as one scholar has pointed out, that creditors will argue that the
transferee will pay less for the business as a result of having to take over the acquired
rights of employees, thereby diminishing the pool of assets against which the creditors
can claim.11'
The first counter-argument concerning capital mobility and integration can be
accommodated in legislation in the form of a provision which allows dismissals for
rational business reasons. For example, the EC's Transfers Directive permits
Ndismissals that may take place for economic, technical or organisational reasons
entailing changes in the workforce." 112 Rationality requires that such an exemption
be interpreted in accordance with objective standards which will not destroy the
protection of employees' rights unless a clear business need has been established.
Accordingly, Courts should be willing to examine an employer's financial position or
prospects to determine whether a decision was made for economic reasons, and
should not simply accept the employer's subjective judgement.' 13 The judicial
10Abels v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalindust,-ie en de Electrotechnische
Industrie, [1985] E.C.R. 469 (E.C.J.)(foflowed in Industriebond FNV v. The Netherlands, [1985] E.C.R. 511
(E.C.J.)); Me Botzen v. Rotterdamsche Droogdok Maatschappij B y, [1985] E.C.R. 519 (E.C.J.), and
Foreningen a! Arbejdsledere I Danmark v. A/S Danmols Inventar, [1985] E.C.R. 2639 (E.C.J.).
111 P.L Davies, "Acquired Rights, Credftors' Rights, Freedom of Contract, and Industrial Democracy,"
9 Y.B. Eur. L 21, 23-24 (1989).
' 12Art 4.
113As yet there is not enough interpretational guidance from the European Court on how to perform the
careful balancing which is necessary to prevent the destruction of most of the protective measures of the
Directive. The clearest statement from the Court expressed the need to take account of all the objective
circumstances in which the dismissal occurred and to determine whether it took place on a date close to
that of the transfer (P. Bork International A/S v. Foreningen a! Arbejdsledere I Danmai*, [1989] I.R.LR. 41,
44 (E.C.J.)). From this fact it would be possible to draw the inference that the dismissal was connected to
the transfer and did not take place for economic reasons. The objective standard to which the Court
alluded was not clarified sufficiently to allay fears that the exemption may destroy much of the protective
aims of the Directive. Decided cases in the UK have not gone much further to restore confidence that the
employer's reasons for dismissing employees will be closely scrutinised. Signals from the Employment
Appeal Tribunal indicate a reluctant willingness to exercise some control over management prerogative.
The tribunal did, in one case, exclude from "economic" reasons dismissals of the workforce for the purpose
of disposing of the business, at the insistence of the transferee or to secure a better deal, and confined
such reasons to dismissals which arose during the conduct of the business (Wheeler v. Pate!, [1987] I.C.R.
631 (E.A.T.)). It also stated, in another decision recognising the importance of safeguarding acquired terms
and conditions of employment, that an 'economic, technical or organisationar reason necessarily had to
(continued...)
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responsibility of striking a fair balance between the promotion of business and the
safeguarding of workers' rights can be achieved by emphasising the unfairness of
dismissal for a reason connected with the transfer and by not allowing employers'
characterisation of their business needs to undermine this valuable protection. Striking
a balance generally means that Courts, assigned with the task of reviewing manage-
ment prerogative, will closely have to scrutinise the scope of employers' freedom to
dismiss for reasons of 'business efficiency.' Fulfillment of this task will not necessarily
place undesirable limits on proposed employer initiatives; it will, however, provide
employees with their share of industrial justice."4
Rationality can provide some yardstick for striking a balance between the
conduct of business and the protection of employees' rights, an exercise which is,
under normal circumstances, by no means easy to perform, but which becomes much
more arduous under circumstances of business insolvency. The second counter-
argument against the protection of employees' rights in the context of insolvencies
stresses the dangers which this may hold for the sale of businesses and the
continuation of the productive process. Although evidence of such risks is hard to
come by, the difficulties which the European Court faced while applying the provisions
of the Directive in situations of insolvency give some idea of the complications
involved. In the much-critisized Abels decision, the European Court limited the
application of the Acquired Rights Directive to pre-liquidation procedures which had
the object of ensuring continued trading. 115 Other insolvency proceedings, instituted
with a view to the liquidation of the assets of the transferor under the supervision of
a competent judicial authority, were excluded from the scope of the Directive. It has
since been confirmed in another decision of the European Court, D'Urso v. Ercoli
Mare/il Elettromeccanica Generale SpA,116 that the Directive does not apply if an
113(...continued)
entail changes in the function or composition of the workforce and that it was not enough if this was merely
an incidental consequence (Berriman v. Delabole Slate Ltd., (19851 I.C.R. 546, 550-1 (EAT.)).
114John Bowers and Andrew Clarke, Unfair Dismissal and Managerial Prerogative: A Study of Other
Substantial Reason', 10 Indus. U. 34 (1981); John McMullen, Management Prerogative, Reorganisation
and Employees' Rights on Transfers of Undertakings, 49 Mod. L Rev. 524 (1986).
115AbeIs v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de MetaaIindusrrie en de Electrotechnische
Industrie, [1985] E.C.R. 469 (E.C.J.)(followed in Industrieborid FNV v. The NetheaIands, [1985] E.C.R. 511
(E,C.J.)); Me Botzen v. Rotterdamsche Droogdok Maatschappij By, (1985] E.C.R. 519 (E.C.J.), and
Foreningen at Arbejds!edere i Danmai-k v. A/S Danmols Inventar, (1985] E.C.R. 2639 (E.C.J.).
116 (1992] I.R.LR. 136 (E.C.J.).
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insolvent undertaking is placed under a particular insolvency regime for the purpose
of liquidation. The reasons for this exclusion included a fear that applying the Directive
to insolvent transferors would be prejudicial to employees' interests. In Abels the
Court mentioned the serious risk of general deterioration in working and living
conditions which might result if a transferee, faced with the transfer of the acquired
rights of employees, decided not to acquire the undertaking. 117 However, since
there was no conclusive evidence to demonstrate that this risk would materialise, the
Court's position remained speculative. It is possible that application of the Directive
will not prevent all sales of insolvent businesses and that in many cases employees
may benefit from a transfer. Even if it leads to a transferee paying less for the
business, the price may be more than the break-up value of the assets and other
creditors will be able to claim from this sum.
Based on unstable foundations, the decisions of the European Court present
several problems. A particular problem concerns the spurious distinction between
insolvency proceedings which aim to ensure continued trading and those which result
in liquidation. The first type of procedure, like the latter, may ultimately involve the
choice between selling a business as a going concern or selling the assets separately,
and the issue of the priority of employees' claims in relation to those of other creditors
arises in both situations.' 18 There thus seems to be no sound basis on which to
make the distinction.
In terms of the distinction which the European Court made between different
kinds of insolvency proceedings, each situation will have to be decided on the facts.
This does not provide a solution to the fundamental problem, however, which is that
of formulating clear policy regarding the priority of employees' claims with regard to
those of other creditors. The weighing up of the interests of creditors has always been
the concern of insolvency law and the European Court was reluctant to interfere with
this priority system. But the extent to which it nevertheless did interfere, despite the
lack of evidence, has done nothing to clear up the considerable uncertainty
regarding the impact on the labour market of transfers of undertakings in the case of
an employer's insolvency. 9 Interference would probably not have been necessary
117 [1 9851 E.C.R. 469, 485 (E.C.J.).
118PL Davies, Acquired Rights, Creditors' Rights, Freedom of Contract, and Industrial Demociacy,
9 YB. Eur. L 21, 23-25, 47 (1989).
119g j E.C.R. 469, 485 (E.C.J.).
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at all if the European Directive, which deals with the protection of employees in the
event of the insolvency of their employer and which mainly concerns the guarantee of
employees' outstanding claims by guarantee institutions, provided for adequate
financial protection. 12° At the moment the extent of coverage of this Directive is not
satisfactory.
Socialising the costs of employees' claims may be a commendable route to
escape from the problems posed by business insolvencies. 12' In addition, one
would want to see the results of extensive research into the implications on the labour
market of singling out for protection the specific interests of employees in the case of
insolvencies. Until the results of such research become available there is insufficient
justification to distinguish between different types of insolvencies. Policy consider-
ations apply to all kinds of insolvency situations alike and it would probably be prudent
to leave such policy decisions to insolvency law and to restrict the application of
legislation for the protection of acquired rights in insolvency situations to employee
participation rights and the functions of employee representatives.
3.	 Fair procedure: consultation
A legal instrument for the regulation of business transfers, in addition to its
protective function, has to incorporate a participatory value, based on the underlying
premise that participation has Nan essential role in the management of change."23
Participation can take many forms, of which negotiation and consultation appear to be
internationally the most common.
Consultation is usually interpreted to mean something less than negotiation
with the emp'oyer retaining the right to decide, but "consultation with a view to seeking
agreement," the form of participation employed in the European Directive, can have
considerable force and comes close to negotiation. The requirement that an employer
' 2°Council Directive 80/987/EEC of 20 October 1980, O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 283) (1980) on the
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the protection of employees in the event of the
insolvency of their employer.
' 21 PL Davies, "Acquired Rights, Creditors' Rights, Freedom of Contract, and lndustriai Democracy,"
9 Y.B. Eur. L 21, 53 (1989).
'This was the recommendation of Professor Bob Hepple in his report for the Commission of the
European Communities on the Main Shortcomings and Proposals for Revision of Council Directive
77/187/EEC (December 1990)(unpublished).
' 23Bob Hepple, "The Crisis in EEC Labour Law," 16 Indus. U. 77, 81 (1987).
65
should listen to representations from employee representatives has analogies with the
administrative law requirement of fair hearing. In both areas of the law recognition is
given to the underlying principle that persons affected by certain actions should be
afforded a fair and unbiased hearing before the decision to act is taken. Due
process in both instances serves the purpose of facilitating accurate and informed
decision-making. 124 Consultation invariably contains an important process value and
has the important virtue of informing the employer of the various issues and views to
which regard ought to be paid. 125 It is not inconceivable that an employer, though
not obliged to do so, will adjust a decision to take account of convincing arguments
and proofs. Failure to consult, especially in instances where employees are needlessly
retrenched, constitutes an infringement of a very important interest of employees. For
this reason it is essential to have clarity on the basic principles involved in the process.
Any variant of the consultative process invariably requires notice of the
proposal to be given to the affected parties and their being afforded an opportunity to
present their views. Moreover, it is required that the decision-maker should consider
those views in good faith, that the decision should not be made for an improper
reason and that it should be explained.' Concisely, the process amounts to
notice, attention, and explanation, 127 a minimal set of rights which will be dealt with
in turn.
(a)	 Notice
Those with a right to be consulted have to be given prior notice of the
opportunity to make reprensentations. This requirement implies that the time allowed
for consultation must be adequate, especially where the issues are complex and their
effects far-reaching.128 A short period may only be justified in urgent circumstances.
Normally, an employer's claim that consultation will delay a decision which has to be
taken expeditiously if the employer is not to experience financial loss, will not be
' 24Lawrence Baxter, Administrative Law 538 (Cape Town 1984).
Id. at 225.
'Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process: an Essay foi
Lon Fuller, 92 Harv. L Rev. 410, 415 (1978).
1271d at 423.
l28ApIan D. Jergesen, The Legal Requirements of Consultation, Pub. L 290, 308 (1978).
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sustained. In most instances the assertion is simply untrue that employers cannot
foresee redundancy early enough to allow for consuItation.' 	 The right to be
consulted arises at the formative stage of a proposal before final conclusions have
been drawn and minds have become settled.
Notice of consultation has to mention all important subjects to be included in
the deliberation. Since it is possible that new details may emerge in the process of
consultation as a scheme develops and unfolds, it is desirable to allow for a broad
reading of the subjects to be discussed. To be adequate, consultation may have to
start at an early stage and take place intermittently as more particulars emerge.
A mere reference to the subjects to be discussed is not sufficient. Those being
consulted need information about the subjects put forward for consideration before
they can give their views. Access to relevant information, which includes data on
which the proposals are based and value judgements influencing the decision, 13° is
so crucial to the consultation process that the employer who withholds information
should bear the burden of demonstrating that this did not impair rights of participa-
tion.13'
(b)	 Attention
The nature of consultation bears little resemblance to the art of reasoning or
logic. An employer's decision need not follow from the views and arguments of the
consulted employees. However, the process requires a receptive attitude, open
mindedness and a willingness to consider the advice tendered. The employer
must be susceptible to proofs and other interpretations, and open to suggestions.
Evidence of a receptive mind will be found in the way the proceedings are conducted;
sufficient opportunity to ask questions, to express opinions and even to exchange
views may signify adequate consultation.'
1 M.S.M. Brassey, E. Cameron, M.H. Cheadle & M.P. Olivier, The New Labour Law 91 (Cape Town
1987).
0AIlan D. Jergesen, The Legal Requirements of Consultation, Pub. L 290, 305 (1978).
3 Id. at 306.
'Id. at 308.
1 Id. at 309.
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(c)	 Explanation
Consultation can be advanced by explanation, which serves the dual function
of satisfying employees that the decision is not arbitrary, and confirming that the
employer has paid sufficient attention. Although explanation is not critical to
meaningful participation,' it can no doubt greatly enhance the process and should
only be disregarded in exceptional circumstances. Explanation ensures that a
decision is not made for an improper reason, a function which is probably the most
demanding and most problematic of the entire consultation process.
Underlying the concept of Improper reasonu is the assumption that such a
reason can be identified in some kind of objective manner. However, a determination
of reasons which may be deemed "proper TM or " improper " may entangle a Court in one
of the most contentious areas of labour law. The reason for this is that the employer
is usually allowed considerable latitude regarding the setting of norms. 1 Should
a Court therefore be able to pronounce on the impropriety of an employer's desire to
want to reduce a wage bill? Or should a Court have any say with regard to the
costliness or impracticability of abolishing overtime or implementing short time?1
Should the employer's judgement be accepted without questioning as the final word
on these matters?
It is submitted that a certain amount of interrogation into the employer's
reasons and reasoning is not only apposite but is essential to maintain the intrinsic
worth of the consultation process. Given this submission, the limits of a Court's
interference can best be described with reference to two aspects of the employer's
decision-making process: the dialectical and the substantive.' 37
 A Court can inquire
into the dialectical aspect of the process and can satisfy itself as to the legitimacy of
the employer's standards, values and supporting arguments. Once these have been
accepted as valid, it is irrelevant whether a Court agrees with the final decision. If the
employer appeals to arguments which most people, including, presumably, the
134Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process: An Essay for
Lon Fuller," 92 Harv. L Rev. 410, 412 (1978).
'M.S.M. Brassey, E. Cameron, M.H. Cheadle & M.P. Olivier, The New Labour Law 91 (Cape Town
1987).
'Id. at 91-2.
' 31See Lawrence Baxter, Adminstrative Law 485 (Cape Town 1984) where he distinguishes the two
facets of "reasonableness" in relation to administrative actions.
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employees, would accept as relevant and worthy of consideration, it is immaterial
whether a Court agrees with the substantive outcome. Judging reasons not to be
ImproperN does not necessarily imply that a Court identifies or disagrees with the
employer's views.1
Applied to concrete situations, a dialectical inquiry looks into the relevant and
legitimate reasons for a decision. A Court's interference relates to the process of
decision-making and it can demand that the employer's reasons be comprehensive
enough to be recognized as legitimate, even if it would not have come to the same
conclusion as the employer. If reasons are not sufficient to determine their legitimacy
there is room for judicial scrutiny. A Court may, for example, demand evidence in
support of a simple statement from the employer that a certain practice would have
been too costly or impracticable, in order to make sure that such statements are not
fabrications to conceal reasons which are generally recognized to be improper. An
investigation into the reasons for termination, for example, enables a Court to satisfy
itself that redundancy was the bona fide ground for termination. If retrenchments
could have been avoided or diminished through the implementation of alternative
measures, the reason for the termination is not valid. Part of the investigation will
therefore be for a Court to determine whether the employer has considered alternatives
and, if such alternatives are capable of implementation, whether the employer has
instituted them. 1 Without second-guessing policies which flow from the employer's
personal and distinct knowledge and expertise, a Court's intervention acts as a
safeguard against arbitrariness and hypocracy, and indirectly as a protection of the
consultation process.
There is a particular reason why a Court should be allowed to adjudge the
dialectical aspect of decision-making in the field of labour relations. Generally,
consultation as an administrative procedure is based on trust -- trust that an
administrative authority will TM act fairly if well informed, or that persistent substantive
unfairness can and will be corrected by processes other than substantive judicial
review, such as public criticism or removal from office."° A firm belief that an
1 Id. at 486.
1 M.S.M. Brassey, E. Cameron, M.H. Cheadle & M.P. Olivier, The New Labour Law 123 (Cape Town
1987).
140MeIvin Aron Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process: An Essay for
Lon Fuller, 92 Harv. LA. 410, 417 (1978).
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employer can be relied upon to act fairly can hardly be expected in circumstances
giving rise to retrenchment, when the employees' interests are directly opposed to
those of management. Moreover, the corrective democratic processes which operate
with regard to public authorities have little role to play in the industrial environment and
the employer's decision-making power and decision-making process are usually only
subject to the check of collective action. At a time when an employer intends to
dispense with workers, strike action will neither necessarily inflict economic damage
on an employer, nor will it always serve as an inhibiting factor. It is therefore important
to allow for Court intervention when an employer fails adequately to discharge its duty
to consult, and to guard against narrow judicial interpretations from Courts which do
not appreciate the full value of the participatory process and render legislation
ineffective.
In the UK, for example, the law's contribution towards a fair procedure while
potentially deep, has not yet been very effective. Positive legal underpinning to
maintain something approaching a fair balance of power between capital and
organised labour has not proved very effective. One reason for the ineffectiveness of
the consultation provisions regarding both transfers and redundancies, has to do with
the lopsided emphasis which legislators and Courts have given to business interests,
and the failure to recognise the importance of the review of the exercise of bureau-
cratic power. A partisan interpretation of the Transfers Directive has given recognition
only to the aim to facilitate capital concentrations; 141 a similar bias with regard to the
redundancy payments legislation highlights that it was designed partly to facilitate
redundancy decisions by inducing employees to accept such decisions as a
necessary concomittant of industrial change. 142 The familiar tug of war between the
interests of capital concentrations and those of employees -- two concerns which the
European Community's Social Action Program was intended to address -- have
generally resulted in a defeat for the latter, mainly because of a fear that employees
might be able to impede the process of capital growth if they are allowed a more
significant input in decision-making.' Ironically, aims of business efficiency are not
141 P.L Davies, Acquired Rights, Creditors' Rights, Freedom of Contract, and lndustriai Democracy,
9 Y.B. Eur. L 21, 27 (1989).
142RH Fryer, Redundancy and Public Policy, in Redundancy and Patemalist Capitalism: A stuc±j' in
the sociology of work 216.60 (A. Martin and R.H. Fryer eds., London 1973).
'P.L Davies, Acquired Rights, Creditors' Rights, Freedom of Contract; and Industrial Democracy,
9 Y.B. Eur. L 21, 27 (1989).
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necessarily defeated by the procedural requirement of consultation, but consultation
can actually contribute towards efficiency in that it gives rise to more informed
decision-making. Efficiency requires a process of gathering all relevant information,
not least from the employees who work daily in the enterprise and who are most
closely connected and affected by the decision. However, in the final analysis,
justification for the procedural requirement of consultation is not based on consider-
ations of business efficiency, but rests on respect for individual dignity.'" This
moral standard requires that an employer should not be allowed to implement a
decision before the completion of a fair procedure, and the whole process should be
subject to review by Labour Courts.
4.	 Democracy
An indication of how the value of democracy might be realised in the context
of employment can be gained from looking at existing practices in industrial relations,
which show some similarities in all three countries under discussion. In South Africa,
bargaining mostly occurs within the framework of the Labour Relations Act,145
 which
provides for three statutory bargaining forums: Industrial Councils, Conciliation Boards
and Works Councils. The latter institutions, despite their obvious democratic features,
are largely inoperative because of the legacy of their unfortunate racist past. Prior to
1979, when black workers were excluded from the general statutory bargaining
system, they were allowed to negotiate wages and terms of employment with
individual employers at plant level through so-called liaison and works commit-
tees.' Such committees, which were usually initiated and dominated by
management, were under those circumstances regarded with suspicion by workers.
Under the present statutory regime, the shadows from the era of racially exclusive
legislation still linger on and works councils have never become viable institutions.147
1 Hugh Collins, Against Abstentionism in Labour Law, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence 97 (John
Eekelaar and John Bell eds., Oxford 1987).
145Act 28 of 1956.
ln terms of the Black Labour Relations Regulation Act 48 of 1953, as amended by Act 84 of 1977.
The Black Labour Relations Regulation Act was repealed by the Labour Relations Amendment Act 57 of
1981.
' 41Sec. 34A of the Labour Relations Act provides for works councils consisting of equal numbers of
employer and employee representatives, which shall perform such functions as may be agreed upon by
the employer and employees concerned. Agreements can be enforced in ordinary Courts as contracts,
or in the Industrial Court in terms of its unfair labour practice jurisdiction.
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However, a fair amount of bargaining takes place outside the statutory framework,
when private arrangements are formalised in recognition agreements, a type of
common law contract. In addition, the growth of informal liaison committees has
generally been encouraged, unless they were set up by the employer as substitute
bodies to exclude trade unions from the bargaining process in an effort to avoid
bargaining altogether.
Informal liaison between employers and employees, which has emerged in a
variety of shapes at different times in different nations, is occurring to an increasing
extent in American businesses, as employers have devised innovative programs of
direct worker participation. 149 The principal aim is to introduce a form of worker
participation which will be sensitive to the circumstances of the specific plant or firm,
flexible to adjust to changed circumstances, and will provide both sides of the
relationship with greater mutual benefits, Ideally, employee involvement plans should
provide for a cooperative relationship which leads to improved efficiency for business,
as management is able to make use of the insights and ingenuity of the workforce,
and to an increased sense of accomplishment and satisfaction for workers, as they
contribute actively to the success of the business. Although this view of a more
flexible employment relationship represents a somewhat romanticised model of self-
government, collegiality and collaboration, there are examples of worker participation
schemes which suggest that new models of representation are workable. 15° Most
forms of worker participation take place within the framework of a collective bargaining
relationship, which leads one to believe that, if added to the fundamental value of
collective bargaining for American workers, joint worker-management committees can
be suitable avenues through which the moral aspiration of democratising the
workplace can be achieved. At the moment the law prohibits many forms of
1 See NUM v. Buffeisfontein Gold Mining Co., (1991) 12 l.LJ. 346 (l.C.).
1 A catalogue of different modes of employee involvement plans can be found in Thomas C. Kohier,
Models of Worker Participation: The Uncertain Significance of Section 8(a)(2),27 B.C.L Rev. 499,500-513
(1986) and Thomas A. Kochan, Harry C. Katz, and Nancy A. Mower, Worker Participation arid American
Unions: Threat or Opportunity? (Kalamazoo, Mich.: W.E. Upjohn Institute 1984).
150The scheme that has been most prominent resulted from the UAW-General Motors agreement for
the Saturn Project. For a critical discussion of the implications of this agreement see Harry C. Katz,
Automobiles, in Collective Bargaining in American Industry: Contemporaiy Perspectives and Future
Directions 13, 41-48 (David B. Lipsky and Clifford B. Donn eds., Lexington, Massachusetts 1987).
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participatory management initiated and promoted by management,' 5' but the
developing trends in industry and the potential advantage for both employers and
employees, indicate an urgent need for legal reform, It has been argued that the
statutory ban on employee involvement plans designed by enlightened management
should be removed as part of a broad legislative review of the NLRA, which also
reaffirms the value of collective bargaining for all employees.'
Without general statutory support for joint consultation and little prospect that
the UK Government will relax its opposition to the draft uvredelingu Directive on
procedures for informing and consulting employees, the practice is not foreign to the
shop floor of many businesses in the UK. The spontaneous development of
consultation procedures has not unequivocally been to the advantage of employees
as a result of the peculiar relationship between collective bargaining and consultation
in British enterprises. These do not constitute two separate channels of communica-
tion to the extent that they do on the Continent, but there is an amount of overlap and
consultation procedures can be described as an adjunct to the institutions of
collective bargaining." While this arrangement provides flexibility, it has distinct
advantages for the employer. With no formal requirements for consultation, the
employer has a discretion over the timing and scope of disclosure of information and
consultation, and the tendency has developed in Britain for control to be centralised
and new techniques employed to make use of union involvement to legitimise
managerial ... decisions. Generally, issues which are subject to consultation
concern those over which the employer wants to retain strategic control, but for which
employees' co-operation is required. Consultation is the preferred procedure to avoid
l51• 8(a)(2) makes it an unfair labour practice for an employer to dominate or interfere with the
formation or administration of any labour organisation or to contribute financial or other support to it. In
turn, a labour organisation is defined by sec. 2(5) as including any organisation of any kind or ... employee
representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exist for the purpose, in whole
or in part, of dealing with employers concerning ... conditions of work? The aim was to ensure that all
possible incidents of employer involvement in the representation of employee interests would be prohibited.
1 Paul C. Weiler, Governing the Workplace 217-218 (Cambridge, Massachusetts 1990). Weiler makes
the argument that both analytically and empirically, union representation and employee involvement are not
mutually exclusive paths to the long-range goal of labour law to enhance labour participation as much as
worker protection.
1 W.W. Daniel and Neil Millward, Workplace lndustriai Relations (The DE/PSI/ESRC Survey) 135, 140
(London 1983).
154Steven Anderman, Unfair Dismissals and Redundancy, in Labour Law in Britain 445 (Roy Lewis ed.,
Oxford 1986).
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unacceptable levels of conflict within the management process, but informal
consultation procedures have not consistently enhanced workers' influence over
methods of production and the direction of the enterprise, and their co-existence with
collective bargaining has not invariably expanded the base of workers' control.
However, it can be argued that the phenomenon of voluntary joint consultation
indicates common consent for a legal duty to consult.' Keeping in mind the
dangers of informal consultation, it is important to pay attention to studies which have
shown that regular consultation with workers through consultation committees leads
to an increase in productivity, probably as a result of the enhanced satisfaction which
workers get from participation in decision-making and a greater sense of self-
determination. 1 Legal support for consultative groups can extend the practice in
industry, create more opportunities for self-determination, and generate mutual
benefits. Employees' performance can be assisted through a diminished sense of
domination within the organisation, while the business organisation can benefit from
a better flow of information; both can profit from the infusion of democracy in industry.
Conclusion
The claim that law can make a difference, both to enhance labour participation
as well as worker protection, will be substantiated by detailed case studies of the legal
position concerning the protection of workers in the case of business transfers in the
USA, UK and South Africa. The exposition in the next chapters may to a certain extent
reinforce the sceptisism of those who think that even in-depth legal reform will show
only marginal payoffs: after all, workers in the three countries with different legal
regimes have not enjoyed substantially different rights. However, the adoption of
legislation for the protection of workers in the case of business transfers in the UK, and
amendments to make it more effective, hold considerable promise that the law can
advance the strong moral claim that workers should have respected rights and some
meaningful voice about the exercise of managerial power when this has a far-reaching
impact on their stake in the undertaking, and on a host of other issues in their lives.
When the particulars of different legal systems are considered, it is necessary to keep
1 W.W. Daniel and Neil Miliward, Workplace Industrial Relations; the DE/PSI/ESRC survey Chap. 6
(London 1983).
'Hugh Collins, Against Abstentionism in Labour Law, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence 98 (John
Eekelaar and John Bell eds., Oxford 1987), quoting S. Lukes, Essays in Social Theoiy Ch. 4 (New York
1977); R. Blauner, Aiienation and Freedom: The Factor, Worker and his Industry (Chicago 1964).
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in mind the deeper political values which could justify legal reform to secure for
workers protective and participatory functions.
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CHAPTER 2
THE PROTECTION OF WORKERS IN THE CASE OF BUSINESS TRANSFERS:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Introduction
Employer power has a special significance for the vast majority of employees
in the United States. The majority of employment relationships are not covered by
collective bargaining agreements, 1
 and operate under an age-old rule that employers
Nmay dismiss their employees at will ... for good cause, for no cause, or even for
cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong."2 With the
exception of employees in the civil service, 3 and employees who fall under certain
"protected" categories, 4 statutory protection against discharge is lacking. Acceptance
of the employer's absolute right of discharge places employees in a particularly
vulnerable position with regard to private establishments upon which they usually
depend for their livelihood.
Employment-at-will
A misplaced rule of mutuality of obligation, which ignores the fundamental
inequality in the employment relationship, has since the end of the previous century
justified the right of arbitrary dismissal. The reasoning is that if an employee can quit
a job at any time, the employer must have a similar right to terminate the relationship
for any or no reason. 5 Ordinarily employees do not have the leverage to negotiate
1 Since practically all collective bargaining agreements provide that no employee in the bargaining unit
may be discharged except for just" cause, workers covered by such an agreement are removed from the
operation of the common-law rule.
2Payne v. Western & A. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other grounds, Hutton v.
Walters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915). The rule was apparently first asserted by H.G. Wood in his
treatise on master and servant law without support from the cases which he cited. Horace G. Wood, A
Treatise on the Law of Master and Servant (Albany, New York 1877).
3lhese include employees in federal, state and local government. Federal employees, e.g., are
protected by Government Organization and Employees Act, 5 U.S.C. sec. 7512(a) (1976), which permits
dismissal only 'for such cause as will promote the efficiency of service.'
'These categories have been created bythe National Labor Relations Act of 1935,29 U.S.C. secs. 151-
68 (1976), and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e (1976), in the form of impermissible
reasons for dismissal relating to discrimination or reprisals of various kinds.
5$ee Adair v. U.S., 208 U.S. 161, 174-75 (1908).
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a contract for a fixed term with an employer and they therefore have to rely on the
whim of the employer for preservation of their employment. 8
 The arbitrary right to
"hire and fire" still appears to be the accepted norm, in the absence of a statute or
contract to the contrary. 7 However, slowly and almost unobtrusively, in an increasing
number of states, the ideas of dismissal for cause and greater job security have
started to appear in Court decisions which allow employees successfully to challenge
the termination of their employment.
A 1959 California decision marked the beginning of the erosion of the
theoretical prerogative of an employer to dismiss an employee for any or no reason.
In Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters8 a former business agent of
the union brought a suit for wrongful discharge alleging that he had been fired for a
refusal to commit perjury. The Court recognised that the right to discharge might be
limited by considerations of public policy and said: "It would be obnoxious to the
interests of the state and contrary to public policy and sound morality to allow an
employer to discharge any employee, whether the employment be for a designated
or unspecified duration, on the ground that the employee declined to commit perjury,
an act specifically enjoined by statute." 9 After Petermann it became easier for Courts
to accept the existence of exceptions to the employment at will rule, particularly "where
some recogni[s]ed facet of public policy is threatened,"'° and in a few cases Courts
have gone so far as to reformulate the rule for wrongful discharge. The New
Hampshire Supreme Court stated in 1974 in Monge v. Beebe Rubber Company that
" [Clourts cannot ignore the new climate prevailing generally in the relationship of
6Only those employees whose knowledge or talents are exceptionally valuable may be able to negotiate
such contracts with their employer.
7See generaIli, Lawrence E. Blades, "Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power," 67 Colum. L Rev. 1404(1967); Donald H.J. Hermann & Yvonne S.
Sor, "Property Rights in One's Job: The Case for Limiting Employment-At-Will," 24 Ariz. L Rev. 763 (1982);
Jay M. Feinman, "The Development of the Employment at Will Rule," 20 Am. J. Legal Hist. 118 (1976);
Sanford M. Jacoby, "The Duration of Indefinite Employment Contracts in the United States and England:
An Historical Analysis," 5 Comp. Lab. L 85 (1982); Theodore J. St. Antoine, "You're Fired, 10 Hum. Rts.
32 (1982); Samuel Estreicher, unjust Dismissal Laws: Some Cautionary Notes," 33 Am. J. Comp. L 310
(1985).
8Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 344 P. 2d 25 (Cal. App. 1959).
91d. at 27.
10Geaiy v. U.S. Steel Corp., 319 A. 2d 174, 180 (Pa. 1974). See eisa Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation
District, 563 P. 2d 54, 57 (Idaho 1977): •As a general exception to the rule allowing either the employer or
the employee to terminate the employment relationship without cause, an employee may claim damages
for wrongful discharge when the motivation for the firing contravenes public policy."
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employer and employee" and, on this basis, justified a departure from the rule by
which the "employer has long ruled the workplace with an iron hand."" The Court
inquired into the "proper balance" between the interests of employers, employees and
the public, and found that a termination by an employer of a contract of employment
which is motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation constituted a breach
of the employment contract. The Monge case was referred to by the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court when it had to decide whether an employment contract was
breached by a bad-faith termination. In Fortune v. National Cash Register12 the Court
held that the written contract contained an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, and found that a termination not made in good faith constituted a breach of
contract.
The good faith limitation on the emp'oyer's right to discharge was supple-
mented by a more positive assertion of a right in one's job when the Michigan
Supreme Court found such a right on both express and implied contract terms. In
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan' 3 an employee who was hired in
middle management was handed a pesonnel manual that stated it was company
"policy" to dismiss employees "for just cause only." When the employee was
dismissed five years later and brought suit against the employer alleging that his
employment contract permitted dismissal only for just cause, the Court accepted that
such protection may become part of the contract "as a result 'of an employee's
legitimate expectations grounded in an employer's policy statement." 4 The Court
seemingly took a great leap forward when it affirmed the need for judicial review of the
propriety of the discharge where the employer had promised to discharge for just
cause only. 15
 And yet there are important qualifications to this decision. A Court will
not be able to read the requirement of "just cause" dismissal into the employment
contract where an employer refrains from making any declarations regarding the
reasons for termination. In the end the legal standard of "just cause, even in the most
reasonable state Courts, needs proof of special circumstances. These extreme cases
"Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974).
2Foi1une v. National Cash Register, 364 N.E. 2d 1251 (Mass. 1977).
13Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
14	 MICh. 579, 598, 292 N.W.2d 880, 885 (1980).
15	 Mich. 579, 621, 292 N.W.2d 880, 895 (1980).
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have not altered the norm that most private employers can rid themselves of an
unwanted employee without any need to explain the cause for the dismissal.
Full and effective protection against unjust dismissal is likely to result only from
specialised legislation. A statutory solution, although not without problems, is
accepted in most of the industrial world as the best available means to vindicate
employees' rights by providing protection against unjust dismissal.' 6 In the United
States, ironically, the concern for civil liberties has largely ignored the threat of
employer power to the individual freedom of employees, and the law has not
intervened to stop the abuse of the unorganised worker. Workers are expected to
carry the burden of capitalist crises while employers are allowed to minimise the costs
of dismissal for themselves. The consequences have been harsh, ever since it was
observed decades ago that
[wje have become a nation of employees. We are dependent upon others for our
means of livelihood, and most of our people have become completely dependent upon
wages. If they lose their jobs they lose every resource, except for the relief supplied by
the various forms of social security ... For our generation, the substance of life is in
another man's hands.'7
Through collective bargaining labour unions have in a small measure addressed the
imbalance in the employer/employee relationship, but their sphere of influence is
shrinking, and, as will be pointed out in the next section, has been limited in various
ways to protect employees from employer power.
Insolvency
Workers' interests are recognised to some extent in American bankruptcy
laws. 18 Bankruptcy proceedings may involve the liquidation of a debtor and
distribution of its assets to creditors (Chapter 7), or the reorganisation of the debtor
for continuing operations (Chapter 11). During such proceedings areas of great
concern to workers include the priority of creditors' claims,' 9 and the rejection of
16The International Labour Organization recommended in 1963 that there should be a valid reason for
such termination connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or based on the operational
requirements [of the employer]. (Recommendation No. 119, 1963.)
17F Tannenbaum, A Philosophy of Labor 9 (New York 1951), quoted in Blades, Employment at Will
vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 Colum. L Rev. 1404
(1967).
' 8Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. sec. 101 (Supp. III 1985).
19Such claims include wage and pension claims. See sec. 507(a) of the Code.
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collective bargaining agreements.2°
Statutory priorities determine the allocation of assets for the payment of
unsecured claims upon liquidation or reorganisation (with limited exceptions).
Where assets are insufficient for the payment of all unsecured claims, the priorities
effectively determine which claims will be paid. Workers' claims are given the following
priorities: wages for services rendered after the commencement of the case (first
priority); wages, including vacation, severance and sick leave pay, earned in the 90
days prior to the commencement of the case up to a certain maximum (third priority);
contributions to employee benefit plans arising from service rendered in the 180 days
prior to the commencement of the case up to a certain limit (fourth priority).23
The controversial treatment of collective bargaining agreements in bankruptcy
proceedings has displayed the distinct tension between the object of national labour
relations law to encourage collective bargaining, and the aim of bankruptcy law to
rehabilitate overburdened debtors. 24 The controversy originates from the provision
which allows the bankruptcy trustee to reject, with Court approval, any executory
contract of the debtor. 25
 This provision conflicts with a provision in the NLRA which
makes unilateral rejection of a collective bargaining agreement an unfair labour
20Sec. 365 (as affected by sec. 1113) of the Code.
2111 U.S.C. sec. 507(b) (1982). A reorganisation plan may not be approved unless each daimant
receives consideration with a present value at least equal to the amount the claimant would receive in
liquidation under Chapter 7 (11 U.S.C. sec. 1129 (1982)).
Questions arise when such payments are made after the commencement of proceedings based on
the length of employment including pie-bankruptcy service. See Phillip I. Blumberg, 'United States Report
(Symposium on the Protection of Workers' Rights in the Event of Insolvency and Business Reorganization),
5 Conn. J. Int'l L 7, 11(1989).
From this amount is deducted the aggregate amount paid to such persons under the third priority,
plus the amount paid by the debtor's estate for the benefit of such employees under another benefit plan.
Pension benefits present complex problems which fall outside the scope of this study, particularly, the
statutory obligations imposed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1978 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.
sec. 1001 (1982), a particularly complex statute.
24See, e.g., Rosalind Rosenberg, 'Bankruptcy and the Collective Bargaining Agreement - A Brief Lesson
in the Use of the Constitutional System of Checks and Balances,' 58 Am. Bankr. U. 293 (1984); T.
Haggard & M. Pulliam, Conflicts Between Labor Legislation and Bankn.iptcy Law (Philadelphia
1987)(lndustrial Research Unit, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania); Raymond N. Hulser, "The
Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements in Chapter 11 Reorganisations: The Need for Informed
Judicial Decisions,' 134 U. Pa L Rev. 1235 (1986); John Vian, 'The Rejection of Collective Bargaining
Agreements Since the 1984 Amendments: The Case Law under the New Bankruptcy Code sec. 1113,' 91
Corn. U. 252 (1986).
Sec. 365 of the Code.
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practice. In the 81/disco case, the Supreme Court by a narrow margin, accepted
a standard favouring the debtor to be applied when Courts decide that an unexpired
collective bargaining agreement can be rejected.27
 It held that the collective
agreement can be rejected if it "burdens' the debtor's estate, and if a balancing of the
equities favours rejection. The Court accepted the conditions that the employer must
have made reasonable efforts to renegotiate the agreement and show that such efforts
'are not likely to produce a prompt and satisfactory conclusion."28
In response to B//disco, Congress moved to protect the provisions of a
collective bargaining agreement, and enacted a restriction on a debtor's ability to reject
it. The statutory amendments introduced some element of participation in the
decision-making process: a debtor has to make a proposal to the union which
provides for " necessary modifications in the employees' benefits and protections that
are necessary to permit the reorganisation of the debtor and assuring that all creditors,
the debtor and all affected parties are treated fairly and equitabIy;"° the debtor must
supply relevant information necessary to evaluate the proposal; finally, the debtor must
confer in good faith in an attempt to reach mutually satisfactory modifications of the
agreement. A Court can approve rejection if it finds that a union has refused to accept
a proposal without "good cause,' and that the 'balance of equities clearly favors
rejection."3' Even though the legislative provisions recognise labour's legitimate
voice and the value of collective agreements, the threat which reorganisation
proceedings holds for collectively bargained provisions has not disappeared, and
remains a factor which influences the balance in employment relations.
29 U.S.C. sec. 158(d) (1982).
27NB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
281d at 525-526.
11 U.S.C. Sec. 1113 (Supp. III 1985).
30To determine "necessary' modifications, Courts have applied two standards. A stringent standard
which considers the short-term objective of preventing liquidation regards "necessary as synonymous with
"essential" See Wheeling Pittsburgh Corp. v. United Steel Workers of Amenca, 791 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir.
1986). Another standard which has been applied is more concerned with the long-term financial condition
of the debtor. See Tuck Drivers Local 807, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Carey Transportation, Inc., 816 F.2d
82 (2d Cir. 1987).
31 Sec. 1113(e) also provides that, during the period in which an agreement continues in effect, a Court
may authorise interim changes in an agreement with regard to wages, benefits and protections if it is
essential to the continuation of the debtor's business, or in order to avoid irreparable damage to the estate.
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Obligations of the transferor
1.	 Collective bargaining theory
Introduction
In the United States, unionised workers enjoy little protection in the event of a
transfer. The law gives employers a broad TM managerial prerogativeN and workers are
not regarded as parties to enterprise decision-making. The collective bargaining
framework within which unions operate limits union input and excludes meaningful
participation in decisions which may vitally affect employees. As a consequence,
corporate investment decisions leave unions unable to protect the employment
opportunities of their members. Among unions there is a feeling of frustration with
current labour law and with the fact that the labour movement cannot deal effectively
with the corporate world, mobility of capital and investment decisions. Capital
mobility, changes in corporate structure and workers' demands for participation
challenge the prevailing interpretation of labour laws and the viability of collective
bargaining.
Collective bargaining and the Wagner Act
The form of collective bargaining which has become the dominant mode of
labour dispute resolution is rooted in the National Labour Relations Act (NLRA)
which grants workers the right to bargain collectively over Nwages hours and other
terms and conditions of employment. 	 Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA renders an
employer's failure to bargain in good faith with the exclusive representative of its
employees an unfair labour practice.
The stated policy of Congress with the passing of the Wagner Act was to
reduce industrial conflict and to safeguard commerce by restoring equality of
32See Anthony Mazzocchi, former Vice President of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International
Union, 'Changing Economic Realities and the Changing Role of Unions, 11 N.Y.U. Rev, of L & Soc.
Change 7, 25 (1983).
29 U.S.C. secs. 151-169 (1982)
'29 U.S.C. sec. 158(d) (1982).
29 U.S.C. sec. 158(a)(5) (1982).
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bargaining power between employers and employees." Aggregations of economic
power on the side of employees were created, countervailing the existing power of
corporations to establish labour standards. 37 The primary purpose was to give
employees an effective voice, through collective bargaining, in determining the terms
and conditions of their empIoyment. Industrial democracy was central to the
rationale for unionisation and remained the most widely accepted justification for legal
protection of unions. For Senator Wagner, the denial or observance of the right to
bargain collectively meant the difference between despotism and democracy. 4° He
explained the principles underlying the requirement that the employer should be
required to recognise and bargain with a union as follows:
lhey were founded upon the accepted facts that we must have democracy in industry
as well as in government; that democracy in industry means fair participation by those
who work in the decisions vitally affecting their lives and livelihood; and that the workers
in our great mass production industries can enjoy this participation only if allowed to
organise and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing?'1
Collective bargaining as a means of participation centres around the duty to
bargain, the "performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representa-
tive of employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith" 42
 with
respect to certain topics. However, the legislative history of the NLRA was ambiguous
and vague regarding many particulars of the collective bargaining relationship
including the topics of bargaining which are described as "wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment." Throughout the history of the NLRA there has
been considerable controversy about which decisions are subject to the duty to
NLRA sec. 1, 29 u.s.c. sec. 151 (1982).
37Archibald Cox, "The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith," 71 Harv. L Rev. 1407 (1958).
Clyde W. Summers, industrial Democracy America's Unfulfilled Promise," 28 Clev. St. L Rev. 29, 34
(1979).
B. Meftzer, Labor Law: Cases, Materials & Problems 1117-18 (2d ed. Boston 1977).
40Christopher L Tomlins, The State and the Unions. Labor Relations, Law and the Organized Labor
Movement in America, 1880-1960 106 (Cambridge 1985).
41 M. Derber, The American Idea of Industrial Democracy, 1865-1965 321 (Urbana 1 970)(citing N.Y.
Times, April 13, 1937, at 20, col. 1).
42NLJA sec. 8(d), 29 U.S.C. sec. 158(d) (1982).
Arthibald Cox, "The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith," 71 Harv. L Rev. 1401, 1406 (1958)(with the
passing of the Wagner Act, no one attributed much significance to the imposition of a duty to bargain
collectively because it seemed doubtful whether so vague a duty could be enforced).
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bargain and the scope of bargaining has "long been a major battleground between
management and labour."" The ambiguity of section 8(a)(5) suggests that it may
not be possible to identify the Nperspectiveu from which legislation is enacted and to
apply the "perspective" to particular facts, without extra-statutory values and
assumptions inevitably contributing towards the result. One commentator remarked
that the Act was "profoundly ambivalent" and that it could be made to yield a number
of interpretations more or less consistent with a certain set of values and assump-
tions.
The values and assumptions which have influenced the law in the area of
business transfers can best be described by looking at the pluralist model of
management-labour relations. Against the background of this model judicial decisions
can be examined for the form and content which have been attributed to the
relationship between collective bargaining and management control. Moreover, the
pluralist model can provide for an evaluation and assessment of the scope and
function of collective bargaining as well as the extent and form of management control
in the workplace. 47 In the discussion which follows it will become clear how pluralist
values and assumptions find expression in collective bargaining law and influence the
nature of the relationship and the degree of shared decision-making between the
parties.
2.	 Application of collective bargaining theory in general
Categories of bargaining
In spite of the symbolic voluntarism associated with collective bargaining it is
evident that there are limits on the subject matters deemed suitable for shared
decision-making through the collective bargaining process. Only "legitimate interests"
"Peter E. Milispaugh, "Plant Closings and the Prospects for a Judicial Response," 8 J. Corp. L 483,
487 (1983).
45See Paul N. Cox, Ruminations on Statutory Interpretation in the Burger Court," 19 Val. U. L Rev. 287
(1984).
Paul N. Cox, 0n Debunking Labor Law Doctrine: A Review of James Atlesons Values and
Assumptions in American Labor Law," I Utah L Rev. 101, 105 (1985). See also Archibald Cox and John
1. Dunlop, "Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor Relations Board," 63 Harv. L Rev.
389, 391 (1950) with regard to the ambiguity of secs. 8(a)(5) and 9(a).
47See Andrew Goldsmith, The Management-Control Collective Bargaining Relationship: Three Models,
24 Osgoode Hall U. 775, 776 (1986) (models can have descriptive and normative significance).
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may be subject to negotiation by the parties and, although this can effectively
negate the mutuality of decision-making, it supports the pluralist view of limited
legitimate workplace conflict. By protecting a particular zone of permissive subjects
it is suggested that bargaining over certain issues may be costly or futile and unlikely
to serve the overall industrial welfare.49
The clearest doctrinal manifestation that management and labour are not really
co-equal parties, together formulating the rules of their joint governance, is the
distinction in American labour law between M mandatory and permissive subjects of
collective bargaining. The distinction is based upon the NLRA's compulsion of good
faith bargaining with regard to 'wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment." 50 In NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp. 51 the Court held that
the terms of the statute indicated mandatory subjects about which an employer and
union must bargain in good faith. Either party may insist on its position with regard
to these subjects and back it with the use of economic force. After bargaining to
impasse with regard to mandatory subjects, that is, after the parties have exhausted
the avenues of bargaining, an employer may unilaterally implement pre-impasse offers
or proposals. In the case of all subjects not covered by the statutory terms, the so
called permissive subjects, the law forbids insistence to impasse and the use of
economic force. 52 This means that an employer can act unilaterally without
bargaining and the union cannot strike to protest the action.
The distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining
results in limiting the participation of employees in collective negotiations to establish
working conditions. Many decisions which imperil or destroy the job security of
'R. Hyman, Pluralism, Procedural Consensus and Collective Bargaining," 16 Brit. J. Indus. Rel. 16, 33
(1978).
'See, e.g., Brooks Scanlon, Inc., 246 NLRB 4766 (1979). See also First National Maintenance Coip.
v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 678 (1981).
50NLRA sec. 8(a)(5) and 8(d), 29 U.S.C. sec. 158(a)(5) and 158(d)(1982). Sec. 8(d) was added to the
NLRA in 1947 by the Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Haitley) Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. sec. 141 et seq.
(1982). Congress rejected an attempt to confine collective bargaining to a narrow list of statutory subjects
and delegated the task of defining "terms and conditions" to the National Labour Relations Board and the
Courts. See H.R. Rep. No. 245, BOth cong., 1st Sess. 49, 71 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, Legislative
History of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947 (Washington D.C. 1948).
51 NIJB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
See generally R.Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law: Unionization and Collective Bargaining 496-98
(St. Paul 1976).
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employees are solely for management and there is no sure way to draw the
dividing line between exclusive management prerogatives and subjects concerning
wages, hours and conditions. Crucial subjects of industrial governance such as
corporate transformations and capital investment and disinvestment decisions may be
more important to employees than wages or hours of work. Nevertheless, Courts
have held that most of these decisions are beyond the scope of employee participa-
tion through collective bargaining and are vested in the exclusive discretion of
management. Employers are immunised from bargaining and the threat of work
stoppage over permissive subjects such as plant closures, the sale of part or all of
the enterprise, or joining a conglomerate.57
The dichotomy between mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining
reflects a belief that there is some untouchable core of entrepreneurial sovereignty that
is beyond the reach of compulsory collective bargaining. It suggests that
employees have not been accepted as full partners in the enterprise s
 and that those
with property rights -- that is, employers -- can exercise them as they see fit. Contrary
to the pluralist model's apparent support of an equivalence of bargaining power and
the joint authorship of rules, the reality shows an asymmetrical power relationship
between management and employees in which employee participation is limited.6°
The scope of participation is still narrower than the mandatory subjects would
suggest. Although a subject is a "term and condition of employment" an employer can
bargain for a "management prerogatives" clause which gives the employer unilateral
Fibreboard v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 220 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
See the discussion of Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203(1964) and First National Maintenance
Coip. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) below.
RoyaI Typewriter Co. v. NLRB, 533 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1976); cf. Brockway Motor Trucks v. NI..RB, 582
F.2d 720 (3rd Cir. 1978) (plant closing held not to be a mandatory subject of bargaining).
United Auto Workers v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C.Cir. 1972).
571A.M. v. Northeast Airlines, Inc. .473 F.2d 549 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S. 845 (1972).
Theodore J. St. Antoine, "Federal Regulation of the Workplace in the Next Half Century," Chi.-Kent
L Rev. 631, 645 (1985).
Clyde W. Summers, "Industrial Democracy. America's Unfulfilled Promise," 28 Clev. St. L Rev. 29, 41
(1979).
60Karl E. Klare, "The Quest for Industrial Democracy and the Struggle Against Racism: Perspectives from
Labor Law and Civil Rights Law," 61 Or. L Rev. 157, 171 (1982).
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control over certain working conditions during the contract term.61 Even manage-
ment rights clauses which are so broad that they would leave employees under a
collective agreement Nifl no better state than they were without it have been held to
be proper. The employer can lock out the employees until the union agrees to a
management rights clause and in this way uses its economic strength to limit
participation to an area smaller than that described by the statute. The union,
however, cannot use its economic strength to expand the area of participation beyond
that described by the statute.M
The distinction between mandatory and permissive bargaining subjects has
implications for an employer's right to initiate unilateral changes in operations without
satisfying the bargaining obligation. Under the rule formulated in NLRB v. Katz,65
unilateral action with respect to a mandatory subject is a per se violation of the duty
to bargain because it directly obstructs or inhibits the actual process of dis-
cussion... .' The Court believed that unilateral changes, without notice to the union
and an opportunity to bargain about them, were so disruptive of orderly negotiations
as to constitute a refusal to confer at all. 67 Permissive subjects do not qualify for the
same protection. In Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers of America v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., Chemical Division the Supreme Court held that, since health insurance
benefits for retired workers was a permissive subject of bargaining with the union
representing current workers, the employer was not obliged to maintain such benefits,
61 NLRB v. American Nat'! Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 409-10 (1952).
White v. NLRB, 255 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1958). But see NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mig. Co., 205 F.2d 131,
135 (1st Cir. 1953) (held improper where the employer did not make some reasonable effort in some
direction).
CIyde W. Summers, 'Worker Participation in the US and West Germany: A Comparison from an
American Perspective, 28 Amer. J. Comp. L 367, 382 (1980).
Mid, at 382.
NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
MId. at 747.
67The Katz case involved a unilateral change in working conditions which took the form of a grant of
new benefits but the employer has also been held to violate its duty to bargain when employees were
deprived of benefits already in existence. See, e.g., Molders Local 155 v. NLRB (United States Pipe &
Foundiy Co.), 442 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
AJIied Chemical & Alkali Workers of America v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Chemical Division, 404
U.s. 157 (1971).
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even while the parties' contract was still operative. The employer is therefore free
to modify existing terms or practices on non-mandatory subjects without negotiating
with the union or securing its consent. A basic question raised by the distinction
between mandatory and permissive subjects is the extent to which Courts were
authorised to intervene in negotiations between employers and unions. Pluralist
collective bargaining theory places much emphasis on the private character of
negotiations which result in a compromise among legitimately conflicting interests.
The strategies and relative bargaining strengths of the private parties determine the
final compromise and government is supposed to play a minimal role in regulating the
negotiation process as such. It has been stated repeatedly that the basic theory of the
National Labour Relations Act was that Nthe arrangement of substantive terms and
conditions of employment was a private responsibility from which the government
should stand apart."7°
Pluralist explanations of the relationship between private negotiation and public
intervention are not without contradictions. For example, 80k and Dunlop insist that
the nature of the institution of collective bargaining is chiefly shaped by the parties
themselves7' and go on to add that the collective bargaining process defines the
subjects to be settled by collective bargaining. At the same time they have to admit
that the law in the United States defines the subjects that must be bargained about.
They explain this contradiction in terms of the function of law to respond to strains and
to contain antagonisms within reasonable bounds. Underlying this explanation is an
idea of industrial peace which is biased towards the preservation of employer interests.
Bok and Dunlop, displaying a fear that employers will be made too vulnerable to the
will of labour unions, claim that the employer has to be protected from a bargaining
ld. at 186-88. The repudiation or modification of a contract term which constitutes a permissive
subject of bargaining may, however, be a breach of contract for which the injured party might have another
remedy, such as a suit for damages. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. at 186-87 ([ojnce parties have
made a collective bargaining contract the enforcement of that contract should be left to the usual processes
of the law and not to the National Labor Relations Board).
70A. Cox, D. Bok & R. Gorman, Labor Law: Cases & Materials 84 (8th ed. Mineola, New York 1977);
see also Archibald Cox, The Right to Engage In Concerted Activity, 26 md. L J. 319, 322-23 (1951). The
classic statement of this view is the oft-repeated quotation from the legislative histoty of the Wagner Act
When the employees have chosen their organization, when they have selected their representa-
tives, all the bill proposes to do is to escort them to the door of their employer and say, Here they
are, the legal representatives of your employees. What happens behind those doors is not
inquired into, and the bill does not seek to inquire into it.
79 Cong. Rec. 7660 (1935)(statement of Senator Walsh).
71 Derek C. Bok and John 1. Dunlop, Labor and the American Community 226 (New York 1970).
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process which "reaches into the details of his business, seeking to regulate every
aspect of working conditions in his plant."72
The pluralist theory maintains an extraordinary balance between the "private"
and "public" aspects of industrial decision-making. While insisting upon the private,
semi-autonomous character of the industrial relations system, activism by the judiciary
is regarded as necessary to serve the public interest in industrial peace. More
concealed is the fact that judicial intervention supports existing relations of production
and management practices. 73 Within this framework workers are effectively denied
participation in the development and implementation of important industrial strategies.
The complex justification for the public/private distinction serves to lead the
focus away from an important perspective of the role of law in the labour market. As
Professor Summers has shown, the posture of government neutrality is a departure
from the Congressional goal of affirmatively encouraging collective bargaining.74
Collective bargaining was a "private process constructed to serve public purposes",
namely the promotion of industrial democracy and the equalisation of bargaining
power.75
 In terms of these social claims, the legal rules developed by the Courts to
circumscribe the concepts of mandatory and permissive bargaining do not express or
implement the premises and purposes of the statute. On the contrary, these rules lead
to a disparagement of the collective bargaining process.
Effect
With regard to permissive subjects of bargaining which impact on employee
wages, hours, terms and conditions of employment, an employer is required to
bargain with the union over the effects of the decision. 76 Effects-bargaining focuses
on a decision's impact on the workforce and encompasses matters such as transfer
Id. at 213.
731n this sense private autonomy is maximized and individual entitlements are protected to the same
extent as under a common law regime. See Professor Epstein's plea for the scrapping of labour legislation
in favour of the adoption of a common law regime relying upon toil and contract law. Richard A. Epstein,
"A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 Yale U. 1357
(1983).
74Clyde W. Summers, "Past Premises. Present Failures, and Future Needs in Labor Legislation," 31
Buffalo L Rev. 9, 17 (1982).
751d. at 13.
76See, e.g., NL.RB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191(3rd Cir. I 965); Genera! Motors Coip.
v. NL.RB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Adams Diary, 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965)
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rights to other jobs or locations, retraining, severance pay, seniority, retirement and
medical benefits. Effects-bargaining, unlike decision-bargaining, is concerned solely
with the effects of employer decisions on the welfare of employees and does not bring
into question the prudence of the employer's decision!' Under effects-bargaining
the union cannot require management to consider union-suggested alternatives to the
decision itself.78
The effects-bargaining duty places some burdens on the employer. To lend
force to effects-bargaining, the Act has been interpreted to require the employer to
provide Nreasonable and timely notice"79 and to produce data and information
relevant to its decision. 8° The problem is, however, that the employer's decision is
treated as a fait accompli and that a duty to bargain over effects attaches only after
the decision has already been made. 81 Strikes over the effects of managerial
decisions are recognized as lawful, protected activity.82 However, a union will often
not be inclined to use its economic weapons during bargaining over the effects of a
decision, since a strike would have little impact, for example where workers withhold
labour at a time when the employer plans to cease giving them work. The union will
not be able to inflict economic damage on the employer and it is unlikely that the
employer will make concessions on the effects of the closure. Where decisions
such as terminations impact harshly on workers' lives, effects-bargaining will do little
to make the change more palatable. In one case, the Board has acknowledged that
[tjhe effects are so inextricably interwoven with the decision itself that bargaining
limited to effects will not be meaningful if it must be carried on within a framework of
See R. Swift, NLRB and Managerial Decision-Making 4-5 (The Wharton School Industrial Relations
Unit, University of Pennsylvania, Labor Relations & Public Policy Series, Rep. No. 9, 1974).
78Id at 5.
79See, e.g., NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Aluminum Tubular Coip.,
299 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1962).
80See, e.g., NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
v. National Car Rental Sys., 672 F.2d 1182, 1188 (3d Cit. 1982).
82A union has a right to bargain to impasse and strike over a mandatory subject of bargaining.
Janice R. Bellace, Employment Protection in the EEC, 20 Stan. J. Int'l Law 413, 415 n. 13 (1985).
Professor Bellace notes that statutory rights available to European workers far exceed the level of protection
afforded to workers in the U.S. under the duty to bargain over the effects of a decision. Id. at 416.
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a decision which cannot be revised."
Disclosure
As part of the duty to bargain in good faith, the Board and the Courts have
required the employer to provide the union with information relating to mandatory
subjects of bargaining. Wage or wage-related data are presumed to be relevant to the
union's functions as collective bargaining agent and the employer cannot raise a
defence of confidentiality. However, the Supreme Court has rejected a rule which
would automatically result in a finding of bad-faith bargaining whenever the employer
relects a request for relevant information and has declared that such a finding turns
upon the 'circumstances of the particular case.
With regard to information other than wage or wage-related data, the union has
a burden to prove the information's relevance to a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining. 87 Information beyond the scope of the presumption of relevance includes
management-related information such as production costs, market prospects, or the
profitability of the firm. Unless the employer relies on this kind of information to
justify its bargaining position, requests for management-related data are generally
denied on the ground that such data is not necessary for 'intelligent bargaining.'°
There is no detailed analysis of this concept, but the approach of the Board and the
Courts indicates acceptance of management's claim for a need to conduct business
84Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 NLRB 561, 570 (1966).
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 746, 754 (6th dr. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 971
(1964).
NLRB v. Truilt Manufacturing Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153 (1956). In certain circumstances an employer
can therefore avoid the duty to disclose by showing, for example, that the information is of minimal value
to the union. See, e.g., NLRB v. Clegg, 304 F.2d 168, 176 (8th Cir. 1962).
87Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61, 69 (3d Cir. 1964).
Leslie K. Shedlin, 'Regulation of Disclosure of Economic and Financial Data and the Impact on the
American System of Labor-Management Relations, 41 Ohio St. U. 441, 445-50 (1980).
NLRB v. Truitt Manufacturing Co., 351 U.S. 149, 151 (1956).
90Leslie K. Shedkn, 'Regulation of Disclosure of Economic and Financial Data and the Impact on the
American System of Labor-Management Relations,' 41 Ohio St. U. 441,451(1980) quoting Teleprompter
Corp. v. NLRB, 570 F.2d 4, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1977); United Furniture Workers v. NLRB, 388 F.2d 880, 883 (4th
Cir. 1967); International Woodworkers v. NLRB, 263 F.2d 483, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
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free from union interference. Since the Supreme Court decision in Detroit Edison9'
the employer defence of confidentiality has been accepted more widely. To
accommodate the company's interest in maintaining the security of a test for
promotion selection, the Court held that the company had a legitimate interest in
refusing to disclose test questions. In this case the Court took the further step to try
to determine alternative means to provide the union with the requested data while still
protecting the employer's interests and ordered that the test questions of the aptitude
test be released solely to a psychologist and not directly to the union.
In the US employees have access to reports which employers are required to
file with government agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programmes and the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration. In terms of the Freedom of Information Act any record within
the control of a federal agency is accessible upon the request of any person.
However, the information which can be gleaned from these reports is usually not
enough to give unions a picture of the company's plans and the situation has not
been improved by the legal constraints upon the duty to disclose. The considerations
that have defined the scope of the duty to disclose, like the dichotomy between
mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining, reflect a management prerogatives
rationale. By restricting the scope of information in this way, there is little consider-
ation of potential benefits of a freer flow of information such as the possibility that
access to information can promote rational and informed decision-making. Unions
need information to form an informed and realistic appraisal of the situation and to
bargain for the most suitable allocation of available resources. True mutuality of
interest and meaningful participation by employees can only develop when employees
have enough information on the viability of the enterprise to consider the security of
both the workers and the plant.
91 Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979).
The Freedom of Information Act was enacted in 1966 (and amended in 1974 and 1976) as a portion
of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. sec. 551 et seq. (1976).
Leslie K. Shedlin, "Regulation of Disclosure of Economic and Financial Data and the Impact on the
American System of Labor-Management Relations," 41 Ohio St. U. 441, 452 (1980).
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3.	 Application of collective bargaining theory - business transfers
Type of transaction
Transfers of business, like other changes which affect the structure of a
business, may have harsh results for employees such as transferring, replacing or
reducing the number of employees. Transfers and other company reorganisations
such as subcontracting of bargaining unit work to be performed off the premises,
complete or partial closures or plant relocations may threaten employee job security
or working conditions. The ultimate concern in all cases regarding structural changes
in business is to find a balance between an employer's right to manage a business
against the effects of employer decisions upon employees.
While Courts have on occasion limited their holdings to a specific type of
management decision, 95
 the categories are often not clear and the Board and Courts
have run into difficulties in attempts to define the boundaries of a particular business
change. Where Courts have limited their holdings to specific situations, the
proposed standards often reach a much broader range of cases involving manage-
ment decisions that have a substantial impact on the continued availability of
employment. ... Categorisation is often difficult because many transactions contain
elements of subcontracting, relocations, liquidations or closures in addition to mergers
or consolidations.
Considerable disagreement remains as to the extent to which certain employer
Transfer can occur through merger, sale of assets, loss of a renewable contract, incorporation of a
formerly unincorporated entity, dissolution, bankruptcy and lease. See Jonathan F. Silver, Reflections on
the Obligations of a Successor Employer, 2 Cardozo L Rev. 545 (1981).
See NLRB v. First National Maintenance Corp., 452 U.S. 666, 686 n. 22 (1981)(in deciding a case
involving a partial closing decision, the Court stated that '[i]n this opinion we of course intimate no view as
to other types of management decisions, such as plant relocations, sales, other kinds of subcontracting,
automation, etc., which are to be considered on their particular facts).
See, e.g., Bob's Big Boy Family Restaurants, 264 NLRB 1369, 1371 (1982), where an employer
decided to shut down its shrimp preparation department, lay of its shrimp-processing employees, and
purchase shrimp processed by a food supplier. The majority of the NLRB found the employer's action to
be a subcontract whereas the dissent thought it was a partial shut-down.
97First National Maintenance Corp. V. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 676 (1981).
The difficulty in distinguishing between various types of transformations has been noted in, e.g.,
Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Board, 417 U.S. 249, 257 (1974) citing Golden State
Bottling Co., 414 U.S. 168, 182-3 n. 5 (1973). The Court stated that ordinarily there is no basis for
distinguishing among mergers, consolidations or purchases of assets in the analysis of successorship
problems.... Fail River Dyeing and Finishing Corp., 107 S.Ct. 2225, 2234 (1987) referred to the wide variety
of corporate transformations possible.
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actions constitute unlawful conduct. For this reason, an employer's bargaining duty
in the case of business transfers will be considered against Board and Court decisions
which concern an employer's bargaining duties with respect to a variety of substantial
business transformations.
Duty to bargain
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.
In one of the first cases to consider the closure of two facilities and subcon-
tracting of the operations, the NLRB stated categorically that an employer may
"change his business structure, sell or contract a portion of his operations or make any
like change" without consultation with the employees' represerltative. 10° Following
this decision, the Board in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. concluded that bargaining
was not required with regard to an "economically motivated decision to subcontract
maintenance operations. "°1 This view was reconsidered in Town and Countiy
Manufacturing Co. ,102 after which the Board reversed its initial holding in Fibreboard
and held that the employer's economic decision to subcontract unit work was a
mandatory subject of bargaining under section 8(a)(5). 103 The NLRB ordered the
employer to resume the maintenance operation, reinstate the employees laid off, and
fulfill its statutory obligation to bargain. The decision was affirmed by the Supreme
Court, although confined to the particular circumstances presented in the case.1°4
In Fibreboard the employer subcontracted maintenance work previously
performed by bargaining unit employees, replacing them with workers of an
See Michael C. Harper, Leveling the Road from Borg-Warner to First National Maintenance: The
Scope of Mandatory Bargaining," 68 Va L Rev. 1447 (1982); B. Murphy, "Plant Relocation and the
Collective Bargaining Obligation," 59 N.C.L Rev. 5 (1980).
'Mahoning Mining Co., 61 NLRB 792 (1945).
'°1 Fibre board Paper Products Corp., 130 NLRB 1558(1961), reversed, 138 NLRB 550(1962), enforced,
322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963), affirmed, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). The Board initially found an employer's
unilateral subcontracting not mandatory because the subcontract replaced all employees in the bargaining
unit. The Board explained that the decision was not concerned with the conditions of employment of
employees within an existing bargaining unit; it involves, rather, the question whether the employment
relationship still exists". The Board's decision placed the duty to bargain in the hands of employers who
can avoid the duty by replacing a whole bargaining unit.
102Town and Country Manufacturing Co., 136 NLRB 1022(1962), enforced, 316 F.2d 846(5th Cir. 1963).
'°138 NLRB 550 (1962), enforced, 322 F.2d 411 (D.C.Cir. 1963).
104379 U.S. 203 (1964).
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independent contractor. The Supreme Court held that subcontracting was a matter
of "vital concernN to management and labour and therefore a mandatory subject of
bargaining. In reaching its conclusion the Court looked at industrial bargaining
practices and found that experience illustrated that subcontracting had been brought
"widely and successfully within the collective bargaining framework.' While the
Court 's approach seemed to create an expandable, flexible and adaptable standard
to fit an evolving system of collective bargaining, '06
 the Court emphasised that its
decision was not intended to expand the scope of mandatory bargaining. The
company 's decision to subcontract the maintenance work did not alter the company's
basic approach or involve capital investment. Under these circumstances the
bargaining requirement "would not significantly abridge [the employer 's] freedom to
manage his business. '107 The Court expressly stated that this ultimate test for
determining whether an issue was mandatory would not lead to the same result in
"other forms of ... subcontracting which arise daily in our complex economy."'°8
Justice Stewart, in an influential concurring opinion, reiterated that subcontracting
decisions were not as a general rule subject to the mandatory duty to bargain. He
acknowledged that various issues of job security traditionally required bargaining, but
regarded managerial decisions which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control as falling
outside the scope of the requirement. 1 °9 Among the decisions which he viewed as
the prerogatives of private business management were those concerning Nthe
commitment of investment capital and the basic scope of the enterprise.N0
In contrast to the result reached in this case, imposing on management the
duty to bargain over a subcontracting decision, the rationale used by both the majority
and concurrence in arriving at that result considered the importance of preserving
managerial freedom in accordance with the purpose of the Act. The majority referred
to the Act's purpose of promoting industrial peace through negotiation, 11 ' but limited
'°51d. at 203.
' 06Clyde W. Summers, "Labor Law in the Supreme Court 1964 Term," 75 Yale U. 59, 62 (1965).
107379 U.S. at 213.
at 215.
'°91d. at 222.
"°Id. at 223.
at 223.
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negotiation to matters which would leave the freedom to manage the business
untouched. 112
 Similarly, the concurrence expressly held that the Act was not
intended to give union a voice in issues involving prerogatives of management and
explained this conclusion as follows:
That path would mark a sharp departure from the traditional principles of a free
enterprise economy. Whether we should follow it is, within constitutional limitations, for
Congress to choose. But it is a path which Congress certainly did not choose when it
enacted the Taft-Hartley Act.""3
The Fibreboard case, far from envisaging greater participation for organised labour,
preserved management's freedom to run the business enterprise.
Dat/in gton Manufacturing Co.
After Fibreboard the boundaries of managerial freedom remained elusive.
Drawing distinctions between decisions affecting job security that did not significantly
abridge the freedom to manage and decisions involving a basic alteration of capital
investment was difficult. The concept of managerial freedom formed the basis for the
Court's decision in Dat/in gton Manufacturing Co. h14 Although the case did not deal
primarily with a violation of an employer's bargaining duty, but with the discriminatory
discharge of employees to discourage membership in a labour organisation," 5 it
can be argued that the Supreme Court's decision has been of importance in relation
to the duty to bargain over plant closures. Following a union victory at a textile mill,
the board of directors decided to dissolve the corporation, liquidate its assets and
close the plant. The union filed charges against the corporation alleging unlawful
discrimination" 6
 and a refusal to bargain." 7 Darlington argued that as an
employer it had an absolute right to "go out of business for whatever reason it may
choose, and regardless of whether union animosity may have contributed to the
at 213.
" 31d. at 225-6.
"4Oarlington Manufacturing Co., 139 NLRB 241 (1962), enforcement denied, 325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir.
1963), vacated and remanded, 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
11529 U.s.c. sec. 158(a)(3) makes this an unfair labour practice.
"6Under sec. 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3).
lllUnder sec. 8(a)(5). This charge was predicated upon a violation of sec. 8(a)(3).
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decision."118 This proposition was accepted by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit: "To go out of business in toto, or to discontinue it in part permanently at any
time, we think was Darlington's absolute prerogative."119
The Supreme Court adopted a similar approach to an employer's property
right: "an employer has the absolute right to terminate his entire business for any
reason he pleases"° and rejected the proposition Nthat a single businessman
cannot choose to go out of business if he wants to."' 21
 In finding that the closure
of an entire business was not an unfair labour practice even if the liquidation was
motivated by vindictiveness towards the union, the Court took into account that the
action yielded no future benefit for the employer.' However, a partial closure is
proscribed if it is motivated by a purpose to impair unionism in any of the remaining
plants of a single employer and the employer may reasonably have foreseen that the
closure would be likely to have that effect.123
Not only is the decision to close a plant because of anti-union animus not an
unfair labour practice, according to the Supreme Court in Darlington, but an employer
is also not required to bargain concerning a purely business decision to terminate his
enterprise. This seems to be the most likely construction of a rather vague statement
by the Court regarding the duty to bargain' 24
 and after the decision in First National
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB' 25 the only possible interpretation.'
11813 NLRB at 245.
1195 F.2d at 685.
120380 U.S. at 268.
121 1d at 270.
1 ld. at 271-2.
' 231d at 274-5.
124The Court referred to the Board's finding that Daiiington's failure to bargain was a violation of the
Act and continued: "Such finding was in part based upon the determination that the plant dosing was an
unfair labor practice, and no argument is made that section 8(a)(5) requires an employer to bargain
concerning a purely business decision to terminate his enterprise. 380 U.S. at 267 n. 5.
125452 U.S. 666 (1981).
1251t can be argued that since the reasoning in First National Maintenance pertaining to partial closures
applies with even greater force to decisions resulting in the complete closure of a facility, decision-
bargaining in complete closure situations will not be required.
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First National Maintenance Corp.
In First National Maintenance the discontinuation of part of a business was held
not to be part of the terms and conditions of employment which required bargain-
ing.127 First National Maintenance Corporation discontinued its maintenance
operations at one site, which resulted in the dismissal of a significant number of
employees. The corporation contended that since the decision was economically
motivated, it was not required to bargain. The Supreme Court agreed. In support of
this conclusion the Court cited the basic policy underlying the NLRA, namely "the
establishment and maintenance of industrial peace to preserve the flow of interstate
commerce", primarily through "the promotion of collective bargaining as a method of
diffusing and channeling conflict between labour and management." 128 The Court
accepted the pluralist assumption that there is a public interest common to a plurality
of interest groups within a society and stated that "the concept of mandatory
bargaining is premised on the belief that collective discussions will result in decisions
that are better for both management and labour and for society as a whole." 3° It
is interesting to consider the Court's decision against the background of the basic
pluralist perspective which it adopted initially. A careful analysis of the reasoning
reveals the basic paradox which occurs regularly in the pluralist perspective, resulting
in a restrictive approach towards collective bargaining.
The demand that the interests of all the parties be served through collective
bargaining required, according to the Court, that the subject proposed for discussion
had to be "amenable to resolution through the bargaining process." 31
 Underlying
this requirement is the suggestion that collective bargaining should occur only in those
instances where a widespread basic consensus exists which may yield to a
compromise. Where the interests of the parties diverge to the extent that their mutual
concerns or common pursuit are not immediately obvious, union interests have to
surrender to accommodate managerial prerogative. The Court in First National
1272 U.S. 666, 686 (1981).
1281d at 686.
1 See A.Flanders and H.A. Clegg, The System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain 318, 322 (Oxford
1954).
°452 U.S. 666, 678 (1981).
131 452 U.S. 666, 678 (1981).
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Maintenance gave paramount importance to an employer's need to operate freely in
deciding whether to shut down part of its business. Justice Blackmun accepted the
prerogatives over industrial change that employers enjoyed at common law without
giving sufficient explanation why employee statutory rights must yield to them.1
The worst possible outcome of negotiations within a pluralist framework is that
the agenda of collective bargaining will be tilted so favourably towards employer
interests that the little weight granted to employee interests will allow workers no room
to operate or to command any power. When this repressive result is imposed from
outside by the Court on the parties' collective bargaining relationship, as was the case
in First National Maintenance, even the illusion which unions may have of being
treated fairly can no longer be maintained. The Court based its rationale upon a
balancing test which was explained in the following terms:
[l]n view of an employer's need for unencumbered decision making, bargaining over
management decisions that have a substantial impact on the continued availability of
employment should be required only if the benefit ,for labour-management relations and
the collective bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the
business.'1
Applying this test to an economically-motivated decision to shut down part of a
business, the Court found that the harm which an employer was likely to suffer from
a mandatory bargaining duty, outweighed the Incremental benefit TM of union
participation in making the decision.
The balancing of interests in First National Maintenance took place with the
scales tilted heavily towards employer interests.' 	 Labour's interest in job security
was mentioned	 but the Court argued that it was adequately protected by
The origins of the concept of entrepreneurial property rights have been traced back to the late
nineteenth century. Haggai Hurvitz, American Labor Law and the Doctrine of Entrepreneurial Property
Rights: Boycotts, Courts, and the Juridical Reorientation of 1886-1895,' 8 lnd. Rel. L J. 307 (1986). See
also H. Wellington, Labor and the Legal Process 87 (New York 1968)(the theory [of management
prerogative] is a modern day rationalization of the views of the judges in the conspiracy cases. As such,
it has been rejected by the theories...and the policy goals of the Labor-Management Relations Act).
1 See Derek C. Bok and John T. Dunlop, Labor and the American Communify 223 (New York
1970)('the sense of participation through bargaining serves to mitigate the fear of exploitation on the past
of the workers).
134452 U.S. 666, 679 (1981).
1 The asymmetries involved in the Court's bargaining test have been convincingly revealed in Richard
Litvin, 'Fearful Asymmetry Employee Free Choice and Employer Profitability in First National Maintenance,
58 md. U. 433(1983). Professor Litvin pointed out that the test, as articulated and applied, counted the
burden of mandatory bargaining On management twice.
136452 U.S. 666, 681-82 (1981).
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mandatory effects-bargaining and by permissive decision-bargaining. 137
 The
possibility that unions could make helpful suggestions which could result in delaying
or halting the closure was acknowledged, but the Court indicated that it was unlikely
that decision-bargaining, in addition to effects-bargaining would augment the flow of
information and suggestions.' In sum, the Court showed a reluctance to consider
any benefits to labour that would result from mandatory bargaining and insisted that
such benefits would accrue without enforcing the statutory requirement to bargain'
In considering the burdens of mandatory bargaining on management, the Court
was concerned that the union's use of economic weapon's could thwart a closure,
should mandatory bargaining be imposed 14° thereby forgetting that strikes may in
any event occur as incidents of effects-bargaining. More important, the
characterisation of strikes as a burden on management disregards the statutory
collective bargaining framework which rests on the premise that parties may resort to
economic weapons to protect their perceived self-interest.' 4' A central principle of
the NLRA is the right of employees to engage in concerted activity to protect their
mutual interests.'42
Other burdens on management which the Court included in the bargaining test
contributed further to the insulation of managerial interests at the expense of employee
rights. These burdens were phrased in broad terms and applied by the Court without
careful consideration of the facts and regardless of limitations or exceptions. In
sweeping language, the Supreme Court significantly limited the class of mandatory
subjects, leaving some of an employer's most crucial decisions beyond the reach of
the union's power to compel bargaining. According to the Court, a bargaining
requirement would unduly burden the conduct of a business where management
needed speed, flexibility and secrecy in meeting business opportunities and
exigencies or where economic factors other than labour costs contributed significantly
' 371d. at 677 n. 15.
d. at 681.
1 Id. at 681 n.19.
' 401d. at 681.
' 41 See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union 361 U.S. 477, 488-89, 495 (1960).
' 42 Employees shall have the right...to engage in...concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. 29 U.S.C. sec. 157 (1982).
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to the decision to close."3 The Courts solicitude with regard to management's
need for speed and secrecy is not supported by the facts in First National Mainten-
ance since the decision to terminate cleaning and maintenance services did not
require secrecy, and costly delays from bargaining were unlikely. 1 " The danger is
that the Court has created a precedent whereby employers, by using the maxim of
"speed, flexibility and secrecy" will be able to avoid bargaining and preclude a careful
scrutiny of the facts.145
The same danger lurks in the Court's statement that bargaining would unduly
burden management where economic factors other than labour costs contributed to
a decision to close. Immediate economic constraints which are beyond the union's
power to influence may render bargaining futile. However, the factual determination
of instances of futile bargaining is very important. If employees can make concessions
sufficient to prevent a closure, bargaining should not be precluded." A conclusion
that bargaining would be futile should be made only in extreme cases after careful
consideration of the facts and with due deference to the statutory commitment to
collective bargaining as a means of communication over "problems of vital concern
to labour and management.""7
The application of the broad standards set by the Court in First National
Maintenance in diverse circumstances has lead to a narrowing of the scope of
mandatory bargaining and the erosion of crucial bargaining rights. A good example
of the restrictive application of the standards to the facts of a particular case can be
found in the leading case of Otis Elevator Co.' in which the NLRB split three ways.
"3452 U.S. 666, 682 (1981).
'"In Note, "The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 Harv. L Rev. 91, 334 n. 33(1981) it is pointed out that
FNM's financial difficulties did not arise suddenly. It could have given sufficient advance notice to the union
to avoid costly delays caused by bargaining. Moreover, even if bargaining delayed the closing FNM stood
to lose only a relatively small amount compared to the loss of jobs by employees.
145K. Van Wezel Stone, "Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and Emerging
Possibilities," 55 U. Chi. L Rev. 73, 94 (1988) argues that mandatory bargaining after First National
Maintenance will be determined by an employer's characterization of the reasons tot its decisions and
therefore by the employer's subjective state.
"3See Note, "The Supreme Court, 1980 Term," 95 Harv. L Rev. 91,338 n. 55 (1981) for the suggestion
that concessions by the union might have solved FNM's economic difficulties. See also Note, "Mandatory
Bargaining and the Disposition of Closed Plants," 95 Harv. LR. 1896, 1904 (1981) regarding substantial
concessions offered by multiplant unions.
147Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964).
"3Otis Elevator Co., 269 NLRB 891 (1984).
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The majority stated that a determination of a decision as a mandatory subject of
bargaining depended on whether it turns upon a change in the nature or direction of
the business or turns upon labour costs. However, it was suggested that even if
labour costs were an important factor in an employer's decision, bargaining would
not be required if the decision Nturn[ed] upon a significant change in the nature or
direction of a business. 49 In a separate concurring opinion NLRB Member Dennis
maintained a two-phase analysis, consisting of a determination of amenability to
collective bargaining and a balancing test. According to her, a decision was
uamenable to resolution through the collective bargaining process if the employer's
decision was motivated by any factor over which the union has controI.No If the
decision is amenable to the bargaining process, the balancing test of the Supreme
Court in First National Maintenance is applied. This means in effect that the
mandatory nature of a management decision is determined by the employer's reasons
for the decision. 151 NLRB Member Zimmerman's opinion held out slightly more
hope for unions. He argued for a broader notion of NamenabilityN which would be
based on an employer's overall costs, not merely labour costs. According to him,
should a decision be amenable to bargaining, then the benefits outweigh the burdens
unless an employer proves that the circumstances present additional burdens such
as a need for speed, secrecy or flexibility. However, in the particular case he found
that the company's reasons for relocating were not amenable to resolution through
bargaining.
The reason for the balancing test in First National Maintenance, emphasised
also in Otis EIevator, was to insulate managerial freedom from uncertainty 10 the
extent essential for the running of a profitable business." In formulating its
balancing test, the Court lost sight of the fact that many established mandatory
subjects of bargaining are as important for running a profitable business as a partial
149!d. at 893-4.
' 50!d. at 897.
' 51 NIJB Member Dennis admitted as much in a discussion of the case. Patricia Diaz Dennis,
"Principles That Guide My Decision-making," 15 Stetson L Rev. 13, 17 (1985).
'269 NLRB 891, 900-901 (1984).
Id. at 892, citing First National Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 678-79.
154452 U.S. 666, 678-9 (1981).
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closure decision. There is some intrusion in management rights whenever an
employer fulfills the statutory obligation to bargain collectively. Despite the inevitable
risk to profitability of individual employers, however, the NLRA grants rights to
employees and suggests that these rights are necessary to the free flow of corn-
merce.'
Given the purpose of the NLRA, another solution was possible. The dissent in
the Supreme Court argued for a presumption of a duty to bargain based on the
underlying policy of the Act.' Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, found
the Court's balancing test unacceptable since it failed "to consider legitimate
employment interests of the workers and their union." 57 They pointed out the
application of the test was based solely on speculation, disregarding benefits that
would in all likelihood accompany bargaining in a partial closure situation.'
Recognition of a presumption of a duty to bargain not only serves the purpose
of the Act to establish democratic self-government in industry through collective
bargaining, but also serves the interest of pluralist industrial relations. To understand
how this is possible, a different content has to be given to the pluralist doctrine, so as
to avoid the paradox between the recognition of conflicting interests and the process
of reducing union interests to the lowest possible level.
An attempt to restructure the concept of industrial pluralism may benefit from
expositions of political theories of pluralism. American pluralism was described by
Dahrendorf as "pluralism of institutions, conflict patterns, groupings and interests
[which] makes for a lively, colourful and creative scene of political conflict which
provides an opportunity for success for every interest that is voiced".' Pluralism
valued the intervention of intermediate groups between the state and the individual,
wanted to ensure that all groups were able NtO have a foot in the political door" and
1 Sec. 1 of the Act states: "Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption...". 29
U.S.C. sec. 151 (1982).
U.S. 666, 691 (1981). Zimmerman's concurrence in Otis Elevator attempts to work with the
presumption idea within the framework of the First National Maintenance test by proposing that where
amenability is found, then the subject is presumed to be mandatory unless the employer proves the need
for speed, flexibility or secrecy. The speculative element is eliminated as the employer must prove the
existence of the burden.
1571d. at 689.
at 690.
'R. Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society 317 (Stanford, California 1959).
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introduced the concept of "countervailing power." 6° Gaibraith observed that "the
operation of countervailing power is to be seen with the greatest clarity in the labour
market where it is also most fully developed" and claimed that "private economic
power is held in check by the countervailing power of those who are subject to it".'61
Following a suggestion by Hyrrian, it is submitted that the purpose of the Act
and the interests of pluralist industrial relations would have been better served if the
Court had admitted that "the priorities of capitalist industry [to which management is
formally committed] are themselves only one [however dominant in practice] among
a variety of sectional pressures. '162
 Allowing labour an input in corporate govern-
ance does not conflict with new theories which see the corporation as a bundle of
contractual arrangements among a variety of parties - customers, suppliers, lenders,
investors, managers and workers. Under these theories every group contends
on an equal basis with other groups using its particular input and bargaining strength.
Such an approach need not destroy profitability or injure commercial growth.
Some Western European countries, despite imposing legislative constraints on
managerial decision-making and allowing labour participation in making decisions,
have increased productivity and sustained economic growth.' Productivity may be
enhanced through improved performance by workers who believe that management
considers their interests. A good argument can be made that employee participation
can be of mutual benefit to employer and employee, and may be necessary to restore
American competitiveness and increase social weaIth.1
1 °D. Nicholls, Three Varieties of Pluralism 25 (London 1974).
' 61 J.K. Gaibraith, American Capitalism 125, 128 (Boston 1963).
'R. Hyman, "Pluralism, Procedural Consensus and Collective Bargaining," 16 British J. of Indus. Rel.
25 (1978).
'Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, "The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure,' 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 311 (1976).
1 This does not suggest that decision-bargaining alone may account for a healthy economy. Many
factors contribute to economic growth in a society. However, productivity increases in Western Europe
belies the idea that negotiation with regard to major decisions would cripple the economy. See Clyde W.
Summers, 'Worker Participation in the U.S. and West Germany: A Comparative Study From an American
Perspective," 28 Am. J. Comp. L 367 (1980).
'See Robert A. DahI, A Preface to Economic Democracy 107.110 (Berkeley 1985) regarding the
beneficial effect of 'self-governing enterprises.
104
Disclosure
After First National Maintenance some of the most crucial decisions of an
employer have been excluded from mandatory bargaining. There is no duty to bargain
where Uthe burden placed on the conduct of the business outweighs the benefits for
labour-management relations and the collective bargaining process", or where
decisions involve the scope and direction of the enterprise 11 or concern the core
of entrepreneurial control. The Board in Otis Elevator suggested that a duty to
bargain may exist where the decision turns primarily on labour costs. In this instance
the employer will have to provide sufficient advance notice to give the union a
meaningful opportunity to bargain about the decision. A union may be able to request
information, even where the employer claims no duty to bargain over the decision,
where it is possible to justify the request on the basis that the information will assist
in determining the extent to which labour costs were a factor in making the deci-
sion.'	 A union may also justify a request for information by claiming that it will
assist in effects-bargaining.
Effects-Bargaining
In First National Maintenance the Court made it clear that a union must be
given a significant opportunity to bargain about matters of job security as part of
effects-bargaining. The Court went to great length to stress the advantages of effects-
bargaining while denying that greater benefits would result from decision-bargaining.
The Court mentioned that a union, by pursuing its rights to bargain over the effects,
Umay achieve valuable concessions from an employer... and stated that a union has
some control over the effects of [a] decision and indirectly may ensure that the
decision is deliberately considered.17°
The problem with effects-bargaining, which has been noted above, is that it
treats the employer's decision as a fait accompli. The union suffers a substantial
1 First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 678-79 (1981).
' 67ld. at 676-77.
1 Fibreboard Paper Products v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964)(Stewait, J., concurring).
169Workplace Closures and Company Reorganizations: Enforcing NLR8, Contract and Non-Contract
Claims and Obligations, Paper presented at the Twenty-Second Teamsters Lavyers Conference, N#,
Orleans, Louisiana (1989).
'°452 U.S. 666, 682 (1981).
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disadvantage in bargaining power and will in most cases only be able to gain short
term benefits from bargaining. Although the Court has stated that bargaining over the
effects of a decision must be conducted "in a meaningful manner and at a meaningful
time"17' the Courts often do not allow adequate preparation time for the union.1
An additional problem is that an employer may have few incentives not to implement
a decision before it begins bargaining and the Board is unlikely to protect effects-
bargaining by ordering an employer to undo a decision that it has the legal right to
effect unilaterally. 173
 If the decision resulted in the termination of jobs for employees,
an effects-bargaining order from the Board may at most help the union to request
special severance pay, transfer rights to other plants, or job relocation assistance.174
Proactive conduct by the union
In interpreting the NLRA, the American Courts have taken a clear stand in
favour of management interest. Workers' interests in bargaing over entrepreneurial
decisions have been scaled down to leave the seller almost completely free to make
whatever deal is desired. The only real protection for employees in a business transfer
situation under the present state of the law derives from the collective bargaining
agreement. One possible concern of a seller may be a successors and assigns clause
in the collective agreement. Although it has been held that such a clause does not
bind the purchaser,' 75 the union has several options to pursue against the prede-
cessor. The predecessor may incur liability for failure to persuade the successor to
' 711d. at 681.
ln one case a five day notice of closure was not regarded as sufficient. See NLRB v. Emsing's
Supermarket, 872 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1989). However, the Board has found a week's notice sufficient in
case of business necessity. See Ceasy Co., 268 NLRB 1425 (1984). The notice requirement may be
affected by the provisions of The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN Act), which was
enacted in August 1988,29 U.S.C. sec. 2101 etseq. (1988)). The WARN Act requires 60 days written notice
before plant closings or mass layoffs "so that workers and their communities may try to make some
arrangements in connection with their own lives and their future employment and training"(134 Cong. Rec.
S 8375 (daily ed. June 22, 1988)(statemerit of Sen. Metzenbaum)). Three conditions allow for a reduction
of the 60-day period, namely a "faltering company", "unforeseeable business circumstances" and natural
disaster" (WARN Act sec. 3(b), 29 U.S.C. sec. 2102)).
' 73Michael C. Harper, "Leveling the Road from Borg-Warner to First Naitonal Maintenance: The Scope
of Mandatory Bargaining," 68 Va. L Rev. 1447, 1482 (1982).
' 741d. at 1483. The Board is unlikely to protect effects-bargaining by ordering an employer temporarily
to undo a decision that it has the legal right to effect unilaterally.
175Hovd Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 294-95 (1974).
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ii u UfliOiu i. ii. Moreover, a clause in a union contract which binds
successors and assigns may enable a union to enjoin the sale if it has not been made
contingent on the successor assuming the contract. Failing that, the predecessor may
be liable for a breach of the labour contract if it remains a viable entity.
Collective contracts have not proved to be sufficient insulation against the legal
trend which allows private power to nullify the democratic aspirations of the
statute.178 Case law permits employers to transfer bargaining unit work so as to
evade collectively bargained terms and conditions of employment. In Milwaukee
Spring jj179 the Board found a unilateral midterm transfer of bargaining unit work to
a non-union facility so as to avoid collectively bargained wage rates lawful.
Milwaukee Spring, after bargaining with the union and failing to secure its
consent, unilaterally implemented its proposals to transfer operations. 180 This
resulted in the layoff of employees. The Board initially held that the transfer constituted
an unlawful midterm modification of a collective bargaining agreement's recognition
clause. 181 The holding was subsequently reconsidered and reversed and the Board
found that the recognition clause in the collective bargaining agreement did not
constitute a work preservation clause which precluded the transfer of work during the
duration of the agreement. It indicated that labour organisations wishing to prevent
midterm production transfers had to obtain express work-preservation clauses
precluding such actions by the company. 1 This holding implies that since the
mandatory subject was not contained in the agreement, the employer, after
bargaining to impasse, could unilaterally implement its decision. On the other hand,
' 76!d. at 257-58 n.3.
lT Id at 257.
178K E. Kiare, "Traditional Labor Law Scholarship and the Crisis of Collective Bargaining Law A Reply
to Professor Finkin," 44 Maryland L Rev. 731, 768-69 (1985).
' 79Milwaukee Spring II, 268 NLRB 601 (1984), enforced sub nom. International Union, UAW v. NLRB,
765 F.2d 175 (D.C.Cir. 1985).
180The union conceded that the employer fulfilled its bargaining obligation under sec. 8(a)(5).
181 I!flnojs Coil Spring Company (Milwaukee Spring I), 265 NLRB 206 (1982), rev'd, 268 NLRB 601
(1984). Sec. 8(d) prohibits the midterm modification of a collective bargaining agreement without the
union's consent.
182268 NLRB 601-05.
3The collective bargaining agreement did not contain a zipper clause waiving bargaining.
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if a subject is contained in an agreement, changes can only be made if the union
consents. By taking a very narrow approach to what is contained in a collective
bargaining agreement, the decision in Milwaukee Spring works to the benefit of
employers, allowing them to change the situation of employees covered by a collective
bargaining agreement for their own economic benefit.
One method to combat workplace transformations is through the filing of
grievances alleging violations of specific contract clauses. As Milwaukee Springs
cautions, however, such contract clauses need to be specific. Such grievances may
provide the basis for obtaining an injunction pending arbitration to prohibit an
employer from eftecting a closure or sale.1M However, the success of labour's
eftorts to enjoin unilateral investment decisions pending arbitration has been described
as "quixotic since victory merely postpones the employer's plans.' 86 The outcome
ultimately depends on specific language in the collective bargaining agreement and
it may be a problem for the union to negotiate contract language restricting
management's control over investments. The majority of investment decisions are
considered permissive subjects of bargaining which means that a union has no right
to insist to impasse on language restricting the employer's power to implement such
decisions.
Obligations of the transferee
Introduction
The doctrine of employer successorship in the United States represents an
attempt to balance the interests of the parties in business transfer situations while
ensuring the uninhibited transfer of capital and an unimpeded flow of commerce within
society. Underlying this doctrine is the idea that obligations can be imposed on an
employer who perpetuates an existing enterprise and reaps benefits from the
continuation of the business.' 86 Factors which are considered relevant to determine
'MIBT Local 115 v. De Soto, Inc.,725 F.2d 931 (3d Cir. 1984). See also Workplace Closures and
Comparry Reorganizations: Enfoming NLRB, Contract and Non-Contract Claims and Obligations 5, Paper
presented at the Twenty.Second Teamsters Lawyers Conference, New Orleans, Louisiana (1989).
' 86Staughton Lynd, investment Decisions and the Quid Pro Quo Myth, 29 Case W. Res. L Rev. 396,
410 (1979).
186 The imposition of obligations on the transferee assumes that the new employer is not merely a
disguised continuance of the old employer (Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106 (1942)).
Such cases, usually referred to as alter ego cases, concern organisational changes undertaken not for
(continued...)
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the continuity of the enterprise and the status of the transferee include production of
similar goods or services as before; use of the same plant and machinery; employ-
ment of the same work force; existence of the same jobs; continuance of the work
without interruption; maintenance of the same organisational structure in an enterprise
of the same size. 187
 The most important factor in recent cases has been the extent
to which a transferee hires the work force of the transferor.
John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston1
The obligations of a transferee upon a change in corporate ownership, was first
adressed by the United States Supreme Court in John Wiley & Sons v. Uvingston. The
Court recognised the need for protection to contractually based interests of employees
and sought to accommodate this need in accordance with national labour policy. The
Court stated that Nthe objectives of national labour policy, reflected in established
principles of federal law, require that the rightful prerogatives of owners independently
to rearrange their businesses and even eliminate themselves as employers be
balanced by some protection to the employees from a sudden change in the
employment relationship." 89 Protection of employees and preservation of some of
their rights were considered important, given the fact that employees do not usually
participate in capital decisions.'9°
The Wiley case concerned a merger between lnterscience, a small publishing
firm whose employees were covered by a collective bargaining agreement, with the
larger and non-unionised publishing company of John Wiley & Sons, Inc.. When the
employees of lnterscience were integrated with the Wiley employees, the question
arose whether the collective bargaining agreement with lnterscience remained in force.
The union brought an action under section 301 of the Labour Management Relations
6(.continued)
legitimate business purposes, but frequently to avoid the effect of labour laws or to evade obligations under
labour contracts. In these circumstances the Court will be predisposed to pierce the corporate veil and to
hold that the transferee is in reality the same employer and subject to all the legal and contractual
obligations of the transferor.
' 87See Stephen B. Goldberg, The Labor Law Obligations of a Successor Employer, 63 Nw. U.L Rev.
735, 746-72, 793-806 (1969).
'John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
'Id. at 549.
1901d. at 549.
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Act (Taft-Hartley Act) 19' to compel Wiley to arbitrate the extent to which certain
contract rights had survived the merger. The Supreme Court held that:
"the disappearance by merger of a corporate employer which has entered into a
collective bargaining agreement with a union does not automaticaHy terminate all rights
of the employees covered by the agreement and that, in appropriate circumstances,
present here, the successor employer may be required to aibitrate with the union under
the agreement."'
Two pillars supported the Court's conclusion: the nature of the collective bargaining
agreement and the circumstances surrounding the transaction. The Court stated that
the collective bargaining agreement Ncalls into being a new common law - the
common law of a particular industry or of a particular plant." Since the agreement
was "not in any real sense the simple product of a consensual relationship" the
Court was of the opinion that the policy considerations favouring arbitration should
prevail to impose some liability on a non-consenting transferee. The circumstances
were such that substantial "continuity of identity" existed between the old and the new
employers, 195
 a critical factor to determine liability for the purposes of arbitration on
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. The Court suggested that "continuity
of identity" could be found in different transfer situations, not only where an employer
disappeared as a result of a merger, but also in those cases where one employer
replaced another while the business entity remained the same.1
Wiley was generally interpreted to mean that a transferee was bound in some
ways to the transferor's collective bargaining agreement and that it was for an
arbitrator to determine which terms of the previous contract should apply to the
transferee, considering relevant new circumstances arising out of the change of
'Sec. 301 provides for federal jurisdiction over suits "for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labour organisation."
192376 U.S. 543, 551.
'Id. at 550. This statement reiterates a point made in United Steelworkers v. Warrior and Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) that the collective bargaining agreement was not an ordinary contract
but a "generalised code" to govern the whole employment relationship (at 578-79), "an effort to erect a
system of industrial self government" (at 560).
'376 U.S. 543, 550 (19).
ld. at 551.
ld. at 549.
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ownership. 197 On policy grounds Wiley could be defended in terms of the impres-
sive policy considerations favouring arbitration." 98 The case furthered the national
labour policy of avoiding industrial strife, in instances where significant aspects of the
employment relationship remained unchanged, by striking a proper balance between
narrow contractualism, 1 which would impose no obligations on an unconsenting
transferee, and limited employer liability to arbitrate grievances under the transferor's
labour contract. 20° This balance has been distorted in subsequent cases involving
transfer situations. The employer's liability has been demarcated and confined, while
the concern for employees expressed in Wiley has disappeared from the logic.
NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc.
The next important case to deal with the rights and obligations of a transferee
employer, arose not in the context of a section 301 Suit to compel arbitration, but in
the context of an unfair labour practice proceeding. 2°' In NLRB v. Burns Interna-
tional Security Seivices, Inc., 202 Burns replaced Wackenhut as plant protection
service for Lockheed Corporation. Burns employed a workforce which consisted of
a majority of former Wackenhut employees but refused to bargain with the union that
had represented these employees or to honour the transferor's collective bargaining
agreement. The Supreme Court ruled that although the transferee was under no
obligation to adopt the collective bargaining agreement, it had an obligation to bargain
with the union. The obligation to bargain was limited to circumstances in which the
' 97See United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 335 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964); Printing Pressmen,
No. 447 v. Pride Papers-Aaronson Bros. Paper Corp., 75 LR.R.M. 2185, aff'd, 445 F.2d 361 (2d Cir. 1971);
Retail Store Employees Local 954 v. Lane's of Findlay, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 655 (N.D. Ohio 1966); McGuire
v. Humble 011& Ref. Co., 247 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), re v'd on other grounds, 355 F.2d 352 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 988 (1966).
198376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964). See also Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior Gulf, 363 U.S. 574
(1960).
narrow interpretation of the common law viewed a collective bargaining agreement as creating
personal rights and obligations between consenting parties and regarded Congressional action to be
necessary before a transferee could be bound by the arbitration clause of a transferor's labour contract.
See D. Benetar, "Successorship Liability Under Labour Agreements, 4 Wisc. LRev. 1026, 1029 (1973).
200See S. Goldberg, "The Labor Law Obligations of a Successor Employer, 63 Northwestern U.L Rev.
735, 738 and 740-745 (1969); James B. Atleson Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law 161
(Amherst, Massachusetts 1983).
2°'Sec. 8(a)(1) and (5) of NLRA, 29 U.S.C., sec. 158(a)(1) and (5) (1970).
2°2NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
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new bargaining unit consisted of a majority of former employees of the transferor.
The Court's ruling reflected the preference for private bargaining, rather than
judicial or government compulsion, to establish the terms of a labour agreement.203
A distinction was drawn between the imposition of a contract in the context of the duty
to bargain under section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA and the continuity of contractual
provisions in the context of a section 301 suit to compel arbitration. The Court sought
to explain the difference in terms of the strong federal labour policies supporting the
latter process as a means to achieve a peaceful settlement of labour disputes.
However, no satisfactory answer was given to the question why at least the arbitration
provision of an agreement survives a transfer in an action under section 301, while an
employer is not bound at all by the existing contract under the provisions of the
NLRA.204 The apparent inconsistency between different outcomes resulting from
different statutory contexts implies that the union in Burns would have had a much
greater chance of success if it had followed Wiley and sought the avenue of arbitration
under the collective bargaining agreement.205
If the Court's reasoning fails to give an adequate explanation for the apparent
contradiction, it is important for revealing the train of legal thought. The main concern
was not to discourage and inhibit the transfer of capital, a result which the Court
thought was likely to occur if an employer was saddled with the terms and conditions
of employment contained in a pre-existing collective bargaining agreement. The
overriding concern for capital mobility and an employer's flexibility to make changes
in corporate structure, composition of the labour force, work location, task assignment
and nature of supervision°7
 was unsupported by the facts since Burns had
instituted no changes of the nature mentioned by the Court. Despite the lack of a
factual basis, the fear of capital inhibition dominated to the extent that any important
rights which employees may have under the collective bargaining agreement were
203!d. at 287.
204Charles J. Morris and William Gaus, Successorship and the Collective Bargaining Agreement
Accommodating Wiley and Burns, 59 Vir. L Rev. 1359, 1370 (1973).
205James B. Atleson, Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law 165 (Amherst, Massachusetts
1983); Frederick K. Slicker, A Reconsideration of the Doctrine of Employer Successorship - A Step Toward
a Rational Approach, 57 Minn. L Rev. 1051, 1098-99 (1973).
206406 U.S. 272, 287-88 (1972).
2071d. at 287-88.
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ignored. These rights include a measure of job security, accumulation of job benefits
and a system of dispute resolution. The Court did not seek to establish any middle
ground between complete freedom of capital mobility and the interests of
employees.208
In the Burns case no consideration was given to the fact that protection of
employee interests in the United States depends to a large extent on the collective
bargaining agreement.209
 Legislation does not provide protection against arbitrary
dismissal and any such protection will only be attained through collective bargaining.
Moreover, the collective bargaining agreement protects a number of accumulated
rights and benefits which are not limited to the life of a single contract. 21 ° The
destruction of all accrued rights of employees can have a devastating effect and an
obligation to bargain will not be likely to ameliorate the situation. The union's ability
to retain benefits through collective bargaining is uncertain, especially since Burns
stated that a transferee is 'ordinarily free to set initial terms on which it will hire the
employees of a predecessor.'211 The Court argued that a transferee could not be
guilty of changing the terms or conditions of employment unilaterally because as a
new employer 'it had no previous relationship whatsoever to the bargaining unit and
no outstanding terms and conditions of employment from which a change could be
inferred . N212
 This leaves a transferee more freedom than other employers who are
normally restrained from making changes in working conditions without first bargaining
to impasse with a union.
The Court was overly aware of M problems for an employer who acquires a
business with a pre-existing labour agreement and ignored the benefits of the
agreement for the protection of employees. Moreover, it disregarded the role of the
contract in the public interest: a mechanism for the resolution of potential labour
208Morris and Gaus argue convincingly for the use of arbitration to enforce labour contracts in
successorship cases. The method of arbitration would be flexible and adequate to adjust the old contract
to the new employer and would not unduly discourage and inhibit the transfer of capital. Charles J. Morris
and William Gaus, Successorship and the Collective Bargaining Agreement Accommodating Wiley and
Burns, 59 Vir. L Rev. 1359, 1384 (1973).
See, e.g., E. Kassalow, Trade Unions and Industrial Relations: An International Comparison 132 (New
York 1969).
210Charles J. Morris and William Gaus, Successorship and the Collective Bargaining Agreement
Accommodating Wiley and Burns, 59 Vir. L Rev. 1359, 1382 (1973).
2114 U.S. 272, 294 (1972).
at 294.
113
disputes.213
 The Court appeared to accept that industrial peace could not be
achieved in every case, and, rather than unduly restraining employers' rights and
actions, to allow the parties to fight it out anew. 214 Freedom for the employer was
regarded as the ultimate goal, more worthy of protection than the public interest in
peaceful industrial relations and economic stability, more compelling than the
employees' perception of a legitimate interest in continued employment2' 5 and more
fundamental than the commitment to collective bargaining.
Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Boara6
In Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Board, freedom for the
employer was again the dominant theme, this time in the context of a transferee's duty
to arbitrate the extent to which it was bound to the transferor's collective bargaining
agreement under section 301. A franchisee sold all the assets of a restaurant and
motor lodge to the franchiser, Howard Johnson, and agreed to lease to the company
the property on which the business was located. Howard Johnson commenced
operations with a work force of forty-five employees, only nine of whom had previously
been employed by the transferor. The union brought suit under section 301 of the
Labour Management Relations Act 217 seeking an order to compel arbitration to
determine the extent of the transferee's obligations under the transferor's contract.
Although decided within the same context as Wiley, Howard Johnson differed
significantly: the hedges around the duty to arbitrate were drawn closer, leaving the
employer with a wide discretion. The Court held that the duty to arbitrate would only
be imposed in instances where there was a Ncontinuity in identity in the business
enterprise, which included a substantial continuity in the identity of the work
force. 2 ' 8 Should the employer decide to hire a new work force which includes only
a minority of the transferor's employees, no obligation to arbitrate arises. The only
2 ' 3See Charles J. Morris and William Gaus, Successorship and the Collective Baigaining Agreement
Accommodating Wiley and Burns,' 59 Vir. L Rev. 1359, 1386 (1973).
ai'106 U.S. 272, 288 (1972).
2l5See, e.g., NLRB v. Armato, 199 F.2d 800, 803 (7th Cir. 1952); Cruse Motors, Inc., 105 NLRB 242,247
(1953).
2161.Ioward Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Board, 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
2119 U.S.C., sec. 185.
210417 U.S. 249, 257-65 (1974).
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constraints on the employer's discretion are the prohibitions against discrimina-
tion.219
When the transferee has an almost unlimited discretion to eliminate employees'
jobs, little remains of the concern expressed in Wiley for the protection of employees
confronted with a change in the enterprise. Although Wiley was not overruled
expressly, the future vitality of Wiley is likely to be threatened by Howard Johnson's
emphasis on the right of a purchaser to make appropriate changes in a business,
including the hiring of his own independent work force.° This right follows from the
Court's statement that the basic policies that control in an unfair labour practice
context cannot be disregarded in a section 301 suit. 1
 The Court observed that
'[c]learly the reasoning of Burns must be taken into account here.' It is difficult
to defend why an employer who takes over a business and makes no basic changes
in operation that require changes in the work force should be allowed the freedom to
discharge any number of employees, while enjoying all the benefits of continuity.3
Regrettably for the union, the Court found that a 'successor's and assigns'
provision contained in the transferor's labour contract had no impact on the
transferee's operations. In Howard Johnson the labour contracts which the seller of
the business had with the union stipulated that they were binding on 'successors,
assigns, purchasers, lessees or transferees of the Employer ... provided the
establishment remains in the same line of business.' 4 When the transferee refused
to accept the labour contracts, the transferor terminated the employment relationship
with effect from the date of the transfer of the business. In the absence of substantial
continuity and any express or implied assumption by the purchaser of obligations
under the collective bargaining agreement, the mere existence of a successors and
assigns clause was found to be insufficient to bind the transferee to the agreement.
The Court remarked that the union had failed to consider legal action to enjoin the sale
219Sec. 8(a)(1) and (3).
0Sue J. Henry, is There Arbitration After Burns?: The Resurrection of John Wiley & Sons,' 31
Vanderbilt L Rev. 249, 265 (1978).
221417 U.S. 249, 256 (1974).
2221d. at 256.
223Charles J. Morris and William Gaus, 'Successorship and the Collective Bargaining Agreement
Accommodating Wiley and Burns,' 59 Vir. L Rev. 1359, 1395 (1973).
417 U.S. 249, 266 n.1 (1974).
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as a breach of the successorship clause in the contract. However, since the transferor
in this case continued to be a viable entity with substantial assets the union had an
effective means to satisfy contractual claims, by seeking damages against the
transferor for breach of the agreement.
Conclusion
The law as interpreted and applied in the United States in business transfer
situations serves the predominant goal of free capital mobility which entails freedom
to set the initial terms and conditions upon transfer and freedom to hire a new work
force. 5
 The employer's freedom is not counterbalanced by a concern for the
protection of representational or contractual rights of employees or for the avoidance
of industrial unrest. It is not taken into account that imposition of the transferor's
labour contract will not necessarily impede the transfer of capital and, by providing
transitions with a minimum of disruption, may advance the cause of industrial
peace. The transferee may reap the benefits of absence of economic unrest as
well as predictability of labour costs. 7 Should the costs be too high, especially in
the case of a failing company, a transferee will be able to negotiate a new labour
contract with the union as a precondition for the take over of the business. Unions,
concerned about their own interests as well as those of the business, will need little
convincing to agree to the transferee's contract proposals rather than lose their jobs
and go under with a moribund business.8
In limited circumstances a transferee may be required to arbitrate grievances
James Severson and Michael Willcoxon, "Successorship Under Howard Johnson: Short Order
Justice For Employees," 64 Calif. L Rev. 795, 844 (1976) made the observation that the practical effect of
the successor doctrine is destroyed by allowing the transferee unilaterally to determine its labour obligations
simply by monitoring the size of the employee contingent inherited from the transferor.
Intemationa! Ass'n of Machinists Dist. Lodge 94 v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1135, 1139 (D.C. Cir.
1969)(Leventhal, J., concurring). See also James Severson and Michael Wilicoxon, "Successorship Under
Howard Johnson: Short Order Justice For Employees," 64 Calif. L Rev. 795, 827 n. 153 (1976) where they
point out that the exact magnitude of the restriction of capital flow and the attendant debilitating effect on
the market are highly conjectural and may in fact be minimal. Data on merger and acquisition are at best
incondusive on the question of what effect requiring successors to honour extant collective agreements has
had on the free flow of capital.
7Sue J. Henry, "Is There Arbitration After Burns?: The Resurrection of John Wiley & Sons,' 31
Vanderbilt L Rev. 249, 295 (1978).
Id. at 296.
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under a transferor's labour contract and to remedy a transferor's unfair labour
practices230 . Confined as these orders are, they represent a reasonable accommo-
dation of competing interests. An order requiring arbitration will avoid industrial strife
by protecting employees' expectations from the effects of sudden business changes
over which they have no control. 23' Arbitration has the advantage of promoting
N industrial harmony through a fair, fast and flexible system utilizing neutral but
knowledgeable 'peace-makers." 2 The arbitrator's expertise and the speed of
arbitration are likely to contribute to a fair and practical resolution of union grievances
against the transferee. Since employee participation in crucial decisions to sell or
merge is not encouraged or protected by law, employees have no other means to
represent their interests than through imposing provisions of the transferor's labour
contract, such as an arbitrator may deem reasonable and equitable in view of the
change in employer, on the transferee. 230 The transferee is usually the only one who
can provide an effective remedy for employees for claims involving not only monetary
damages but, for example, continued employment, discharge without just cause, and
violation of seniority rights.2
The principle that the transferee is responsible to remedy a transferor's unfair
labour practices, was expressed in Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB.2 In this
case, a transferee had purchased a business and hired employees with knowledge
that the transferor had committed an unfair labour practice by discharging an
employee for engaging in union activities. The Court held that the Board could order
the reinstatement of the employee with back pay and indirectly gave support to the
policies expressed in Wiley of avoiding labour strife and protecting the exercise of
John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 u.s. 543 (1964).
230NB v. Golden State Bowing Co., 414 u.s. 168 (1973).
231 See, e.g., Note, Contractual Successorship: The Impact of Burns,N 40 U. Chi. L Rev. 617, 621-22
(1973); Sue J. Henry, 1s There Arbitration After Bums?: The Resurrection of John Wiley & Sons , N 31
Vanderbilt L Rev. 249, 268 (1978).
InternationaI Ass'n of Machinists v. Howmet Corp., 466 F.2d 1249, 1253 (9th Cir. 1972).
See Note, Labor Law - Effect on Successor Employer of Predecessor's Collective Bargaining
Agreement, 86 Harv. L Rev. 247, 256 (1972).
Stephen B. Goldberg, The Labor Law Obligations of a Successor Employer,N 63 Nw. U.L Rev. 735,
755 (1969); Sue J. Henry, • There Arbitration After Burns?: The Resurrection of John Wiley & Sons,' 31
Vanderbilt L Rev. 249, 270 (1978).
235414 U.S. 168 (1973).
117
guaranteed employee rights. By requiring a transferee to remedy the unfair labour
practices of the transferor it is possible to strike a more equitable balance between the
interests of the victimised employee, the transferee and the pubtic.2°
at 181-85.
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CHAPTER 3
THE PROTECTION OF WORKERS IN THE CASE OF BUSINESS TRANSFERS:
UNITED KINGDOM
Introduction
Structural business changes which occur as a result of a transfer commonly
involve managerial decisions which impinge on the rights of employees. Such
decisions do not only concern the change of employer, but are often accompanied by
decisions concerning redundancy, reorganisation or insolvency. In the United
Kingdom, laws intervene in situations such as these to regulate to some extent the
procedural aspects of decision-making and the substantive impact upon workers'
rights. These laws, their introduction, sometimes as a result of European Community
obligations, and their development through judicial interpretation will be discussed in
this chapter. The discussion will first turn to the Transfers Directive, its objectives,
scope, and specific transfer provisions, and to the way that it has been implemented
in the United Kingdom. After that a discussion of the redundancy and insolvency
provisions will follow, and the last section will consider the part played by trade unions
in the different schemes. Since the legal rules can only be appreciated against the
background of the basic common law which previously regulated the consequences
of a change of employer, a brief outline of the common law will be given in the section
following immediately.
The common law position
Pervading the law of employment has a'ways been the notion that contract is
based upon agreement. In terms of the common law of the contract of employment,
contracts can be transferred only by novation, which requires the consent of both
parties to the contract as well as the substituting party. The non-assignability of
employment contracts has generally been defended on the basis of their personal
nature, perhaps most powerfully so by Lord Atkin in Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated
Collieries Ltd. with the famous statement: NJ had fancied that ingrained in the personal
status of a citizen under our laws was the right to choose for himself whom he would
serve, and that this right of choice constituted the main difference between a servant
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and a serf.'1
The common law's assertion that an employee should be regarded as a
servant, not a serf, implies a freedom of choice for the individual employee when
confronted with a transfer situation that occurs without any knowledge on the part of
the employee. In most instances, however, this choice serves no protective function
since the common law makes no provision for automatic transfer of employees'
acquired rights in the event of their choosing to move with the business and accept
an offer of employment form the transferee. 2 In reality, a break in continuity caused
by a transfer usually works to the employee's disadvantage. The transferee's options
are completely open: to engage an employee on any set of terms and conditions, or
not to engage any employees of the transferor at all. Any outstanding claims of an
employee who suffers a loss of employment as a result of a transfer, have to be made
against the transferor, particularly a claim for wrongful dismissal in instances which
point to a repudiatory breach of the contract. Since the mere fact of a transfer does
not terminate the employment contract, a termination is lawful if the contract is
complied with and due notice is given by the transferor. 3 This means that a worker's
common law rights usually extend to no more than a period of notice which may be
merely a few weeks.
The limitations of the common law's standard assumption -- freedom of
contract equals freedom of choice -- are evident in most transfer situations and two
important flaws of this equation have been identified. 4 First, underlying the assump-
tion is a premise of mutuality: the employee's freedom to choose not to work for an
employer is matched by the transferee's freedom not to offer employment to an
'(19401 App. Cas. 1014, 1026 (H.L).
2Note also that the common law never gave an employee the right to object to a transfer taking place.
This was recently pointed out in a decision of the Court of Appeal which involved an unsuccessful attempt
by an employee to restrain a business reorganisation. Newns v. British Airways plc, [1992] I.R.LR. 575
(C.A.).
3There is some controversy regarding the effect of a transfer on a contract. In Secretaiy of State for
Employment v. Spence, [1986] I.R.L.R. 248, 250 (C.A.), Balcombe U. states that the transfer actually
determines the contract. Other writers think that the transfer only amounts to a unilateral repudiation of the
contract, which gives the innocent party the right to terminate. See, e.g., F. Younson, Employment Law and
Business Transfers: A Practical Guide 50 (London 1989); P.L Davies and M. Freedland, Transfer of
Employment (London 1982).
Kahn-Freund, 'Contemporary note on the decision in Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries
Ltd., [1940] AC. 1014 (H.L), 4 Mod. 1.. Rev. 221 (1941); P.L Davies, Acquired Rights, Creditors' Rights,
Freedom of Contract, and Industrial Democracy, 9 Y.B. Eur. L 21, 49-50 (1989).
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employee. This premise rests upon the idea that the common law operates in a
neutral fashion, unbiased as between the interests of employers and employees. For
the bulk of employees affected by a business transfer, whose main concern is to
preserve employment, not to absent themselves from work, this premise denies
protection and has no relevance. Unlike the emp'oyee in Nokes who could
successfully raise the liberal argument concerning freedom of contract to assert his
right not to be employed by the transferee, most employees' interests lie in the
assertion of a right to be employed. In all these cases there is no parity between the
choices of the employees and the transferee which would justify an assertion of
mutuality. What is more, these cases demonstrate that a belief in the neutrality of the
principles of the common law is essentially naive. Its origins can be traced to the
ideology of contract and property which has been dominant in the last two centuries
and which, in the context of transfers as in many others, favours the employer.
A second problem with the common law belief in freedom of contract concerns
the nature of the modern corporation. Without the employees' knowledge or consent,
behind the obscuring corporate veil, control of the company may change. The law of
contract does not attach significance to many such changes in the identity of the
employer. Alternatively, without there being a change in the control of the company,
the person who on a day to day basis acts as the employee's direct employer, for
instance the manager of a company, may be replaced by another. Again the law of
contract ignores these changes which may have a direct effect upon an employee and
imply a significant transformation of the employing enterprise. In such instances the
freedom of contract argument does not tally with the reality of the modern work
environment. It is unrealistic to cling to the idea which Lord Atkin expressed in Nokes
that an employee cannot be compelled to serve a new master, when 'had the whole
share capital of the transferor company been transferred instead of the undertaking,
the man would have been compelled to serve what, in reality, was a new master.'5
With regard to difterent kinds of commercial transfers, it is desirable to look for a
labour law framework which takes into account the actualities of the relationship
between employer and employee and does not depend upon the method chosen to
transfer control, whether it takes place by way of a sale of the business, a takeover of
shares or any other method.
The common law provisions for the protection of employees in the event of
5LC.B. Gower, Principles of Modern Company Law 124 (5th ed. London 1992).
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structural changes in the enterprise are so limited that they bear little relation to the
expectations of employees working under the realities of the modern business world.
Changing patterns of commerce and industry have made it necessary to supplement
the law of the contract of employment with concepts "which enable the employment
relationship to be seen as a valuable entity extending beyond the óonfines of the
particular contract of employment with the particular employer." 6
 It is against this
background that the introduction of statutory provisions for the expansion of workers'
rights, mostly under the influence of the European Communities, should be viewed.
These statutory provisions will be the subject of discussion in the rest of this chapter,
specifically those that provide for the preservation of employees' rights in the event of
transfers of undertakings, for the payment of financial compensation in circumstances
which lead to a loss of jobs, and for some form of trade union participation in
decisions which involve substantial changes in the enterprise.
The creation of a "European social area"7
Around the time when the United Kingdom became a member of the European
Community on January 1, 1973, signs of recession and industrial unrest in EC member
countries caused general concern that economic integration in itself would not be able
to protect working and living standards. 8 During this period an upsurge in strikes and
wage explosions occurred throughout Europe. Contrary to the initial expectations, the
perception dawned that economic benefits had not been experienced across the
board and that certain groups were adversely affected by the processes of economic
integration; workers specifically needed legal protection. Moreover, ideals of equity
and redistribution and the need to give the Community a "human face" motivated a
more active social policy. 9 A declaration by Community Heads of Government in
1972 "that they attribute the same importance to energetic proceedings in the field of
social policy as to the realisation of the economic and financial union" 1 ° signified a
6M.R Freedland, The Contract of Employment 371 (Oxford 1976).
7See B.A. Hepple, "The Crisis in EEC Labour Law," 16 Indus. U. 77, 85 (1987).
81d. at 85.
9Chns Brewster and Paul league, European Community Social Policy 65 (London 1989).
'°Conferences of the Heads of Government of the Member States were held in The Hague in December
1969 and in Paris in October 1972.
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clear change from the earlier neo-liberal phase of EC social policy and led to social
action programmes by the organs of the EC.11 Among the specific measures
resulting from the action programmes were Council Directive 75/129 on the
harmonisation of provisions for collective redundancies, Council Directive 80/987 on
the harmonisation of the provisions for the protection of workers in the event of
insolvency of the employer, and Council Directive 77/187 on the harmonisation of the
provisions for the protection of workers on the transfer of undertakings.
The Transfers Directive can be considered a novel development, notably so in
Britain where it was reluctantly implemented after the European Commission
threatened the Government with legal proceedings for failure to implement it, and more
strikingly so after recent legislative amendments. 12 The development extends to two
levels: first, the automatic transfer of contracts of employment and collective
agreements, and second, participation arrangements, such as the duty to inform and
consult the representatives of recognised trade unions when a transfer is contem-
plated. The Directive13 brought about a reversal of the rule in Nokes with the
endorsement of the underlying principle of automatic novation of the contract of
employment for all employees who are employed in an undertaking immediately
before a transfer takes place. The automatic transfer of acquired rights is supported
by two complementary provisions of the Directive. Not only do employees' transfer
rights extend to the continuing observance by the transferee of the terms and
conditions of the individual contract of employment and the collective agreement,14
The first programme was adopted by the Council on June 27, 1972, O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. C
23)(1972), and the second on January 21, 1974, 0.J. Eur. Comm. (No. c 13)(1974).
' 2The Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Bill (TURER) was introduced into Parliament in
November 1992.
' 3Council Directive 77/187/EEC of 14 February 1977 on the approximation of the laws of the Member
States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of the transfers of undertakings,
businesses or parts of businesses.
14Art. 3(1) and 3(2). Art. 3(1) provides for the transfer of the individual contract of employment and all
rights and obligations arising from it, which in effect creates the same set of contractual terms and
conditions between the employee and the transferee that existed previously in the employment relationship
with the transferor. In a similar fashion, art. 3(2) provides for the transfer of collective rights and requires
that 'the transferee shall continue to observe the terms and conditions agreed in any collective agreement
on the same terms applicable to the transferor under that agreement, until the date of termination or expiry
of the collective agreement or the entry into force or app'ication of another collective agreement.
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but also to protection against dismissal which occurs as a result of the transfer
itself. 15 This protection is qualified, however, to allow for "dismissals that may take
place for economic, technical or organisational reasons entailing changes in the
workforce."
The Transfers Directive
1.	 Objective
When the Acquired Rights Directive was introduced by the European
Commission it was as part of a social program which aimed at mitigating the effects
of recession and legitimating the Community "as a political ideal based upon social
justice." 16 The Directive was introduced primarily to counter the adverse effects on
employees of the economic processes in the Community. Its aim was to achieve
justice by distributing the costs of economic and social changes so that employees
did not have to carry the whole burden. This ambitious aim, based on a thoughtful
interpretation of economic and social conditions, was expected to be workable and
the drafters of the Directive did not perceive any basic incongruity with the economic
and social environment in which the law operates. 17 What they set out to do was to
make the legal systems of Member States more compatible.
The preamble to the Transfers Directive notes that differences in Member States
as regards the extent of protection of employees' rights upon transfers of undertakings
can have a direct effect on the functioning of the common market and lays out the
objective to reduce such differences. "Harmonisation" ideally would lead to the raising
of social standards in countries like the UK where these standards had not been
advanced. This ideal, according to one view, was hindered by the dominant
151n order to preserve substantive rights which had been acquired prior to a change of employer, Art.
4 of the Directive introduces a necessary complement to the automatic transfer rule in the form of protection
of employees against dismissal which occurs as a result of the transfer itself.
166ob Hepple, "Harmonisation of Labour Law in the European Communities," in Essays for C/lye
Schmitthof 14, 28 (J. Adams ed., Abingdon, Oxon. 1983).
17ln one of the most difficult areas of legislation which concerns the allocation of risk of the unavailability
of work, there are examples of legislation with ambitious aims which proved to be impossible to achieve.
The creation of a right to guaranteed pay for workers laid off because of the unavailability of work did not
succeed, mainly because, in the prevailing economic climate, the cost could not be transferred from the
state to the employers. In cases such as these the central question is in how far the employee should be
liable to suffer loss of earnings, and in how far the cost should be shared by others including the employer,
the social security system and the tax-payer. See Bob Simpson, "British Labour Relations in the 19805:
Learning to Live with the Law," 49 Mod. L Rev. 796, 805 (1986); P.L Davies and M. Freedland, Labour Law:
Text and Materia/s 357-362 (2d ed. London 1984).
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perspective of the Commission, which was that of European integration and not labour
law; the Commission was insensitive to the difficulties of transplanting a practice from
one member state to others.' 8 In all likelihood, however, the real barrier in the way
of achieving social justice had more to do with the type of Directive chosen by the
Commission, a Directive treated by the European Court of Justice as a measure of
partial harmonisation which does not "aim to establish a uniform level of protection for
the entire Community by reference to common criteria."' 9 The reason for this
approach relates to the fact that labour law, perhaps more than most other areas of
the law with which the European Commission is concerned, bears a close relationship
to specific national industrial and political traditions. But too much emphasis on the
national character had the unfortunate result that the Commission, instead of aiming
to establish "fundamental social rights', 20 bowed to national law in many important
respects, restricted the effectiveness of the Directive and created uncertainty through
discordant applications in different Member States.
The objective of the Directive, NtO ensure as far as possible the safeguarding
of employees' rights in the event of a change of proprietor of the undertaking and to
allow them to remain in the service of the new proprietor on the same conditions as
those agreed with the vendor," 21 is only partially realised, since the Directive provides
for nothing more than a level of protection similar to the one employees enjoyed
before the transfer. Thus, the European Court of Justice stated that the Directive "can
be relied upon only to ensure that the employee is protected in his relations with the
transferee to the same extent as he was in his relations with the transferor under the
' 8Chris Brewster and Paul Teague, European Community Social Policy: its impact on the U.K. 94
(London 1989).
19Foreningen a! Arbejdsledere i Danmark v. A/S Danmols Inventar, [1985] E.C.R. 2639 (E.C.J.)
describing the Transfers Directive. In Rask and Christensen v. ISS Kantineservice A/S. [1 993J I.R.LR. 133
the E.C.J. again made it clear that the aim of the Directive was only partial harmonisation of the law. Only
the protection which employees have under the system of their own Member State is transferred in the
event of a transfer.
2°Not all Directives have been designed like this. Professor Hepple distinguishes between a
"fundamental rights" approach, which was followed with regard to the Equal Pay Directive 75/117/EEC (O.J.
Eur. Comm. (No. L 45) 19 (1975)) and the Equal Treatment Directive 76/207/EEC (O.J. Eur. Comm. (No.
I. 39) 40 (1976)), and the "employment Jaw" approach which characterises the Directives on collective
redundancies (75/129/EEC), safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings
(77/187/EEC) and protection of employees in the event of insolvency of their employer (80/ 987/EEC).
See Bob Hepple, "The Implementation of the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights," 53 Mod.
L Rev. 643 (1990).
21Foreningen a! Arbejdsledere I Danmatk v. Daddy's Dance Hail A/S. [1 989J 2 C.M.LR. 517, 524
(E.C.J.).
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legal rules of the Member State concerned.
Although it has to be recognised that harmonisation in a Community-wide
context poses difficult problems, it is to be regretted that the relatively limited objective
of the Directive has in certain instances had the effect of undermining the protection
of acquired rights in transfer situations. The problem can be identified as relating not
to the principle, but to the application of the principle by the European Court of
Justice. The principle that substantive rights are to be determined by national law
while the Directive covers the protection of Utransfere rights is an acceptable solution
to the problem of harmonisation.23 However, to apply this principle so as to exclude
important issues relating to "transfer" rights from the ambit of protection is to reduce
the effectiveness of the Directive. Too often, the Court's deference to national law has
impeded the proper functioning of the Directive, sometimes even against the intentions
of the drafters of the Directive. It was thought originally that all forms of employment
relationships would be covered, 24 but the European Court failed to carry through with
this intent and allowed national law and the Ucontract of employmentU - the existence
of which on the date of transfer has been held to be a matter for national law25 - to
decide who are "employees" 26 In many instances this has had the caustic result of
excluding the increasing number of marginal workers, including part-time and
temporary workers, from protection. National law also determines the machinery and
structural arrangements for workers' representation. In Britain no legal machinery
exists for designating workers' representatives and an employer can avoid obligations
to inform and consult by simply refusing to recognise trade unions.27
2.	 Scope
Despite its fairly limited objective, the European Court of Justice has in some
ways allowed the Directive a wide scope of application. Article 1 of the Directive states
RId. at 524-5.
Bob Hepple, Main Shortcomings and Proposals for Revision of Council Directive 77/187/EEC
(December 1990)(Report for the Commission of the European Communities, unpublished).
241d at 24.
Wendelboe v. Li Music Aps, [1985] E.C.R. 457 (E.C.J.).
26Foreningen a! Arbejdsledere I Danmark v. A/S Danmols Inventar, [1985] E.C.R. 2639 (E.C.J.).
27B Towers, "Derecognising Trade Unions, 19 Indus. Rel. J. 181 (1988).
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that ihis [D]irective shall apply to the transfer of an undertaking, business or part of
a business to another employer as a result of a legal transfer or merger. In
accordance with the intention expressed in this article, the Court has defined a transfer
as not necessarily including a change of ownership, but as covering any situation
where, following a legal transfer or merger, there is a change in the natural or legal
person who is responsible for carrying on the business and who by virtue of that fact
incurs the obligations of an employer towards the employees. Consistent with the
spirit and purpose of the Directive, a wide interpretation has been given to the term
transfer and little significance has been attached to the nature of the transaction.
The Court also extended the scope of the Directive to transfers of only a part of an
undertaking, provided that the employees were employed in the transferred part.3°
In terms of this definition of a transfer various contingencies do not affect the
application of the Directive, for instance the fact that the transaction takes the form of
a lease to a new owner who carries on the business without interruption, 31 or the fact
that an interlude occurs after a sale and before trading is resumed. Similarly, the
Directive has been applied to the transfer of an undertaking under a lease-purchase
agreement as well as to the retransfer of the undertaking to the original transferor upon
the termination of the lease-purchase agreement by a judicial decision. The fact
that a transfer takes place in two stages does not preclude the application of the
Directive.TM
Two significant judgements of the European Court of Justice in 1992 extended
and clarified the meaning of legal transfera in the Acquired Rights Directive, in a
28Landsorganisationen I Danmark for Tjenerforbundet I Danmark v. Ny Molle Kro, [1987] E.C.R. 11
(E.C.J.); P. Born International A/S v. Foreningen at Arbejdsledere I Danmark, [1989] I.R.LR. 41 (E.C.J.).
See opinion of Mr. Mancini A-G in Landsorganisationen I Danmark for Tjenerforbundet I Danmark v.
NyMolleKro, (1987] E.C.R. 11 (E.C.,J.).
30Arie Botzen v. Rotterdamsche Droogdok Maatschappij BV, [1985] E.C.R. 519 (E.C.J.).
3 'Foreningen a! Arbejdsledere i Danmark v. Daddy's Dance Ha/I A/S, [1988] E.C.R. 739 (E.C.J.).
Jozef Maria Antonius Spijkers v. Gebroeders Benedik Abattoir CV and A/fred Benedik en Zonen BV,
[1986] E.C.R. 1119 (E.C.J.).
Ham, Berg and Johannes Thecdorus Maria Busschers v. Ivo Marten Besselsen, [1989] 3 C.M.LR.
817 (E.C.J.).
34P Born International A/S v. Foreningen at Arbejdsledere I Danmark, [1989] LR.LR. 41 (E.C.J.).
Art. 1(1).
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way consistent with the aim of protecting employees. In the Sophie Redmond case
a public body had decided to terminate a subsidy to a foundation and to transfer the
foundation to another legal person with similar aims. The Court decided that the
Directive applied in a situation such as this and stated specifically that transactions
arising out of the grant of subsidies to foundations or associations whose services are
not remunerated are not excluded from the scope of the Directive. 37 The implication
is that the Directive can be applied to non-commercial undertakings, provided that the
business retains its identity. The second leading case, Rask and Christensen v. ISS
Kantineservice A/S, concerned an agreement between two owners of undertakings
to transfer Nthe responsibility for providing a service, with the second owner
subsequently assuming the obligations of an employer in respect of the employees
who were engaged in the provision of that service. The Court held, in a decision
which could have far-reaching implications for all forms of contracting-out, that the
Directive could apply where an employer decided to contract out the running of a staff
canteen.
The wide scope of the Acquired Rights Directive was called its most radical
and striking feature.h139 The original proposal was based not on company law, but
on the law of the enterprise and did not only apply to mergers between companies,
but also to takeovers where businesses, their subsidiaries, places of work, or work
units were transferred from one person to another with the result that a new employer
replaced the previous one. In this way the Directive gave recognition to the continuing
vitality of an enterprise, despite changes in ownership of the physical assets. It is
unfortunate, however, that in its final form, the Directive did not follow through with its
radical new direction and covered only transfers from one person to another but
stopped short of including share mergers within its scope. A sale of share capital,
although it does not involve a change in the legal identity of the employer, or affect the
contractual rights of workers, involves a change in control which may affect the long-
term security of the workforce and the role of the union. A new employer who
acquires control may introduce new policies that may seriously affect non-contractual
Dr Sophie Redmond Stichting v. Barto!, [1992] I.R.LR. 366 (E.C.J.).
371d. at 369.
91993] I.R.L.R. 133 (E.C.J.).
8ob Hepple, "Workers' Rights in Mergers and Takeovers: The EEC Proposals, 5 ndus. U. 197, 205
(1976).
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terms and job opportunities. 40 In principle therefore, at least the provisions relating
to consultation and the transfer of collective rights seem as important in this context
as in the case of transfers which result in a change of employer.
Another potential limitation of the Directive's scope resulted from an
interpretation of the European Court which made a 'transfer of an undertaking' subject
to the material condition that the economic entity remains in existence. 41 The Court
explained that this will be apparent from the fact that its operation is being continued
by the new employer, with the same economic or similar activities. 42 Several factors
will be indicative of this fact, for example that the transferee takes over the tangible
and intangible assets (know-how, goodwill) from the transferor, employs a majority of
the transferor's employees, has the same customers and carries on similar activities.
The main problem with this analysis is that it fails to consider a transfer of the assets
of a business, or significant changes in the nature of the business by the transfer,
which have the result that the employees keep on working for the transferee on the
same tools and in the same working environment, but manufacturing different
products. Such a situation cannot be brought under the concept of transfer of an
'undertaking' because it has generally been assumed in Community law that this
concept indicates a continuation of the same economic or commercial activity.
However, a transfer of a 'business' is susceptible to a wider interpretation which would
take account of the fact that the working environment in which the employees are
engaged remains essentially unchanged, and would emphasise continuity of the
40Since, according to legal theory, the company remains the employer, there is no interruption of
contract or continuity. However, an argument could be made that an employee should be able to object
to a share transfer if the new employer planned changes in contractual terms to the employee's detriment.
41 Spijkers v. Gebr. Bene4ikAbattoir CV, [1986] E.C.R. 1119 (E.C.J.). The Court repeated in Dr Sophie
Redmond Stichting v. Bartol, (1992] I.R.LR. 366,369 (E.C.J.) and inRaskv. 155 I<äntineserviceA,', (1993J
I.R.LR. 133 (E.C.J.) that the key issue was whether the transfer showed that a business had retained its
identity.
42ft was again stated in Dr Sophie Redmond Stichting v. Bartol, (1992] I.R.LR. 366, 369 (E.C.J.) that
the key issue was whether the transfer showed that a business had retained its identity. In Rask v. ISS
Kantineservice A/S, (1993] I.R.LR. 133, the E.C.J. also mentioned that the decisive criterion for establishing
whether there is a transfer is whether the business retains its identity, as would be indicated, in particular,
by the fact that its operation was either continued or resumed.
See, e.g., the meaning given to 'undertaking' under art. 85(1) of the Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community, Rome, 25 March 1957, BRTv. SABAM, (1974] E.C.R. 313 (E.C.J.), per A.G.Mayras;
BNIC v. C/air, (1985] E.C.R. 391 (E.C.J.), per A.G.Slynn.
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workforce as the primary guide to the finding of a relevant transfer." For this reason
Professor Hepple, in his report for the Commission of the European Communities on
the shortcomings of the Transfers Directive, proposed that article 1(1) should be
amended so as to make it clear that the Directive applies to the transfer of an
undertaking, business, or part of a business whether or not the same economic entity
continues to exist after the transfer. The suggested wider interpretation of the concept
of a transfer, is to a certain extent implied in Rask v. ISS Kantineseriice A/S45 where
the emphasis was on the transfer of the responsibility for providing a service and the
working environment of the staff, rather than the type of enterprise which was carried
on after the transfer, and the customer base. Many instances of subcontracting, such
as the contracting out of maintenance or catering services, arguably do not involve the
transfer of an economic entity but only the transfer of certain tasks. On the whole, this
more specific formulation of the scope of the Directive would better serve the aim of
the Directive, which is to safeguard employees' rights in the event of a transfer, and
would prevent this aim from being defeated by the commercial form of the transaction.
3.	 Transfer of rights and obligations
The automatic transfer rule applies to a11 the transferor's rights and obligations
arising from a contract of employment or from an employment relationship existing on
the date of the transfer. Contractual and statutory rights and obligations are clearly
covered by this rule and one would hope, for the sake of the continuance of good
industrial relations after the transfer, rights and obligations arising from customary
industrial practice as well. 47 Unfortunately, this rule's coverage, through the
trepidation of the European Court of Justice to give it its intended effect, has been
restricted. The aim of the drafters of the Directive, as reported by one of the
"Hugh CoVing, "Transfer of Undertakings and lnsolvency, 18 Indus. U. 144, 154(1989). But see Brian
Napier, CCT, Market Testing and Employment Rights: The Effects of TUPE and the Acquired Rights
Directive 34 (Streatham 1993)(publication sponsored by the Institute of Employment Rights) who is of the
opinion that the absence of staff transfers would not be conclusive evidence that no transfer took place.
According to him, the fact that a contract makes no provision for staff transfer should not be decisive
evidence against the existence of a transfer, since to accept this would make it too simple for the parties
to circumvent the social protection of employees by adopting a particular form of agreement.
45[i g J I.R.LR. 133 (E.C.J.).
Art. 3(1).
47This is, however, not certain. The first draft of the Directive (COM. No. 74) 351 final, art. 3(1) expressly
applied the automatic transfer rule to rights and obligations arising from customary industrial practice."
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committee of independent experts, was to cover all forms of employment relationships
and it was thought that the present wording of the Directive would be sufficient to do
so. However, deference to the definitions of national legal systems has become
an obstacle to the realisation of this aim and has produced a result that is largely out
of touch with the requirements of modern forms of employment.
The Court in Mikkeisen49 refused to give a general definition to the term
NemployeeN
 as used in the Directive, and held that this was for national Courts to
determine. As a result it has been possible for Member States to ignore the concerns
of the drafters of the Directive, to exclude from the protection of the Directive many
present-day employment relationships and to allow the traditional "contract of
employmentN
 to determine the extent of coverage. 50 With the changing nature of
employment this "figment of the law' 51 has become outdated to the extent that it
cannot, even with a wide stretch of the imagination, be made to cover many
contemporary, but atypical forms of employment. Two pertinent observations will
illustrate the serious need to rethink and to come up with a new statement of meaning
of the term "employee". First, the increase in part-time work and temporary work,
including that of casual workers and agency-supplied labour, is no longer a new
phenomenon and has been well documented. The growth in flexible employment
mostly concerns women who try to fit working hours in with family responsibilities and
who should, as much as any other "employee", be able to qualify for employment
protection rights.
The second observation concerns the nature of the employer/employee
relationship which has traditionally been defined in terms of the "control" exerted by
Bob Hepple, Main Shortcomings and Proposals for Revision of Council Directive 77/187/EEC
(December 1990)(Report for the Commission of the European Communities, unpublished).
49Foreningen af Arbejdsledere i Danmark v A,i Danmols Invents,, [1985] E.C.R. 2639 (E.C.J.).
50There is a wide divergence between the laws of different countries. Whereas the French law has been
interpreted to cover most employment relationships, the United Kingdom's Transfer of Undertakings
(Protection of Employment) Regulations extend only to a contract of employment."
'O. Kahn-Freund, The Institutions of Private Law and Their Social Functions 166 (K. Rennet ed.,
London 1949).
See,e.g., B.A. Hepple, The Harmonisation of Labour Law in the EEC: A British Perspective," 6 Recht
der Arbeit 348,350(1989). He mentions that in the United Kingdom, from March 1983 to March 1988 there
was a growth of nearly 4.3% in the full-time workforce and a growth of 28.2% in the part-time workforce.
In 1951 part.timers constituted 4% of all those in employment; by 1987 they were 23% of those in work and
more than four-fifths of these were women.
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the employer. This "control relationship" dominated the thoughts expressed by
Advocate General Slynn in Mikkelsen concerning a possible definition of the term
"employee" He suggested that, should the need for a Community-wide definition of
this term arise, an acceptable definition of employee would be "one who in return for
remuneration agrees to work for another and who can as a matter of law be directed
as to what he does and how he does it, whether pursuant to a contract of employment
or employment relationship." Elaborating further on the matter of "control" he stated
that Nthe question is whether the individual concerned has bound himself, or put
himself into an employment relationship where he can be required to carry out
instructions pursuant to that contract or relationship. The question in each case is
whether he is subject to control...".
This definition can be critisised on the basis that while historically "control" may
have characterised the employment relationship, and probably still does in professions
which require a limited amount of expertise, this is no longer true for the work
performed by the highly-skilled or professional worker who is the sole judge of "how"
tasks should be performed. Because the "control" test is difficult, if not impossible to
apply in relation to many modern employment relationships, Professor Hepple
suggested that transfer rights should apply to all those in gainful employment whatever
the precise legal form of the relationship. He suggested that an employment
relationship be defined as "any agreement in return for gain to do or perform
personally any work or services for another person.
The rights and obligations which are transferred, are those Nexisting on the date
of the transfer. For a while there was uncertainty whether "date" meant moment" of
the transfer, TM but since the decision in Bok Internat!onalss this doubt is of no great
consequence. The Court decided that workers who were dismissed as a result of the
transfer, and therefore in contravention of article 4(1) of the Directive, must be
Bob Hepple, Main Shortcomings and Proposals for Revision of Council Directive 77/187/EEC 75
(December 1 990)(Report for the Commission of the European Communities, unpublished). This suggestion
only follows the Community rules on free movement which apply to all those in gainful employment, with
the exclusion of those who work for only a few hours or days and those not engaged in economic activities,
for example amateur sports players.
54ln Knud Wendelboe v. L.J. Music ApS, [1985] E.C.R. 457 (E.C.J.) and Foreningen a! Arbejdsledere
iDanmark vA,'S Danmols Inventar, (1985] E.C.R. 2639 (E.C.J.) the question did not &ise for immmediate
decision but A.G.Slynn was of the opinion that the words "date" and "time or "moment" were interchange-
able.
P. Born International A/S v. Foreningen a! Arbejds!edere I Danmark, (1989] I.R.LR. 41 (E.C.J.).
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considered as still employed by the undertaking on the date of the transfer. All the
transferor's obligations towards them in such a situation are transferred to the
transferee. In the case of a valid dismissal, however, no rights and obligations exist
on the date of a transfer and the automatic transfer rule does not apply.
Liability in respect of rights and obligations generally extends to the transferee,
although the Directive allows member states the option to hold the transferor and
transferee jointly liable. In all circumstances excluding insolvency, this option
provides for a fair allocation of responsibility and seems the desired course to take,
even though it may be necessary to limit the transferor's liability to obligations which
arose in the period of one year immediately before the transfer, 57
 and to impose a
time limit for liability.
4.	 Consent
The Directive does not make it clear whether the protection of acquired rights
of employees necessarily implies that employees' traditional freedom of contract,
which the English case of Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd. so
emphatically defended, cannot be maintained. In the majority of cases, employees will
be concerned with the continuation of employment and the issue of a choice to the
contrary will therefore not arise. Relatively few employees show great concern for their
traditional freedom of contract in the event of a transfer, and most employees, instead
of abandoning the transferee's employment have a deep-seated interest in keeping
their jobs. However, occasionally an employee may wish to object to the transfer of
the employment relationship to a new employer, and the European Court, in fact, has
had to decide two such cases, Berg, Busschers, Besselsen and recently, Katsikas
v. Konstantinidis61
Art. 3(1) para. 2.
7'Bob Hepple, Main Shortcomings and Proposals for Revision of Council Directive 77/187,/EEC 81
(December 1990)(Report for the Commission of the European Communities, unpublished).
In the Netherlands and Germany the time limit is one year from the date of transfer, and in Spain three
years.
[194OJ App. Cas. 1014 (H.L).
60Hariy Berg and Johannes Theodorus Maria Busschers v. Iwo Marten Besse!sen, [19891 3 C.M.LR.
817 (E.C.J.).
61 (19931 I.R.LR. 179 (E.C.J.).
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In Berg the employees argued that it was not possible to transfer the
transferor's obligations to them to another without their consent. Logically, their
argument has some merit if one considers that an employer who wishes to acquire a
business has complete freedom to obtain information about the staff before deciding
to purchase the undertaking. The employees, on the other hand, have no choice
regarding the identity of the transferee. Moreover, it is a well established principle in
international labour law that labour is not a commodity and employees should
therefore be protected from being sold or transferred involuntarily.
The Court came to a different conclusion, however, stating that:
this [D]irective is intended to safeguard the rights of workers in the event of a change
of employer by making it possible for them to continue to work for the transferee under
the same conditions as those agreed with the transferor. Its purpose is not, however, to
ensure that the contract of employment or the employment relationship with the transferor
is continued where the undertaking's employees do not wish to remain in the transferee's
employ'
According to the Court, the transferor is released from his obligations as an employer
solely by reason of the transfer (unless Member States provide for joint liability of the
transferor and transferee following the transfer) and this legal consequence is not
conditional on the consent of the employees concerned. The most obvious reason
for the Court's preference can be found in the dual concern of the Directive with capital
mobility and employment protection. At the same time it is fair to wonder about
the necessity of rescinding a basic common law right which employees will wish to
exercise in a minority of cases, and to be wary of any inclination towards a new regime
of serfdom, especially since the likelihood is small that a ruling which permitted
employees to object to a transfer in good time would have been a big obstacle to
The Constitution of the International Labour Organization, 1919, Art. 41.
Harr,r Berg and Johannes Theodorus Maria Busschers v. Ivo Marten Besselsen, [1989] 3 C.M.LR.
817, 826 (E.C.J.).
MThis deviation from earlier opinion seems to be best explained by the dual concern which Advocate
General Mancini stated explicitly in his opinion when he expressed the fear that the purpose of the Directive
- to facilitate mobility of enterprises while protecting the rights of their staff- would be frustrated by the
necessity of obtaining the consent of all employees concerned. (Hariy Berg and Johannes Theodorus
Maria Busschers v. Ivo Marten Besselsen, [ 1989] 3 C.M.LR. 817, 821 (E.C.J.)). His statement reminds us
of the two sides of the Directive, which Davies calls the employment protection side and the business
promotion side. (P.L Davies, Acquired Rights, Creditors' Rights, Freedom of Contract, and Industrial
Democracya, 9 Y.B. Eur. L 21, 50 (1989)). The Social Action Programme, as much as it was concerned
with the elimination of costly injustices to workers, also anticipated that the protection of acquired rights
should not hinder the mobility and integration of capital, and against this background the Court's support
for the facilitation of business transfers is understandable.
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capital concentrations. It seems to be a retrogressive step to limit employees'
choice to only two options: a right to claim constructive dismissal in instances of
transfer resulting in a substantial change in working conditions which is to their
detriment, as provided for in Article 4(2) of the Directive, or freedom to terminate the
employment relationship in terms of the contract. The first option requires specific
proof of significant and detrimental changes and does not apply to objections based
on the identity of the employer. The unilateral freedom allowed under the second
option is inadequate in that an employee cannot claim compensation from an
employer, be it the transferor or transferee.
The basis for the objections which could have been raised against the Berg
decision has recently been removed by the decision of the European Court in Katsikas
v. Konstantinidis which puts the Berg decision in perspective. The Court interpreted
Berg as not meaning that an employee employed by the transferor at the date of the
transfer of the undertaking is precluded from objecting to the transfer to the transferee
of the employee's contract of employment or employment relationship. Implanted
notions of the non-assignability of employment contracts find expression in the Court's
opinion that the Directive cannot be interpreted as obliging the employee to continue
the employment relationship with the transferee. The Court perceived that the
imposition of such an obligation would undermine the fundamental rights of the
employee who must be free to choose an employer and cannot be obliged to work
for an employer that the employee has not freely chosen. According to the Court, it
is for Member States to decide the fate of the contract of employment or of the
employment relationship in cases where the employee do not wish to remain in the
transferee's employ. The contract can either be seen as repudiated, or as to be
continued with the transferor.
5.	 Collective provisions
The individual provisions of the Directive are complemented by the collective
provisions which seek to warrant the continued application of collectively agreed terms
Professor Hepple's recommendation in his report for the Commission of the European Communities
was that the contract of employment or employment relationship should not be transferred if the employee
objected to such transfer in good time. (Bob Hepple, Main Shortcomings and Proposals for Revision of
Council Directive 77/187/EEC (December 1 990)(Report for the Commission of the European Communities,
unpublished)).
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and conditions by the transferee, for a period of not less than one year. Within this
time the transferee and employee representatives can negotiate a new agreement --
which may be desirable, especially if conditions have to correlate with those of
employees already employed by the transferee -- but in the meantime employees
whose contract of employment or employment relationship is in existence at the time
of the transfer will enjoy terms which are no less favorable than those which apply at
the date of transfer.67
The collective aspect of the Directive also extends to protection for employee
representatives, whose status and function, as laid down by the laws, regulations or
administrative provisions of the Member States, will be preserved, but only if the
business preserves its autonomyN after the transfer. This means that the protection
will fall away when a business becomes part of a bigger economic entity. A more
comprehensive, and not necessarily very cumbersome, protection would have been
to allow employee representatives of the transferred or controlled undertaking to
continue to operate with representatives of employees in the new undertaking.
6.	 Protection against dismissal
The automatic transfer provisions acquire their full force through Article 4 which
prohibits the dismissal of an employee before or after the transfer. However, the
provision that the transfer TM shall not in itself constitute grounds for dismissal by the
transferor or transferee is qualified to permit udismissals that may take place for
economic, technical or organisational reasons entailing changes in the workforce.
This potentially wide exemption was obviously introduced so as not to weigh down the
conduct of business and obstruct mergers and takeovers which may occur as part of
such conduct. But a careful interpretation of permissible reasons for dismissal is of
the utmost importance for retaining the effect of acquired rights protection, and the just
fear is that this exemption will eat away the protection. The European Court of Justice,
Art. 3(2).
67Landsorganisationen I Denmark for Tjenerforbundet I Denmark v. Ny Molle Kro, [1987] E.C.R. 11
(E.C.J.).
MArt. 5(1).
Professor Hepple proposed that the existing provisions be amended to this effe. (Bob Hepple, Main
Shortcomings and Proposals for Revision of Council Directive 77/187/EEC (December 1990)(Report for the
Commission of the European Communities, unpublished)).
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in the Bork case, 7° has given some guidance on the interpretation of economic and
stated that Naccount must be taken of all the objective circumstances in which the
dismissal occurred, and, in particular ... the fact that it took place on a date close to
that of the transfer and that the workers concerned were re-engaged by the
transferee . N
 Such an occurrence will lead to the inference that the dismissal was not
an economic one, but was connected to the transfer. The Court also made the
critical observation that:
workers employed by the undertaking whose contract of employment or employment
relationship has been terminated with effect on a date before that of the transfer, in
breach of Article 4(1) of the Directive, must be considered as still employed by the
undertaking on the date of the transfer with the consequence, in particular, that the
obligations of an employer towards them are fully transferred from the transferor to the
transferee, in accordance with Article 3(1) of the Directive.
Although the Court in the Bork case hinted at an objective standard for
determining NeconomicN reasons for dismissal, it is submitted that it did not go far
enough in explaining the level of penetration of such a standard. Does objectivity
require a tribunal to examine an employer's financial position and prospects in order
to decide whether dismissals were economically justified, or is it sufficient to accept
the employer's subjective judgment in this regard? The latter interpretation will only
leave a tribunal with the task of determining whether the employer's decision
necessarily resulted in changes in the numbers or functions of the workforce, without
questioning the evidence on which such a decision was based so as to evaluate the
decision itself. If tribunals are unwilling to penetrate the employer's decision, at least
to the extent of examining evidence that the employer was motivated by an economic,
technical or operational reason, the permitted exemption can easily destroy the
primary aim of the Directive and devour much of the protection of job security.
Implementation of the Transfers Directive In the UK
Implementing legislation for the Transfers Directive in the United Kingdom was
finally adopted in 1981, with a remarkable lack of enthusiasmu, as the responsible
minister himself pointed out. 7' The policy of the Conservative Government which
came into power in May 1979 had been to resist, and determinedly attack, Community
regulation as burdens for the development of new forms of employment and business
efficiency. Subordinate, and not primary, legislation was chosen to implement the
70p. Born International A v. Foreningen a! Arbejdsledere I Danmark, [1989] I.R.LR. 41, 44 (E.C.J.).
'14 Pail. Deb., H.C. (6th ser.) cols. 677, 680, 695, 696 (December 7, 1981).
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Directive, with several unfortunate consequences, due to the fact that the scope had
to be limited to avoid the risks of challenges on grounds of ultra vires, and that no
textual changes could be made to existing legislation. The introduction of subordinate
legislation also meant that there was limited discussion and no possibility of
amendment by Parliament.
Several provisions of the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment)
Regulations 198172 evidenced a want of sympathy for the Directive and, as such,
were applied for over a decade. In 1992, however, the European Commission, in a
report on the treatment of the Acquired Rights Directive in different Member States,73
criticized aspects of the UK's Regulations which did not conform adequately with the
Directive,74 and initiated proceedings against the UK before the European Court of
Justice. The UK Government subsequently gave an undertaking to make most of the
required changes to the law, 75 and, in November 1992, introduced the Trade Union
Reform and Employment Rights Bill (TURER) into Parliament.
1.	 Application
The Regulations apply to a transfer of an undertaking from one person to
another, and declare that a transfer may be effected by a series of two or more
transactions between the same parties, whether or not any property is transferred to
the transferee by the transferor. 76 The test used in the UK to determine the existence
72S1 1981, No. 1794 as amended in minor respects by SI. 1987, No. 442 (TUPE), made under sec.
2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 which authorises the Crown in Council and any designated
Minister or Department by regulations to make provision:
(i) to put into effect those treaty and other obligations which are not directly applicable or effective
by virtue of section 2(1); and
(ii) to fill out and to make specific provision within the context and limits of UK law those Treaty
and other Community obligations which are directly applicable or effective...
73Commission Repo.'t to the Council (adopted on 2 June 1992) on progress with regard to the
implementation of Directive 77/187/EEC relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of
transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses. See Brian Napier, CCT, Market Testing and
Employment Rights: The Effects of TUPE and the Acquired Rights Directive 9 (Streatham 1993)(publication
sponsored by the Institute of Employment Rights).
7 rhe five main points of criticism concerned the British system for appointing workers' representatives,
the requirement that the transferor had to be the owner of the undertaking, the exdusion of undertakings
not in the nature of a commercial venture, inadequate sanctions and the weak consultation requirement
which omitted to state that consultation had to be 'with a view to seeking agreement s as reguired by aft.
6(2) of the Directive.
75With the exception of changing the system for appointing workers' representatives.
76TUPE 1981, Regulations 3(1) and 3(4), as amended by TURER 1993, sec. 32(3).
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of a transfer corresponds in broad terms to the interpretation of the Directive. UK
Courts have accepted the requirement that an economic entity retains its identity and
have taken factors such as the effects of the transfer with regard to the assets, staff,
customers and the type of enterprise into account. Courts have excluded a transfer
of assets alone unless such assets constitute the essence of the business. 78 It
can be expected that a transfer incorporating all the criteria will most probably be
regarded as a relevant transfer. Between these extremes many variations can occur
and it is possible, given the indeterminate nature of the criteria, that under certain
circumstances a transfer of a majority of employees to the transferee will not be
covered, although a strong argument could certainly be made that such a possibility
is at odds with the clearly stated purpose of the Directive which is to protect the
interests of employees.79
Where the UK Regulations at first only applied to ownership transfers 8° the
TURER amendments make it clear that a change of ownership is not required in order
to find a relevant transfer. 81 Decided cases in the United Kingdom which suggested
that the Regulations only applied to transfers involving a change of ownership are now
clearly of no significance. Decisions by the Courts which excluded franchising and
sub-contracting arrangements in every instance where the franchisor, sub-contractor
or transferor did not in effect own the business or part of a business which was being
transferred, or which denied employees protection when a transferee acquired
possession of a business and started to run it before the change of ownership
occurred, and also when a franchise was surrendered and re-granted without there
Melon v. Hector Powe Ltd., [1981] I.C.R. 43 (H.L).
78LIoyd v. Brassey, [1969] 2 O.B. 98 (C.A.).
79See, e.g., Abe/s v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor do Metaalindustrie en do Electrotechnische
Industrie, (1985] E.C.R. 469, 484 (E.C.J.); Harry Berg and Johannes Theodorus Maria Busschers V. No
Marten Besselsen, [1989] 3 C.M.LR. 817 (E.C.J.).
80Brook Lane Finance v. Bradley, [1988] I.R.LR. 283 (EAT.); Robert Seligman Corp v. Baker, [1983)
I.C.R. 770 (E.A.T.).
81 TURER 1993, sec. 32(3).
Robert Seligman Corp. v. Baker, [1983] I.C.R. 770 (EAT.); Hadden v. University of Dundee Students
Association, [1985] I.R.LR. 449 (E.A.T.).
Brook Lane Finance v. Bradley, [1988] I.R.LR. 283 (E.A.T.).
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being any transfer of goodwill,M now have to be read in the light of the latest
amendments to the law and the guidance of the European Court of Justice in Rask v.
ISS Kantineservice A/S.as There is no basis for making ownership of goodwill or
premises a prerequisite for the transfer of an "economic entity", and for excluding
employees working for a subcontractor or licensee from the protection of acquired
rights. Limiting transfer protection in this way is neither justified nor authorised by the
Transfers Directive, which suggests that protection should extend to transfers of
employer. It may even be necessary to rethink the use of the term "employer " , which
is normally a "mystification of reality " , as Lord Wedderburn pointed out, and to
concentrate more on centres of decision and of power.87
The UK Regulations, before the amendments in TURER, did not apply to
transfers of undertakings "not in the nature of a commercial venture.es It was
generally understood that this exclusion applied to all ventures in which capital was
not invested with a view to profit and a risk of loss. On the basis of this interpretation
Courts excluded any undertakings not interested in financial gain, for example a
Quaker school and a student cafeteria 90 which aimed at breaking even. Similarly,
the contracting out of a catering service by a public body, which was operated
commercially after the transaction, was held not to be in the nature of a commercial
venture.91 Since the Directive applies to the transfer of a "business" 92 and therefore
arguably to all economic activities, serious questions were raised with regard to the
Aobert Seligman Corp v. Baker, [1983] I.C.R. 770 (E.A.T.). In Stirling v. Dietsmann Management
Systems Ltd., [1991] I.R.LR. 368 (E.A.T.), the absence of transfer of either physical assets or goodwill was
held to preclude the application of the Regulations.
[1993] I.R.LR. 133 (E.C.J.).
8kord Wedderburn, "Labour Law Autonomy from the Common Law?," 9 Camp. Lab. U. 219, 243
(1987).
87See Lord Wedderburn, "Labour Law-i Autonomy from the Common Law?," 9 Camp. Lab. U. 219,243
(1987), quoting Gerard Lyon-Caen, "Du Role des Principles Generaux du Droit Civil en Droit du Travail
(Premiere Approche)," Rev. Trimestrielle de Droit Civil 229, 231 (1974).
TUPE 1981, Regulation 2(1). This exclusion was removed by TURER Act 1993 sec. 32(2).
89WOOdCOCk v. Friends School of Wigton, [1987] I.R.LR. 98 (C.A.).
90Hadden v. Universiy of Dundee Students' Association, [1985] LR.LR. 449 (EAT.).
9 'Expro Seivices Ltd. v. Smith, [1991] I.R.LR. 156 (E.A.T.).
92Art. 1(1).
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UK Regulations' consistency with the objectives of the Directive. Subsequent
disapproval came from the European Commission which, in its 1992 report,9'
criticized the exclusion of undertakings 'not in the nature of a commercial venture' as
being an unacceptable diversion form the Directive. The Government, while denying
that it did not comply with Community obligations, finally removed this exclusion.
The 'commercial venture" requirement has been particularly controversial
because of its potential to exclude all kinds of 'privatisation exercises of Govern-
ment. Privatisation of both central and local Government services has been a
central pillar of Conservative economic policy since the 1980s. Areas ranging from
refuse collection to management of prisons, from provision of health services to
computer operations, have been affected by the policy, with the aim of subjecting such
services to the competition of the market and to offer best value for money. The
Government's privatisation programme, rests on the assumption that '[t]he free
operation of the market is the best way of delivering greater choice, higher productivity
and better quality services at lower prices.' 97 In the vigorous pursuit of this liberal
economic idea, the Government tends to disregard the incongruity which often exists
between the goals of greater efficiency and cost savings, and pays no heed to
criticisms of those who point to a deterioration of both the quality of services and
employment conditions of employees.
Lately, there has been renewed interest and debate, with occasional
Bob Hepple and Angela Byte, The Application of EEC Labour Law in the United Kingdom (September
1988) (Study commissioned by the Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Education of the
Commission of the European Communities); R.W. Rideout, "The Great Transfer of Employee Rights Hoax,
35 Current Legal Probs. 236 (1982).
9'Commission Report to the Council (adopted on 2 June 1992) on progress with regard to the
implementation of Directive 77/187/EEC relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of
transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses.
Brian Napier, CCT, Market Testing and Employment Rights: The Effects of TUPE and the Acquired
Rights Directive 5 (Streatham 1993)(publication sponsored by the Institute of Employment Rights).
The programme is known by various names such as facilities management" (usually referring to
contracting-out of a particular service), "compulsory competitive tendering' (CCT) (referring to the provision
of local Government services), 'market testing" (referring to the provision of central Government services).
97see Brian Napier, CCT, Market Testing and Employment Rights: The Effects of TUPE and the
Acquired Rights Directive 1 (Streatham 1 993)(publication sponsored by the Institute of Employment Rights),
quoting Secretary of State for the Environment, 119 Pan. Deb., H.C. col. 80.
9'See Brian Napier, CCT, Market Testing and Employment Rights: The Effects of TUPE and the
Acquired Rights Directive 2 (Streatham 1 993)(publication sponsored by the Institute of Employment Rights),
quoting Privatisation, Disaster for Quality, Public Services Privatisation Research Unit (March 1992).
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expressions of outrage or expectancy, over the application of the Transfer Regulations.
The Government has continued to express a firm belief in the beneficial operation of
market forces and has sought to deny that the latest legal developments will seriously
impede its programme. Employers, however, have expressed disquiet about the
anti-competitive aspects of the Transfer Regulations which could make it too expensive
for small contractors to bid for contracts when they have to maintain exisiting
conditions of employment for employees.' 00 These views do not take into account
the factor that resources typically move from the public to the private sector with
potentially powerful consequences for the rights of employees. 101 The most weighty
consideration for employees is the almost inevitable reduction in labour costs which
follows most privatisation exercises and which means either a substantial worsening
of employment conditions for employees who continue to work in the operation, or
staff redundancies.
Were it not for the tact that the relationship between privatisation and
employment protection rights is to a certain extent controlled by Community law and
therefore outside the Government's exclusive authority, the repercussions which the
transfer from public to private sector has for the rights of employees would probably
never have been discussed at Government level. However, the Government has been
forced to pay attention because of the way in which the case law of the European
Court of Justice has developed. Cases suggest that the reach of the Directive may
extend to public sector transfers of undertakings which are regarded as non-
commercial, 102 as well as to the contracting-out of services. 103 In addition, the
ln a statement made by Mr. Michael Forsyth, Minister of State, Department of Employment, on Trade
Union Reform and Employment Rights Bill, 214 Pail. Deb., H.C. (6th series) col. 340 (19 November 1992),
he implied that all along the TUPE Regulations had applied to the public sector ("The fact is that the
Regulations have always covered the public sector.). Mr Waldegrave, a senior minister, has stated that the
general position in relation to market testing is unaffected by recent decisions of the E.C.J., 216 Pan. Deb.,
H.C. (6th series) col. 537 (11 January 1993).
'°°See Brian Napier, CCT, Market Testing and Employment Rights: The Effects of TUPE and the
Acquired Rights Directive 10 (Streatham 1 993)(pubtication sponsored by the Institute of Employment Rights)
who refers to reports of several contractors such as Paul Gosling, "Contracting out - into Trouble," The
Independent (12 November 1992), and Alan Millar in Corn. Motor (7-13 January 1993).
'°'The significance of market testing on employment rights was the subject of a study by Professor
Brian Napier. In CCT, Market Testing and Employment Rights: The Effects of TUPE and the Acquired
Rights Directive (Streatham 1993)(publication sponsored by the Institute of Employment Rights) Professor
Napier's specific concern was with how the regulatory framework of employment law, operating at both the
domestic and the European Community level, applies to the transfer of staff from public to private sector
employment.
1 °2Dr Sophie Redmond Stichting v. Bartol, [1992] I.R.LR. 366 (E.C.J.).
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European Court of Justice provided an opening for an employee to object to being
transferred, and even, if a Member State decides to allow this option, to continue the
contract of employment with the transferor.'° 4 The latest cases confirm the senti-
ment that a proper interpretation of the Directive has to be teleological rather than
historical, 105 and consistent with the aim of employee protection. 105 On one
occasion, the Advocate General made the remark that the primary aim of the Directive
was to prevent the process of restructuring of firms being carried out to the detriment
of employees. 107 In another case the Advocate General (Van Gerven) pointed out
that the Directive has to be interpreted against the background of Article 117 of the
EEC Treaty, 10 promote improved working conditions and an improved standard of
living for workers." 1 °8 Since Courts in the UK have an obligation to give a purposeful
construction to the Regulations, the decisions of the European Court of Justice can
have a considerable impact. The latest decisions, in combination with amending
legislation, will force Courts in the UK to adopt a less restrictive approach than
previously to the Regulations. It is clear that many public sector transfers, even though
they are not Ncommercial,N fall within the scope of the Directive. 109 The scope is
narrowed mainly by the requirement that there must be a retention of identity, as this
appears from all the factual circumstances of the transaction.°
'°3(...continued)
103Rask and Christensen v. ISS Kantineservice A,, [1993] I.R.LR. 133 (E.C.J.).
10¼atsikas v. Konstantinidis, [1993] I.R.LR. 179 (E.C.J.). The European Court left it for domestic law
to determine whether the contract with the transferor continues or not. The UK Government's choice is to
regard the contract as terminated and it ruled out the possibility that an employee's objection be treated
as a dismissal which would give rise to a redundancy entitlement.
'°51n R. v. Henn, [1981] App. Cas. 850 (H.L), Lord Diplock made the remark: The European Court, in
contrast to the English Courts, applies teleological rather than historical methods to the interpretation of the
Treaties and other Community legislation. It seeks to give effect to what it conceives to be the spirit rather
than the letter of the Treaties?
106This thought influenced, e.g. Abe/s v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalindustrie en
de Electrotechnische Industrie, [1985] E.C.R. 469 (E.C.J.); Hany Berg and Johannes Theodorus Maria
Busschers v. Ivo Marten Besselsen, [ 1989] 3 C.M.LR. 817 (E.C.J.).
107Advocate General (Van Gerven) in Dr Sophie Redmond Stichting v. Bartol, [1992] I.R.LR. 366
(E.C.J.).
108D'Urso v. Ercole Mare/li Elettromecanica Generale SpA, [1992] I.R.LR. 136 (E.C.J.).
' 091n Dr Sophie Redmond Stichting v. Battol, [1992] I.R.LR. 366 (E.C.J.), the E.C.J. held that the
Directive was capable of applying to transfers of undertakings which were financed by means of public
subsidies.
' 1 °The most important decision is probably Spijkers v. Gebroeders Benedik Abaffoir C.V., [1986] 2
C.M.LR. 296 (E.C.J.).
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2.	 Dismissals arising in the context of a business transfer
Regulation 5(1) prevents a transfer from operating so as to terminate the
contract of employment of any employee. This provision has not been easy to apply,
primarily because of uncertainty as to which employees are subject to compulsory
transfer. For many years the most seriously debated judicial question regarding the
individual transfer provisions concerned the Regulation which states that the persons
whose contracts are transferred are those "employed immediately before the
transfer."" The question had the potential to render the automatic transfer
provisions powerless if the Courts were to decide that employees who were dismissed
before the transfer did not qualify for protection because they were not employed
immediately before the transfer. In a series of alarming decisions this view held sway
in Courts of first appeal 112 until the House of Lords finally restored the protection
which the compulsory transfer of contracts of employment was intended to convey.
The Litster" 3 case concerned the dismissal of employees by the transferor an hour
before the completion of the transfer. It was convincingly argued that the drafters of
the Regulations could hardly have "contemplated that, where the only reason for the
termination of the employment is the transfer of the undertaking... the parties to the
transfer would be at liberty to avoid the manifest purpose of the Directive by the simple
expedient of wrongfully dismissing the workforce a few minutes before the completion
of the transfer."" 4 The House of Lords accepted this purposive interpretation of the
Regulations" 5 and ruled accordingly that employees who were unfairly dismissed
as a result of the transfer, had to be treated as still employed and therefore subject to
the automatic transfer provisions." 6 The method by which this conclusion was
reached is interesting, especially since there was no clear ambiguity in the UK
Regulations. In the light of the European law and the decision of the European Court
' 11 TUPE 1981, Regulation 5(3).
" 2Secretarj, of State v. Spence, [1986] I.C.R. 651 (C.A.); Fo,M Estuary Engineering v. Litster, [1988]
I.R.LR. 289 (C.A.); Wheeler v. Pate!, [1987] I.C.R. 631 (E.A.T.).
113LJtster v. Forth Dry Dock and Engineering Company, [1989] I.C.R. 341 (H.L). See Hugh Collins,
"Transfer of Undertakings and Insolvency," 18 Indus. U. 144 (1989).
1 1 4 (1989] I.C.R. 341, 357 (H.L).
' 15See Bob Hepple and Angela Byre, "EEC Labour Law in the United Kingdom - A New Approach," 18
Indus. U. 129 (1989) regarding the "purposive construction" of United Kingdom legislation.
116(1989] I.C.R. 341, 371 (H.L).
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in the Bork" 7 case the House of Lords was willing to accept that the legislation
could reasonably be construedN to bear the given meaning and stated: in effect this
involves reading Regulation 5(3) as if there were inserted after the words immediately
before the transfer the words or would have been so employed if he had not been
unfairly dismissed 118 A purposive interpretation of the Regulations has since been
endorsed in the Community decision in Mar/easing SA v. La Comercial Internaciona!
de Alimentacion SA,' 19 and applied by the House of Lords in Webb v. EMO (Air
Cargo) UK Ltd., 12° with the important qualification, though, that the Mar/easing
doctrine cannot help where there is a direct conflict between a UK statute and
Community law.
3.	 Dismissal for an economic, technical or organisational reason
The Litster case restored the provision that any dismissal connected with a
relevant transfer is automatically unfair to its full meaning.' 21 However, concern that
employers may find the effect of the rule too cumbersome, for instance in the case of
genuine redundancies in the context of business transfers, led to the inclusion of a
broadly formulated exception. Following the wording of the Directive, the UK
Regulations permit dismissals for economic, technical or organisational reasons but
require that such dismissals satisfy the ordinary test for unfair dismissals.'
A case of unfair dismissal usually involves a two phase procedure. After an
employer has proven to an industrial tribunal the reasons for the dismissal, the tribunal
will proceed to consider whether in the circumstances the employer acted reasonably
or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee."
Potentially fair reasons for dismissal may relate to conduct, capability, redundancy,
' 17P. Born International A/S v. Foreningen a! Arbejdsledere i Danmark, [1989] LR.LR. 41 (E.C.J.).
" 8Litster v. Forth Dry Dock and Engineering Comparry, [1989] I.C.R. 341, 371 (H.L).
119Marleasing SA v. La Comercial Internacional de Aiimentacion S4, [1992] 1 c.M.LR. 305 (E.C.J.).
120[19931 I.R.LR. 27 (H.L).
121 Regulation 8(1).
1 TUPE 1981, Regulations 8(1) and 8(2), incorporating secs. 57(1) and 57(3) of the EP(C)A 1978.
Sec. 57(3) of EP(C)A 1978.
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illegality, or "some other substantial reason of a kind such as to justify the dis-
missal."' 24 It is expressly provided that a dismissal for an "economic, technical or
organisational reason" will fall under this last comprehensive heading which serves as
a wide categorisation for reasons which do not fall within the first four categories but
is nonetheless of a kind which could justify dismissal.
Ultimately, the fairness of a dismissal will depend upon an interpretation of an
"economic, technical or organisational reason entailing changes in the workforce."
One interpretation by the Employment Appeal Tribunal gives some hope that the
exception will be construed narrowly. If the present view of the Employment Appeal
Tribunal in England prevails, dismissals of the workforce for the purpose of disposing
of the business, at the insistence of the transferee or to secure a better deal, will not
constitute an "economic " reason, but only dismissals which arise during the conduct
of the business, including therefore most genuine redundancies.' 25 Another hopeful
signal was given by the Court of Appeal in Bernman v. Delabole Slate Ltd.' when
it interpreted the concept of "entailing a change in the workforce" as requiring that the
change in the function or composition of the workforce should be a necessary, and
not simply a possible, consequence of the employer's "economic, technical or
organisational" decision.' 27 In this case the employee refused to accept changes
in terms and conditions which the transferee wanted in order to standardise terms and
conditions for all workers in his employment.
These judicial interpretations of the Regulations, recognising that automatic
transfer of employment would be of little benefit if either the transferor or transferee
were free to dismiss employees for reasons which are directly or indirectly linked to
the transfer, contribute towards the stated aim of safeguarding employee rights. There
is reason for concern, though. In general, employers are given relative freedom to
dismiss for reasons of "business efficiency" and tribunals have shown an unwillingness
to examine the economic reasons proferred by an employer while accepting the
124	 57(1) & (2) of EP(C)A 1978.
'Whee1er v. Pate!, [1987) I.C.R. 631 (E.A.T.).
126[19851 I.C.R. 546, 550-1 (C.A.).
' 27For a discussion of this case, see John McMullen, "Management Prerogativ e, ReorganiSatiOfl and
Employees' Rights on Transfers of Undertakings," 49 Mod. L Rev. 524-529 (1986).
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employer's prerogative to make financial decisions. 1 If the same reticence to
interfere in the exercise of this kind of managerial prerogative appears with regard to
transfers, the dangers remain that tribunals will be unwilling to assess the employer's
decision to dismiss employees for economic reasons, and that the exemption will
provide a wide escape avenue which may be used to undermine the presumption that
dismissal for a reason connected with the transfer is unfair.
Redundancy and reorganisation
Situations of redundancy and reorganisation, like transfer situations, are
characterised by managerial decisions regarding organisational changes which may
present dangers for the rights of employees. The Redundancy Payments Act 1965
was introduced to provide for financial compensation for employees who lost their jobs
because an employer's need for them declined or ceased. This Act, as the first real
piece of statutory employment protection, signified a change from previous legislation
which had always concerned adjustments to the common law of the contract of
employment, and paved the way for the introduction of unfair dismissal legislation.1
One explanation for the introduction of a scheme of financial compensation for
workers has an equitable basis. In the United Kingdom, as in other countries in
Europe, employers, Governments and workers increasingly came Nto accept that the
negative consequences of economic and technological change should be more
equitably shared among employers, workers and the community. 1 However, as
is often the case with the introduction of labour legislation, it was a combination of
specific social, economic and technological factors, rather than a concern for social
justice, that created the environment for its acceptance. During a time of relative high
employment, the aim was to make change due to new technologies acceptable to
workers, and to encourage mobility of labour.' 3' It was hoped that workers who lost
their jobs as a result of the introduction of high technology in some of the more
128See John Bowers and Andrew Clarke, Unfair Dismissal and Managerial Prerogative: A Study of
'Other Substantial Reason', 10 Indus. U. 34-44 (1981).
'Paul Davies and Mark Freedland, Labour Law: Text and Materials 528 (2d ed. London 1984).
130Workforce Reductions in Undertakings 3 (E. Yemin ed., Geneva 1982).
131 Brian Napier, Retention of the Job in the Event of Change in Structure of the Enterprise - Legal
Aspects, 3 Intl J. Comp. Lab. U & Indus. Rel. 158, 159 (1987); R.H. Fryer, The Myths of the Redundancy
Payments ACt, 2 Indus. U. 1 (1973).
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traditional industries would be willing to move to sectors that were experiencing a
labour shortage, and that employees over a broad spectrum would come to accept
the concept of redundancy. A broad characterisation of severance pay in Britain, thus,
suggests some recognition of a property right in a job with the idea that workers
should be compensated for loss of their job security.' In addition, there is an
efficiency rationale aimed at promoting flexibility, and the Redundancy Payments Act
1965 was commonly seen as Npart of an overall manpower policy aimed at securing
a greater acceptance by workers of the need for economic and technological
change."
Statutory redundancy payments' were introduced in Britain after studies
had shown that employers and unions were reluctant to negotiate redundancy
agreements' and that voluntary collective bargaining could not deal adequately
with the problems of industrial restructuring. The statutory scheme has not
replaced voluntary agreements, however, and employers and unions are free to
contract above the statutory minimum. Moreover, the parties to an agreement may
apply for exemption from the statute if certain requirements are met, 137 but this has
rarely happened in practice.1
As an answer to the shortcomings of collective bargaining the statute was only
partially successful. An assessment of statutory redundancy payments in Great Britain
after twenty years, showed that they, in fact, made it easier for employers to achieve
132RH Fryer, The Myths of the Redundancy Payments Act, 2 Indus. U. 1, 8 (1973).
1 S.R. Parker, C.G. Thomas, N.D. Ellis and W.E.J. McCarthy, Effects of the Redundancy Payments Act
3 (London 1971).
'"Redundancy payments are made by employers, who could originally claim a rebate of 70% from the
State Redundancy Fund, but the rebate had been progressively reduced over the years, and was finally
abolished in 1986 (Wages Act, 1986), except for companies employing fewer than ten employees.
Redundancy rebates were completely abolished by the Employment Act 1989. This means that small
employers whose right to a rebate was preserved by the Wages Act 1986 lost this entitlement from 16
January 1990. Firms can, however, set off redundancy pay as an expense against corporation tax.
1 Donovan Commission, Report of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers
Associations, Cmnd. 3623 (1968).
'Paul Lewis, Twenty Years of Statutory Redundancy Payments in Great Britain 4 (1985) (Leeds-
Nottingham Occasional Papers in Industrial Relations).
1371he Secretary of State may exempt collective redundancy agreements under sec. 96, EP(C)A.
1 Paul Lewis, Twenty Years of StaMory Redundancy Payments in Great Britain 13 (1985) (Leeds-
Nottingham Occasional Papers in Industrial Relations).
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redundancies. On the one hand, reduced opposition from workers during major
restructuring was noted, apparently because financial compensation removed the fear
of insecurity.' On the other hand, it was found that employees were not adequate-
ly compensated for job loss, partly because as many as fifty per cent of redundant
workers were not covered by the scheme, and partly because the compensation for
those who received it was inadequate. 140
 Only a minority of workers received
negotiated payments in excess of the statutory amounts. 14' With a very limited
range of alternative jobs, it seemed as if most of the workers who had been made
redundant joined the ranks of the retired or the unemployed.'42
The legislation provides' that employees over the age of eighteen with a
minimum of two years' service who are made redundant are entitled to a lump sum
payment which is calculated according to age, length of continuous service and
weekly pay.'" In order to qualify for compensation for the loss of a job, employees
have to prove that they have been dismissed. A dismissal is taken to be for reason
of redundancy if it results from an employer's decision to close a business or part of
a business, or to move the business to another place, or to change the requirements
of the business in a way that employees become superfluous.' 45 Redundancy as
defined in the Act concerns mainly two types of situation, one where a business is
shut down, and the other where an enterprise continues to function but with a decline
'Id. at 31.
' 401d. at 29.
14'!d. at 30.
' 421d at 31.
'Redundancy Payments Act 1965 (now EP(C)A Part VI).
'"For details see Brian Napier, Retention of Job in the Event of Change in Structure of the Enterprise -
Legal Aspects, 3 Intl J. Comp. Lab. L & Indus. Rel. 158 (1987); S.D. Anderman, Unfair Dismissals and
Redundancy, in Labour Law in Britain 433 (A. Lewis ed., Oxford 1986).
145A dismissal is taken to be for reason of redundancy under sec. 81 (2)(EP(C)A Past VI) if it is
attributable wholly or mainly to:
(a) the fact that [the] employer has ceased, or intends to cease, to carry on the business for the
purposes of which the employee was employed by him, or has ceased, or intends to cease, to
carry on that business in the place where the employee was so employed, or (b) the fact that the
requirements of that business for employees to carry out work of a particular kind, or for
employees to carry out work of a particular kind in the place where they were so employed, have
ceased or diminished or are expected to cease or diminish.
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in demand for work of a particular kind.' The first type of situation has not been
difficult to characterise, but Courts have had problems in deciding which circum-
stances qualify as a redundancy in the second group of cases. The Act, instead of
including all dismissals "for one or more reasons not related to the individual workers
concerned",' 47 relied on a job-related definition of redundancy. As a result, when
changes of a technical or social nature occur which make it impossible for employees
to perform their jobs, they do not qualify as redundancy dismissals if the jobs still exist
in principle. The failure of the statute to provide workers with extensive legal protection
in the case of job loss for economic reasons, has been aggravated by the reluctance
of judges to interpret provisions of the statute so as to give effect to their protective
aim. The decisions on whether an employee qualifies for a payment have developed
in a way that not only places no check on an employer's decision to make workers
redundant, but also construes art employee's contract of employment to imply
flexibility as to tasks, 1 place 149 and hours of work.' 5° As a result, employees
who have been affected by business reorganisations and have refused to go along
with changes in terms and conditions, have been dismissed without being able to
claim statutory redundancy payment.
Thus, when a pub was refurbished to reflect a youthful ambience a middle-aged
barmaid had to make way for a more attractive younger girl. It was held, however, that
there was no redundancy because the work had not really changed and the job
vacancy remained.' 5' Another employee unable to claim statutory redundancy
payment was a workshop manager who did not have the skills to operate new car-
servicing equipment introduced when a new company took over the garage for which
148The second part of the definition characterises as redundancy'The fact that the requirements of (thel
business for employees to carry out work of a particular kind or for employees to carry out work of a
particular kind in the place where [the employee was employed] have ceased or diminished or are expected
to cease or diminish (EP(C)A 1978, sec. 81 (2)(b)).
' 47Council Directive 75/129 of 17 February 1975, Art. 1.
1 'North Riding Garages v. Butterwick, [1967] 2 Q.B. 56 (Div'l Ci).
1 Geographicai mobility is a matter on which a contractual term will normally be implied, although its
content will vary. See Jones v. Associated Tunnelling Co. Ltd., [1981] I.R.LR. 477 (EAT.); but cL Murpfry
v. Epsom College, (1985] I.R.LR. 80 (C.A.).
' 50Johnson v. Nottinghamshire Combined Police Authority, (1974] I.C.R. 170 (CA); Lesney Products
Ltd. v. Nolan, [1977] I.C.R. 235 (C.A.).
151 Vaur and Associated Breweries v. Ward, [1968] 112 Sol. J. 761 (Div'l Ct.); [1969] 113 Sol. J. 920
(Div'l Ct.).
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he had worked for several years. The Court asserted that an employee had to have
the ability to adapt to new methods and techniques, and could not complain if an
employer introduced higher standards of efficiency.' Through a series of cases
the idea developed that there was no redundancy as long as a certain post remained,
even if conditions changed to the extent that it became impossible for an employee
to continue to function in that post. This happened, for example when, during a trade
recession, an employer withdrew free transport to work for employees from a
neighbouring viIlage, 1 or when hours of work were changed from a five-day week
to a shift system over six days.'
The reason for denying employees redundancy pay in situations such as the
above is not clear but probably has to do with the negative perception of redundancy
in times of recession and economic decline.' The fewer recognised redundancies
there are, the less serious the decline in productive activity may seem. In addition,
Courts may be reluctant to discourage employers from hiring more labour when an
increased demand is expected, even if the expectation turns out to be mistaken, and
the employees then have to be dismissed. 1 In other words, fear of applying any
undesirable curb to an employer's prerogative to hire and fire during the conduct of
a business, may contribute towards the Courts' unwillingness to apply the definition
of redundancy to a wide range of cases. Whatever the reason behind the trend to limit
the concept of redundancy, the result has been clear: employees have been deprived
of protection in circumstances where they have become unemployable because of
technological changes or managerial changes regarding conditions of their employ-
ment. Little is left of the original aim which was to protect employees when they were
dismissed without being at fault, and in many cases employees have had to bear the
costs of managerial changes or inefficient policies.
In many cases, employees' entitlement to redundancy payment has been
assessed purely from a managerial perspective. The tendency has been for the
1 North Riding Garages v. Butterwick, [1967] 2 Q.B. 56 (Divi Ct.).
1 Chapman v. Goonvean and Rostowrack China Clay Co. Ltd, [1973] I.C.R. 310 (CA).
154Johnson v. Nottinghamshire Combined Police Authority, [1974] I.C.R. 170 (CA).
lssPauI Davies and Mark Freedland, Labour Law 540 (2d ed. London 1984).
1 O'Hare v. Rotaprint Ltd., [1980] I.C.R. 94 (E.A.T.). Although this case concerned a claim of unfair
dismissal, the E.A.T. reluctantly suggested that it could probably have been a redundancy.
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Courts to regard redundancy as a subjective concept and therefore to make a finding
of redundancy only in instances where the employer admits to dismissals for reasons
of redundancy. If the employer offers another reason for dismissal, including a claim
that the employment was no longer profitable, the Courts will accept that reason as
long as they are satisfied that the ground put forward by the employer is genuine and
based upon some factual basis.' 57
 Therefore, indirectly, an employer has consider-
able influence with regard to the decision whether to grant an employee redundancy
pay or not. An employer can also directly avoid liability for redundancy payment by
making a suitable offer of alternative employment.lse if an employee unreasonably
refuses an offer of a job which is substantially equivalent,' the claim to redundancy
payment will be lost.
With the narrowing of the concept of redundancy, in many instances the only
possible remedy for the employee who is made redundant can be found in the unfair
dismissal legislation. Fairness extends to issues such as selection for redundancy and
the need for consultation with recognised trade unions. The National Industrial
Relations Court interpreted the legislative provisions to apply to a general category of
unfair selection for redundancy.' 6° In almost contradictory fashion, however, the
Courts proceeded to give broad recognition to managerial prerogative within this
category and made it possible for the employer to avoid liability. The Courts generally
accept management's discretion to decide upon selection criteria when there is a need
for reduction of the workforce, as long as such criteria are not obviously unreasonable,
and will only interfere to ensure that consultation takes place with recognised trade
unions.161
A transfer often results in redundancy of employees of either the transferor
157Hile v. Percival Boats Ltd., [196911 All E.R. 836 (C.A.). See also Paul Davies and Mark Freedland,
Labour Law 549-552 (2d ed. London 1984).
'EP(C)A 1978, sec. 82(5).
1 Hindes v. Supershine Ltd., [1979] LR.LA. 343 (E.A.T.).
160An interpretation of EP(C)A 1978, sec. 59, operating with sec. 57 was given in Bessenden Properties
Ltd. v. Comess, [1973] I.R.LR. 365 (N.l.R.C.)(upheld by the Court of Appeal, [1974] I.R.LR. 338 (CA)).
161 Williams v. Compair Maxam Ltd., [1982] I.R.LR. 83 (EAT.).
Employees of the transferor may find that there is no further work available with their employer.
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or the transferee. However, the law prevents them from claiming redundancy
payments from the transferor in three ways. First, the occurrence of a "relevant
transfer" in terms of the Transfer Regulations will mean that there is no break in the
contracts of employees and that the contracts continue with the transferee.1M
Second, if an employee is dismissed by the transferor and unreasonably refuses an
offer of suitable alternative employment from the transferee, there will be no entitlement
to redundancy pay. 165 Third, if the employees have a right to object to being
transferred, and the transferor has no work available for them, they should be able to
qualify for redundancy payments. Since the European Court judgement in Katsikas
v. Angelos Konstantinidis allowed this option, it seems compatible with EC law.
But the TURER amendments make this impossible by providing that, where employees
object, their contracts of employment with the transferor will be terminated, but they
will not be treated as having been dismissed by the transferor. 161 The effect of these
amendments is that employees lose any rights to claim unfair dismissal or redundancy
pay, and thereby suffer a serious diminution of the right of objection. Basically they
are only left with a right to terminate the contract.
Although a TUPE transfer will in some instances prevent recovery of a
redundancy claim, all situations of transfer and redundancy share the general
requirement of consultation. The redundancy consultation provisions were
essentially an implementation of the European Community's Directive on Collective
Redundancies which formed part of the programme of legislation under the Social
Contract. In the last section of this chapter these provisions will be considered
together with the consultation provisions of the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection
of Employment) Regulations, which also implemented an EC Directive.
'Existing employees may be displaced by incoming employees who had previously been employed
by the transferor.
1MTUPE 1981, Regulation 5(1).
165EP(C)A 1978, sec. 94 specifies that the offer must have been made before the dismissal takes effect,
and the offer must be of employment that is to start within four weeks of the end of his employrrient with
the transferor.
Katsikas v. Mge!os Konstantinidis, [1993] I.R.LR. 179 (E.C.J.).
167TURER Act 1993 sec. 32(4)(c).
8Secs. 99-107 of the EPA 1975.
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Insolvency
In the event of an employer's insolvency, employees who are faced with the
usually inevitable loss of their jobs have two possible sources from which to claim for
pecuniary losses: first, outstanding claims of employees for remuneration rank as
preferential debts of the insolvent company (with other preferential creditors such as
the Inland Revenue and the Department of Health and Social Security) and
second, most claims for remuneration and compensation for an employer's breach of
statutory rights, with the exception of the compensatory award for unfair dismissal, are
guaranteed by the state through the Redundancy Fund. 17° Once payment has been
made out of the Redundancy Fund, the Secretary of State becomes subrogated to the
employee's rights as a preferential creditor.
The shortcomings of the priority mechanism were revealed during investigations
of the EEC Commission, particularly the insufticiency of the assets of an insolvent
company to meet even priority claims, the long period before payment is made, and
the intricacies of the proceedings which can make it difficult for employees to defend
their interests without legal assistance. Mainly the Commission was concerned with
the disadvantaged position of employees vis-a-vis other creditors in the event of their
employer becoming bankrupt or otherwise insolvent. The investigations, which led to
a proposal for a Directive, 171
 concluded that an employee's livelihood is not
adequately safeguarded where the employee has to depend solely on enforcing claims
in bankruptcy proceedings. In the UK many of the shortcomings of the priority
system are alleviated by the additional availability of a state guaranteed system, such
as the Redundancy Fund, to ensure payment of an employee's claims while the state
Sec. 319 of the Companies Act 1948. The combined effect of sec. 319 of the 1948 Act and sec. 121
of EP(C)A 1978 is that priority is given over a debt secured by a floating charge to: four months' arrears
of wages (subject to a certain maximum), au accrued holiday pay, a guarantee payment, remuneration on
suspension on medical grounds, payment for time off and remuneration under a protective award. Priority
does no extend beyond statutory claims in the nature of wages to, for example, compensation for unfair
dismissal or redundancy payments.
170This system was introduced for redundancy payments by the Redundancy Payments Act 1965 (now
EP(C)A 1978, secs. 106(1)(b) & (5)(c)) and extended to include two months' arrears of pay (subject to a
certain maximum), pay for the statutory minimum period of notice, ho'iday pay (up to a certain maximum),
basic award of unfair dismissal compensation, and the reimbursement of the premium paid by an articled
clerk (EP(C)A 1978, sec. 122).
171 J Eur. Comm. (No. C 135)(9 June 1978).
For the Report of the EEC Commission, see Protection of employees in the event of the insolvency
of their employer, 4 Bull. Eur. Comm. 46 (1978) and 10 Bull. Eur. Comm. 17 (1980).
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bears the risk of delay and insufficiency of assets. If the UK Government's emphasis
on the guarantee function of the state in the event of insolvencies appears strangely
paternalistic and contradictory, given its usual preference for deregulation and free
markets, it has to be noted that there is another side to this intervention by the state.
The apparent, although not exclusive, aim is to facilitate the sale of assets of insolvent
companies and to leave the liquidator, administrator or receiver with relative freedom
to dispose of the assets in the most advantageous manner.173
With proper attention given to the two important hinges on which the system
of insolvency regulation in the UK turns, it can be considered to work effectively:
employees are protected from suffering undue hardship and insolvent businesses can
be sold more easily to ensure that the productive process continues. However, one
obvious problem has disrupted the continuous smooth flow of the system. This
problem stems from the incorporation of transfer provisions whose working in
insolvency situations is anything but clear. The two European Directives which deal
with insolvencies and transfers, respectively, do not adequately address this problem
and guidance by the European Court of Justice leaves many questions unanswered.
Council Directive 80/987/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member
States relating to the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their
employer174 deals mainly with guarantee institutions to guarantee employees'
outstanding payments. Weaknesses of this Directive are that it does not consider the
question of joint liablilty of the transferor and transferee in the event of the transferor's
insolvency, and makes no provision for information and consultation rights. 175 When
the Transfers Directive is applied to insolvency situations an additional problem arises.
The scope of its application is not sufficiently clear and even after the European Court
of Justice has had the opportunity to confront this issue, it is still uncertain which type
of insolvency situations are covered by the Directive.
In Abe/s,' 76 the issue arose whether a pre-liquidation procedure which gives
' 73Hugh Collins, Transfer of Undertakings and lnsolvency, 18 Indus. U. 144, 157 (1989).
17420 October 1980 (0.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 283) (1980)).
175Bob Hepple and Angela Byre, The Application of EEC Labour Law in the United Kingdom 15
(September 1988)(Study commissioned by the Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and
Education of the Commission of the European Communities).
AbeIs v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalindustrie en do Electrotechnische
Industrie, (1985] E.C.R. 469 (E.C.J.) (followed in Industriebond FNVv. The Netherlands, [1985] E.C.R. 511
(continued...)
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temporary shelter from creditors, the Dutch surseance van betaling, fell within the
scope of the Directive. The Court held that the Directive does apply to a procedure
such as this judicial leave to suspend payment of debts, mainly because the object of
such proceedings is to safeguard the assets of the insolvent undertaking and, where
possible, to continue the business of the undertaking by means of a collective
suspension of the payment of debts with a view to reaching a settlement that will
ensure that the undertaking is able to continue operating in the future.'
Consequently, the Directive does not apply to the transfer of an undertaking where the
transferor has been adjudged insolvent and the purpose of the ensuing insolvency
proceedings is the liquidation of the undertaking. This appears to be the principle
which was also enunciated by the Court in D'Urso v. Ercoli Mare/li E/ettromeccanica
Generale SpA.178
The Court's conclusion means that only transfers which take place in the
context of insolvency proceedings instituted with a view to continued trading, are
covered. In Abe/s the Court gave some justification for treating insolvency which
results in liquidation as an exception to the Directive, and in doing so mentioned that
"insolvency law is characterized by special procedures intended to weigh up the
various interests involved, in particular those of the various classes of creditors."79
It then singled out the class of employees, for whose protection the Transfers Directive
was designed, and asked itself whether applying the Directive to insolvent transferors
whose assets were being liquidated would further employees' interests. Empirical
evidence was hard to come by and the Court accepted that "considerable uncertainty
exists regarding the impact on the labour market of transfers of undertakings in the
case of an employer's insolvency."' 80 On the one hand, the Danish Government had
argued that "employees whose employer has been adjudged insolvent are precisely
176(...continued)
(E.c.J.); Axle Botzen v. Rotterdamsche Droogdok Maatschappij B y, (1985] E.C.R. 519 (E.C.J.), and
Foreningen at Arbejdsledere I Danmark v. A/S Oanmols Inventar, (1985] E.C.R. 2639 (E.C.J.).
v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaaiindustrie en de Electrotechnische
Industrie, [1985] E.C.R. 469, 486 (E.C.J.).
'[1982] I.R.LR. 136 (E.C.J.).
' 79AbeIs v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalindustrle en de E!ectrotechnische
Industrie, (1985] E.C.R. 469, 483 (E.C.J.).
' 801d. at 485.
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those who are in most need of protection.' 181 On the other hand, an argument can
be made that the automatic transfer of all the employees' entitlements to the solvent
transferee will affect the price which the transferee is willing to pay for the business.
A lower price will mean a smaller pool of assets from which the creditors of the
insolvent company can claim, and in general this will imply that employees are given
a higher priority than all other classes of creditor. Even worse, a transferee faced
with the transfer of the acquired rights of employees may be dissuaded from acquiring
the undertaking 'on conditions acceptable to the creditors thereof, who, in such a
case, would prefer to sell the assets of the undertaking separately.' 1
 The Court
was concerned that this would be prejudicial to the interests of employees and
concluded that 'a serious risk of general deterioration in working and living conditions,
contrary to the social objectives of the Treaty, cannot be ruled out.UIM
As commentators have shown, this decision does not satisfactorily address
some of the fundamental problems which occur during the transfer of the business of
an insolvent transferor, and even creates additional problems. The insubstantiality
of the evidence, which the Court itself noted, renders the conclusion very unconvin-
cing. There is no evidence that the transfer of acquired rights in the context of
insolvency is prejudicial to employee interests and that the Danish Government is not
in fact correct that employees of an insolvent transferor are most in need of protection.
Moreover, it is by no means clear, as Professor Hepple pointed out, that application
of the Transfers Directive will lead the transferee to pay a price which is lower than the
break-up value of the assets. 1 	This implies that if the sale goes ahead, it will
' 81 !d. at 484.
1 See P.L Davies, 'Acquired Rights, Creditors Rights, Freedom of Contract, and lndustriai Democacy',
9 YB. Eur. L 21, 23 (1989); Bob Hepple, Main Shoi'tcomings and Proposals for Revision of Council
Directive 77/187/EEC 34-35 (December 1990)(Report for the Commission of the European Communities,
unpublished).
1 Abels v. Bestuur van de Bednjfsvereniging voor de Metaalindustrie en de Electrotechnische
Industrie, [1985] E.C.R. 489, 485 (E.C.J.).
''ld. at 485.
1 See P.L Davies, 'Acquired Rights, Creditors' Rights, Freedom of Contract, and Industrial Democracy',
9 Y.B. Eur. L 21 (1989); Bob Hepple, Main Shortcomings and Proposals for Revision of Council Directive
77/187/EEC 34-40 (December 1990)(Report for the Commission of the European Communities,
unpublished).
1 Bob Hepple, Main Shortcomings and Proposals for Revision of Council Directive 77/187/EEC 37
(December 1990)(Report for the Commission of the European Communities, unpublished).
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benefit the employees who are transferred, and serve the monetary interests of the
other creditors who will receive more than they would have received for the sale of the
assets alone.
Second, the grounds propounded by the Court for distinguishing between
procedures with a view to continued trading and liquidation procedures are
insubstantial, since the choices involved in both processes show a great degree of
similarity. The choice between the sale of a business as a going concern and a forced
sale on a break . up basis occurs not only when a company is placed under liquidation,
but is a choice which has to be made by all controllers of an insolvent company.'87
What is even more important is that both situations run into the same basic problem,
which involves the priority given to employees' acquired rights in relation to the rights
of other creditors. 1 Therefore, applying the Directive to pre-liquidation procedures
such as a temporary suspension of debts, but not to liquidation procedures, is
ultimately irrational and ineffective. When applied to specific legal insolvency
proceedings in Britain -- and keeping in mind that such proceedings have to be
construed so as to bring them into line with the demands of Community law -- the
distinction will continue to involve an measure of speculation.
In the UK the legal insolvency of a company can include liquidation,
administrative receiverships or administration under order of Court. A transfer of a
company in liquidation which is being wound up by a Court would almost undoubtedly
be excluded from the application of the Transfers Directive according to the distinction
made in the Abels and D'Urso decisions. Not so in the case of transfers by an
administrator,' who can be appointed for purposes very similar to those which the
Dutch suspension of payments procedure strives to achieve, including the purpose of
bringing about •the survival of the company, and the whole or any part of its
undertaking, as a going concern TM , or of attaining a more advantageous realization of
the company's assets than would be effected on a winding-up. But the most
contentious and problematic issue regarding the UK insolvency regulations is whether
the Directive should be applied to administrative receivers, appointed by the holders
of floating charges.
187PL Davies, Acquired Rights, Creditors Rights, Freedom of Contract, and Industrial Democracy,
9 V.8. Eur. L 21, 47 (1989).
' MId. at 23-25.
1 Administrators are appointed under Part II of the Insolvency Act 1986.
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One of the significant tasks of an administrative receiver is to engage in the
process of hiving down which involves selling off viable parts of the business as a
going concern.190 Before the transfer to a purchaser takes place, the receiver will
first transfer those parts of the business which are regarded as salvageable to a
subsidiary, incorporated specifically for the purpose of hiving down and usually
renamed after the original company. The advantage of this method is usually
described in terms of a 'neat commercial package' which gives potential purchasers
an easier opportunity to assess the value of their purchase, which has been separated
from the company in receivership. When the Transfer Regulations were introduced in
the UK, the process of hiving down caused great controversy because of the practice
that employees were not offered employment by the subsidiary but remained in the
employment of the parent company. If the purchaser decided not to make offers of
re-employment, the employees would be dismissed by the insolvent company, which
meant that this company would incur liability for employees' claims in respect of the
dismissal. The most desirable consequence of this arrangement for the purchaser and
the creditors of the insolvent company was that there were no hidden costs involved:
employees had no claims against either the solvent subsidiary or the purchasing
company. Claims for redundancy payments and protective awards would ultimately
be covered by the Redundancy Fund, but compensation for unfair dismissal would
rank as an unsecured claim against the insolvent company.
In spite of arguments that the process of hiving down defeated the legitimate
claims of employees, the Government decided to continue the practice unamended
and to protect it from the automatic transfer provisions. This is done by providing that
no transfer of employment from the insolvent company to the subsidiary takes place
until immediately before the purchaser takes over the subsidiary.' 9 ' Before the
transfer occurs, a purchaser will be able to request the dismissal of unwanted
employees. Only the employees whom the purchaser wishes to retain would, through
two applications of the transfer rule in short succession, become employees of the
subsidiary, and subsequently employees of the purchaser.
Several arguments have been advanced to show that transfers by administra-
' 90For a more detailed discussion of the process, see P.L Davies and M. Freedland, The Effects of
Receiverships upon Employees of Companies,' 9 Indus. U. 95, 104-111 (1980); P.L Davies, 'Acquired
Rights, Creditors' Rights, Freedom of Contract, and Industrial Democracy,' 9 Y.B. Eur. L 21,32-34(1989).
191 TUPE 1981, Regulation 4.
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tive receivers fall within the scope of the Directive and that, by excluding this practice,
the UK is not complying with its obligations. The essence of these arguments is that
the main task of the receiver is to sell off viable parts of the business as a going
concern for the purpose of realizing the debenture holder's security.' These
arguments are usurped by the even stronger argument that TUPE reg.4 which creates
an exception in hiving-down situations has become defunct since Lftster, 1 which
developed the requirement of purposive interpretation. Even without formally
abolishing the exception by legislation, purposive interpretation imposes the duty to
construe provisions in compliance with Community law,'° and can therefore achieve
the same result. In the light of the purposive interpretation which was developed in
Litster, 1 the exception which the UK Government created for hiving down proceed-
ings does not appear to have any force. 1 The main task of the receiver is to sell
off viable parts of the business as a going concern for the purpose of realising the
debenture holder's security. 197 If the receiver fulfills this task with regard to an
insolvent undertaking and with the purpose of ensuring continued trading, the Directive
could apply to the proceedings.1
Although arguments like these are important in terms of the distinction which
the European Court has made between different kinds of insolvency proceedings, the
fundamental problem remains, which is that of formulating clear policy regarding the
priority of employees' claims in relation to those of other creditors. That problem
appears to fall more easily within the province of the European Directive which deals
1 P.L Davies, Acquired Rights, Creditors' Rights, Freedom of Contract, and Industrial Democracy,
9 Y.B. Eur. L 21, 48 (1989).
1 Utster v. Forth Estuary Engineering Ltd., [1989] I.R.LR. 161 (H.L).
MarIeasing SA v. La Comercial Internaciona! de Aiimentacion SA, [1992] 1 C.M.LR. 305 (E..J.).
1 Utster v. Forth Estuary Engineering Ltd., [1989] I.R.LR. 161 (H.L).
'That is if the qualification introduced in Webb v. EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd., [1993] I.R.LR. 27 (H.L)
will not upset purposive interpretation. According to the House of Lords in Webb, such intepretation cannot
be used to defeat the ciear wording of a UK statute.
' 97P.L Davies, Acquired Rights, Creditors' Rights, Freedom of Contract, and Industrial Democracy,
9 YB. Eur. L 21, 48 (1989).
198A potential problem with this argument is, however, created by the decision in Webb v. EMO (Air
Cargo) UK Ltd., [1993] I.R.LR. 27 (H.L) from which it appears that purposive interpretation cannot be used
in the case of direct conflict between a UK statute and the Directive.
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with the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer,1
than under the Transfers Directive. Reluctantly, and faced with scant evidence, the
European Court made an unconvincing choice to interfere with the priority mechanism
in some instances of the transfer of insolvent businesses. This step was necessitated
by the lack of adequate financial protection of employees' outstanding claims by
guarantee institutions. The availability of a state guaranteed system to ensure
payment of employees' claims is an issue which, like the priority mechanism, deserves
to be addressed by the Insolvency Directive in a more adequate way than it does at
present. At the moment the combined application of the Insolvency Directive and the
Transfers Directive in insolvency situations does not provide cogent relief to the
inevitable turmoil which is created by business insolvencies, in the interest of either
employees or the productive process
Obligations to negotiate or consult
1.	 Collective bargaining theory
In the United Kingdom, unlike the United States, there is no general legal duty
upon an employer to bargain with the organization which is representative of its
workforce and no statutory procedure exists for the recognition of a trade union for
collective bargaining purposes. The relative lack of statutory support for collective
bargaining can be explained in terms of the present Government's concern for
burdens on employers which may impede the beneficial operation of the voluntary
labour market, a stance which becomes more significant when considered in the
context of the historical development of the collective bargaining process in Britain.
The extensive system of collective bargaining which existed by the 1950s, at least for
manual workers, operated largely unabetted by laws. The explanation for the absence
of legal mechanisms to require employers to bargain with trade unions was given in
terms of the theory of collective laissez-faire, which implied a limited role for the law
in the field of industrial relations. The theory was based on the assumption that the
nature of the re'ations between employers and employees shou'd be determined
through the regulatory function of collective forces in society, rather than by the
1 CounciI Directive 80/987/EEC of 20 October 1980 on the approximation of the laws of Member
States relating to the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer (0.J. Eur.
Comm. (No. L 283) (1980)).
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state.20° The function of the law was seen primarily in terms of the promotion of
voluntarism. 2°' In practice this meant that employers were not obliged by law to
deal with unions and collective agreements were not directly enforceable as contracts.
The general character of state policy was non-interventionist, even to the extent that
legislation for the protection of individual employees was largely absent.
Legal changes which started during the 1960s when collective laissez-faire
ceased to be the dominant ideology, 2°2 were the result of an economic and social
crisis, characterised by industrial conflict and low productivity. Britain's poor economic
performance in comparison to other industrialised countries and relatively slow
economic growth were linked to collective bargaining practices. The feasibility of legal
reforms of existing practices of collective bargaining was extensively debated in the
Report of the Donovan Commission 203 and successive Governments introduced a
series of laws to regulate industrial relations. 204 The approach during this period
reflected a consensus that a system of free collective bargaining was the most socially
adequate way to regulate and determine conditions of employment. Collective
bargaining was, the Donovan Commission found, 'the most effective means of giving
workers the right to representation in decisions affecting their working lives, a right
which is or should be the prerogative of every worker in a democratic society'.205
With the election of the Conservative Government in 1979, social policy for the
promotion of collective bargaining was reversed and statutory measures to facilitate
its extension were withdrawn. However, deregulation as far as support for collective
200See 0. Kahn-Freund, 'Labour Law' in Selected Writings of Otto Kahn-Freund 8 (London 1978).
201 the historical development, see Kahn-Freund's Labour and the Law (P. Davies and M. Freedland
eds., 3d ed. London 1983); Lord Wedderburn, 'Industrial Relations and the Courts, 9 Indus. U. 65 (1980)
and "The New Policies in Industrial Relations Law,' in Industrial Relations and the Law in the 1980's: Issues
and Future Trends 22-65 (P. Fosh and C. Littler eds., Aldershat 1985); R. Lewis, The Historical Development
of Labour Law,' 14 Brit. J. Indus. Rel. 1-17 (1976).
202A trend towards legal regulation became evident with the development of statutory employment
protection through the Contracts of Employment Act 1963, the Redundancy Payments Act 1965, the Equal
Pay Act 1970 and the Industrial Relations Acts 1971 provisions on unfair dismissal.
203Donovan Commission, Report of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers
Associations, Cmnd. 3623 (1968).
20 'The Industrial Relations Act 1971, introduced by the Conservative Government of Edward Heath, was
repealed by the Labour Government elected in 1974 (Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974, sec.
1(1)). Various Acts followed after that, including the Employment Protection Act 1975; the Employment
Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978; the Employment Acts 1980 and 1982.
205Donovan Commission, Report of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers
Associations, para. 212, Cmnd. 3623 (1968).
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bargaining was concerned did not imply a return to a policy of collective laissez-faire.
The law continued to regulate aspects of industrial relations such as industrial action,
trade union government and the rights of individual employees. The reason why the
trend towards legal regulation was checked in the case of collective bargaining was
that it was seen to distort market relations between employer and individual
employees, thereby causing economic inefficiency. The Government sought to restore
"free " markets through deregulation, privatisation, reduction of public expenditure and
the weakening of trade union power. The emphasis on market forces left little room
for consideration of the underlying social purpose of collective bargaining, namely
participation by unions as a "means of enabling workers to gain more control over
their working lives".206 Government policy led to the repeal of the statutory
procedure which unions could invoke to secure recognition for bargaining pur-
poses,207
 thus removing the foundation of the statutory structure for the encourage-
ment of collective bargaining. Recognition as the crucial step in the development of
the bargaining relationship and the securing of trade union rights became a voluntary
process. By withholding recognition, it became possible for employers to avoid
statutory duties including disclosure of information for collective bargaining pur-
poses208, consultation over redundancies 209 or over proposed transfers of a
business210.
2.	 Application of collective bargaining theory In general
Collective bargaining
Despite the fact that the law does not trigger the bargaining process or regulate
methods of bargaining, widespread collective bargaining remains a distinctive feature
of British industrial relations. The pay and other terms of employment of over two-
thirds of employees are determined by collective bargaining.' However, collective
206Allan Flanders, Management and Unions 42 (London 1970).
207	 1980.
208EPA 1975, sec. 17(2).
2°9EPA 1975, sec. 99(1).
210TUPE 1981, Regulations 10 and 11.
211 B.A. Hepple, "The Harmonisation of Labour Law in the EEC: A British Perspective," 6 Recht der Arbeit
348, 349 (1989).
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bargaining as a model of employee participation in Britain has not extended into the
sphere of what is generally seen as management decisions. The reasons for this not
only concern Government policy, but also the structure of British labour relations in
which the current policy is rooted. Collective bargaining has touched only on marginal
issues while the "major structural features which are crucial for the power, status, and
rewards of the owners and controllers" have remained unaffected. 2 Fox's com-
ments regarding the structural constraints limiting the collective bargaining process in
Britain are particularly apposite:
"Power and social conditioning cause the employee interests to accept management's
shaping of the main structure long before they reach the negotiating table. Thus the
discussion may be about...how the participant interests can protect and advance
themselves within the structure operated by management to pursue its basic objectives,
but not about the nature of those basic objectives."213
In the pluralist tradition it is accepted that a trade union which succeeds in
gaining voluntary recognition for collective bargaining purposes, will come up against
the limits of the legal definition of collective bargaining. In terms of the Act,
negotiations must be related wholly or mainly to matters such as terms and conditions
of employment, or machinery for the settlement of disputes. 214
 Negotiations over
issues such as investment policy or the location of a new plant do not seem to be
included in the subject matter of bargaining as legally defined. As a result of the
restrictive attitude towards negotiation, the scope and detail of collective agreements
tend to be very limited, with the emphasis on procedures rather than on sub-
stance.215 There are few limits on the rule-making power of the employer, a fact
which is sometimes expressly recognised in a "managerial prerogative" clause in an
agreement. Employee participation is further reduced by the lack of legal machinery
in the UK for the enforceability and extension of collective agreements which have no
contractual effect unless the parties agree otherwise in writing. Such intent has been
expressed in very few agreements with the result that the vast majority of agreements
are not legally binding between the collective parties. Agreements may have
normative effect, however, through incorporation in the individual contract. Although
212ftL Fox, industrial Relations: A Social Critique of Pluralist Ideology," in Man and Organization 211 (J.
Child ed., London 1973).
3Id. at 219.
4EPA 1975, sec. 126(1) and TULRA 1974, sec. 29(1), as amended by EA 1982 sec. 18.
5B.A. Hepple, "The Haimonisation of Labour Law in the EEC: A British Perspective," 6 Recht der Arbeit
348, 349 (1989).
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this provides some safeguards for the individual employee, it is possible for an
employer to change terms of employment by terminating the individual contract with
notice and to offer re-employment on new terms. 216 In such an event, an employee
is not likely to succeed with a complaint of unfair dismissal, provided that consultation
took place and the terms are such as could be required by a reasonable
employer.217
Consultation
While UK labour law has few legal mechanisms left for the encouragement of
the processes of collective bargaining, legal obligations to consult have become a
significant feature of collective labour law. Such obligations have mainly been
introduced as a result of the United Kingdom's membership of the European
Community (EC). Three broad principles formed the basis of the 1974-76 Social
Action Programme of the EC, namely full and better employment; the improvement of
living and working conditions; and greater participation of workers and employers in
the economic and social decisions of the Community. It was the latter principle which
led to proposals by the Commission for Directives on collective dismissals and the
protection of the rights of workers in takeover and merger situations. 218 The fact that
the EC Directives on collective redundancies and transfer of undertakings were
introduced under the heading of Nparticipation and industrial democracy gives some
indication of the policy objectives underlying these instruments219 which clearly
recognised the importance of giving workers a voice within the work environment by
allowing them to influence decisions to terminate their employment or to transfer
control. Worker participation and industrial democracy have not been uncontroversial,
however, and it is significant that the Directives do not address the problems arising
from the legal status of the company and the exclusion of workers from corporate
216Burdett Couts v. Hertfordshire CC, [1984] I.R.LR. 91 (Q.B.).
7B.A. Hepple, The Harmonisation of Labour Law in the EEC: A British Perspective, 6 Recht der Arbeit
348, 350 (1989).
8Bob Heppe and Angela Byre, The Application of EEC Labour Law In the United Kingdom 15
(September 1988)(Study commissioned by the Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and
Education of the Commission of the European Communities).
at 14-15.
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government,° and that no further progress has been made with worker participa-
tion measures. The proposed Fifth Directive on worker involvement in company
structure has never been adopted. 1 Similarly, the proposed Directive on employee
information and consultation procedures in large national and multinational firms,
generally known as the Vredeling Richards Directive, has not been enacted.
To the extent that the European Community has extended the obligations on
employers to consult trade unions and preserved collective and individual rights, it has
had a moderating influence on the legislative policies of the present Government in
Britain. However, the reality of industrial relations practice has not been altered
significantly and dominant social values in member states still prevail. Community
social policies have not intervened too directly in the power relations between capital
and labour. The Directives which were passed did not encounter much opposition
from employers, mainly because the Commission was prepared to remove some
clauses in its original proposals which the employers found objectionable. 3 From
the participatory measure which was envisaged under the first draft Directive to the
procedure which was finally adopted by the European Community, a weakening took
place. The first draft provided for negotiations with a view to reaching agreement, and
if no agreement could be reached, the issue could be referred by either party to
binding arbitration to decide on steps for the protection of employees. 4 The final
provision refers only to a duty to consult, not negotiate, with a view to seeking
agreement, and makes no reference to binding arbitration. By abolishing the idea
of binding arbitration for failure to reach an agreement, the Commission destroyed the
°The British Government has constantly resisted attempts by the EEC to finalise draft Directives on
company law (O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. C 240) 2 (9 September 1983)) and on procedures for information and
consultation in companies with complex structures (the 'Vredeling Aichards Directive)(O.J. Eur. Comm. (No.
C 217) 3 (12 August 1983)).
1 Th5 proposed Fifth Directive was first presented to the Council in 1972 and again in a revised form
in 1983 but so far no decision has been taken.
The proposals for the Directive were presented to the Council on 24 October 1980 and thereafter
amended and revised on various occasions.
3Chris Brewster and Paul league, European Community Social Policy 92 (London 1989).
4(COM No. 74) 351 final, art. 8. This procedure was probably modelled on the German Sozialpian
as provided for in article 112 of the Betriebvorfassungsgese of 1972.
Directive 77/1 87, Ait. 6.
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incentive for employers to act in a socially responsible way. The lack of any
mechanism for demanding some form of social responsibility in relation to transfer
decisions or redundancies is confounded by the general lack of democratic structures
in the context of employment.
Disclosure
The statutory duty which British law imposes on an employer to disclose
information to an independent recognised trade union has not been affected by the
repeal of legislative support for collective bargaining. 7 An employer is obliged to
disclose information without which the trade union would be to a material extent
impeded in carrying on collective bargaining, and which it would be in accordance with
good industrial relations practice to disclose for the purposes of collective bargaining.
The fact that the duty of disclosure has been retained while the trend continued for the
reduction of other supports for collective bargaining may lead one to believe that there
is general acceptance of the provisions. However, the terms in which the duty is
formulated has led to a narrow application and the law's direct influence has been
insignificant.
The obligation to disclose information is limited by the extent of the employer's
recognition of the union for the purposes of collective bargaining. A union is only
entitled to information regarding matters 'in respect of which the union is recognised
for collective bargaining". 8 Umiting disclosure to recognised bargaining subjects
means that information will mostly concern details of terms and conditions of
employees. Unions have been relatively successful in obtaining information regarding
wages and employment practices, suggesting that an implicit presumption of
relevance operates in this area. The legal limits of collective bargaining excludes
information about strategic subjects such as investment plans, marketing policy, plant
22 The same shortcoming has been noticed with regard to redundancy legislation. Employers in the
UK are required only to notify, not to obtain the consent of public authorities before making large scale
redundancies. P.L Davies and M. Freedland, Labour Law: Text and Materials 249 (2d ed. London 1984).
7The obligation was introduced by the IRA 1971, sec. 56 and incorporated in EPA 1975, sec. 17(1)(b).
8R. v. Central Arbitration Committee ex pane BTP Tioxide Ltd., [1982] LR.LR. 60 (Q.B.).
Janice R. Bellace and Howard F. Gospel, 'Disclosure of Information to Trade Unions: A comparative
Perspective, 122 Int'l Lab. Rev. 57, 65 (1983).
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location and closures.230
Once a trade union has established that its request for information is within the
limits of its recognized bargaining powers, two statutory tests may operate to exclude
disclosure of potentially relevant information. First, the information must be
information without which the trade union representatives would be to a material extent
impeded in carrying on collective bargaining. This test weighs requested information
in terms of its importance23' and necessity for the collective bargaining process
and suggests that information must be indispensable for bargaining, a difficult hurdle
for the union to overcome in argument. The second test concerns 'good industrial
relations practice ' , a vague concept which adds little to a determination of information
which may be considered relevant.
In addition to the two tests regulating disclosure, an employer may be
exempted from the duty in a variety of circumstances. Employers are exempted from
disclosing original documents 2 and from compiling information which involves
disproportionate work or expenditure. 2 In addition, certain types of information are
excluded from the duty to disclose, including confidential information and information
that would cause substantial injury to an employer 's undertaking if disclosed.2
The goal of fuller disclosure of information, as expressly stated in the British
legislation, is to promote 'good industrial relations ' .230 This concept is ill-defined
and the law does not provide the necessary supports to achieve the proposed goal.
The duty to disclose arises only when there is collective bargaining, a process for
which there is no legal underpinning. The shaky legal foundation is not strengthened
by the traditional adversarial model of industrial relations which has been characterised
by employers ' assertion of their managerial prerogative. Employers have been loath
to disclose information which may lead to greater union bargaining power and which
may interfere with managerial decision-making.
230Hord F. Gospel, 'Disclosure of Information to Trade Unions,' 5 Indus. U. 223, 226 (1976).
231 Daily Telegraph Ltd. and Institue of Journalists, CAC Award No. 78/353, para. 20.
232Civil Service Union v. Central Arbitration Committee, [1980] LR.LR. 274 (Q.B.).
233EPA 1975, sec. 18(2)(a).
234EPA 1975, sec. 18(2)(b).
EPA 1975, sec. 18(1).
EPA 1975, sec. 17(1)(b).
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3.	 Application of theory - business transfers and redundancies
Consultation
The Directive on Collective Redundancies, issued by the Council of Ministers
of the European Communities in 1975, required member states to introduce
provisions for consultation with workers' representatives. Following this Directive, the
Transfers Directive presented more duties to inform and consult in the event of a
relevant transfer. 2 Initially, the consultation duties under the two Directives
overlapped but differed at the same time, thereby creating potential problems for
employers who had to comply with both sets of obligations. The major difterences in
the wording and requirements of the Transfers Directive and the Directive on Collective
Redundancies have, however, been removed by a Directive amending the Directive on
Collective Redundancies. 2
 After these amendments, a situation which may arise
when a transferor or transferee contemplates collective redundancies either before or
after the transfer has been rendered much less complicated. If such redundancies are
for valid 1economic, technical or organisational reasonsN24o the protection for
individual employees falls away but the rights of their representatives to information
and consultation remain. The requirements of the Transfers Directive and the Directive
on Collective Redundancies concerning the content of information, the aim and
content of consultation, and the timing for information and consultation are now
substantially similar. For example, both the Transfers Directive and the Directive on
Collective Redundancies require that the transferor inform in good time. If measures
are envisaged in relation to employees, an employer is required to consult in good
time. The similarity in the consultation requirements of the two Directives underlines
the importance of industrial democracy generally, and particularly when managerial
decisions have serious consequences for employees. However, a more complete and
unequivocal statement of industrial democracy in a separate Directive would have
been a more bold step forward. One of the most constructive suggestions to avoid
the problems of overlap between the two Directives, in the event that collective
redundancies are contemplated by either a transferor or transferee, was made by
7CounciI Directive 75/129 of 17 February 1975.
2 Directive 77/187 of 14 February 1977, Art. 6.
239Coufld1 Directive 92/56/EEC of 24 June 1992 amending Directive 75/129/EEC (O.J. Eur. Comm.
(No. L 245) 3 (1992)).
4 of the Transfers Directive.
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Professor Hepple in his Report for the Commisssion of the European Communities on
the main shortcomings and proposals for revision of the Transfers Directive. 241 He
recommended that the general duties to inform and consult employee representatives
in the event of restructuring of undertakings should be set out in a seperate Directive.
In a sweeping proposal which, if implemented, would approach a more complete
framework for industrial democracy, Professor Hepple suggested that urestructuringN
should include transfers and concentrations of undertakings, technological changes,
and that the duty to consult should arise in respect of any management proposal likely
to have serious consequences for the interests of the employees of the undertak-
ing.242
A requirement that employers consult with recognised trade unions was first
enacted in the UK in 1975, essentially as an implementation of the EC's Directive on
Collective Redundancies.2 The law provides that an employer who proposes to
make an employee redundant has an obligation to inform and consult with a
recognised trade union about the decision. The definition of redundancy for the
purposes of the statutory consultation provisions has recently been amended -- in
conformity with the European approach -- to include any dismissal for a reason not
related to the individual concerned or for a number of reasons all of which are not so
related.2" It is further provided that, for consultation purposes, where an employee
is or is proposed to be dismissed it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved
by the employer, that the dismissal is for redundancy. 245 Consultation must begin
at the earliest opportunity, but the law specifies certain statutory minimum periods, for
example, if a hundred or more employees at an establishment are to be dismissed in
a ninety-day period, consultation must begin ninety days before the first dismissal
takes effect.
The redundancy consultation provisions were supplemented by the Transfer of
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981, which also implemented
241	 Hepple, Main Shortcomings and Proposals for Revision of Council Directive 77/187/EEC
(December 1990)(Report for the Commission of the European Communities, unpublished).
2421d at 118.
243 ce. 99-107 of the EPA 1975, which can be seen as the procedural extension and counterpart of
the Redundancy Payments Act 1965.
244TURER 1993, sec. 33(5).
245.IURER 1993, sec. 33(5).
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an EC Directive. 2 These enactments introduced some element of 'participation'
in major decisions affecting workers in an area which is seldom covered by collective
bargaining. The distinction between consultation and negotiation can be described
in terms of the extent to which the two processes restrict managerial prerogative.
Consultation implies that an employer always formally retains the right to decide after
having received representations from employees and making reasoned replies.
Negotiation involves dealing with the representatives of employees with the aim of
reaching an agreement. An employer may make a unilateral decision only after
negotiations have failed. Although this distinction between the processes of
negotiation and consultation is generally accepted, the line which separates the two
processes is sometimes difficult to draw. Consultation may fall just short of full-scale
negotiations, a point which seems to emerge from the provisions of the Transfers and
Collective Redundancies Directives. The Directives provide for 'consultations' with
workers' representatives 'with a view to reaching an agreement',247
 or 'with a view
to seeking agreement," 2 phrases which were initially deliberately omitted from the
UK Regulations, but then added by the amendments in TURER.249
The requirement of consultation can potentially have far-reaching effects which
were described by the Employment Appeal Tribunal in one case as follows:
'The consultation may result in new ideas being ventilated which avoid the redundancy
situation altogether. Equally it may lead to a lesser number of persons being made
redundant than was originally thought necessary. Or it may be that alternative work can
be found during the period of consuftation.'0
However, in practice, the collective right to consultation has had a much
smaller impact and the main concern has usually been the amount of compensation
for the individual employee. Part of the reason for this has been the way the
legislation was drafted. Before recent legislative amendments the definition of
consultation only required an employer to consider representations made by trade
2 Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981, S.l. 1981, No. 1794 as
amended in minor respects by S.l. 1987, No. 442 (TUPE) and by Trade Union Reform and Employment
Rights Act 1993 (TURER). These Regulations were made under the European Communities Act 1972 (ECA)
sec. 2(2).
24lQirjve 75/129.
2 Directive 77/1 87.
249TURER 1993, secs. 32(6) & 33(2)(b).
25OSpiI/eFrench (Holdings) Ltd. v. USDAW, [1980] I.C.R. 31, 37 (E.A.T.).
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union representatives, reply to them and state reasons for the rejection of any of
them.251 Formulated like this, consultation could easily amount to an empty gesture.
The process of consultation has been given more teeth with legislative changes which
require the consultation to be about ways of avoiding the dismissals, reducing the
number of employees to be dismissed, and mitigating the consequences of the
dismissals.252
 These requirements will make it more difficult for employers to treat
consultation as a sham exercise, as long as they heed the warning of the EAT that
"there must be time for the union representatives who are consulted to consider
properly the proposals that are being put to them".2
A fundamental danger is that an employer can avoid the consultation
obligations completely by refusing to recognise a union. The Transfers Directive does
not define the "representatives of employees" with whom employers are required to
consult in transfer situations, 2
 but leaves it to the laws or practice of member states
to provide for representatives.255
 In terms of the UK Regulations, consultation rights
apply only to representatives of an independent trade union 2 which is recognised
by an employer. 257
 As the UK has no legal provision for the designation of
employee representatives for bargaining and other purposes, 2 an employer can
choose not to recognise a union and avoid the obligation to consult.
Determination of the question whether a union has been recognised in order
to benefit from consultation rights, can be problematic. The legal definition provides
that recognition can be "to any extent, for the purpose of collective bargaining".2
This phrase has been interpreted not to refer to "the strength or conviction of the
1 EPA 1975, sec. 99(7).
TURER 1993, sec. 33(2)(b).
TGWU v. Ledbuty Preserves (1928) Ltd., [1986] I.R.LR. 492 (E.A.T.).
Art. 6, Directive 77/1 87.
Art. 2, Directive 77/1 87.
2561n terms of the EPA 1975, sec. 8 a certification officer has to certify a union as "independent", an
indication that the union is not under the domination or control of, or liable to interference by, an employer.
7TUPE 1981, Regulation 10(5).
2 Rights for independent trade unions to seek recognition for collective bargaining by employers (EPA
1975) were repealed by the EA 1980.
259EPA 1975, sec. 126 (1).
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recognition but to the subjects or areas to which it relates. In other words, there may
be partial recognition, that is, recognition in certain respects but not others.'26°
Recognition which falls short of recognition for the purpose of collective bargaining is
thus excluded from the statutory definition. Before an employer will be held to have
recognised a union, the Courts require 'clear and unequivocal' evidence which may
involve a course of conduct over a period of time.' Generally, the cautious
approach by the Courts has been characterised by an underlying concern for the
consequences and 'severe risks' 2
 of recognition for the employer. Factors which
the Courts have taken into account to decide whether an employer has recognised a
union, include the existence of a collective agreement which usually has to be
accompanied by relevant acts of the particular employer.
Restriction of consultation rights to recognised trade unions can be seen as
implicit legal support for the agents and process of collective bargaining. The duty to
consult over proposed transfers of business only applies to employers who have
clearly expressed their decision to negotiate over collective bargaining subjects. While
the reason for restricting consultation in this way is easy to detect, justification for the
narrow application of consultation rights is more problematic. The UK has no statutory
provision for employee representation, and unions may be regarded as the most
obvious avenue for consultation proceedings. However, the EC Directive has made
a clear choice for consultation, albeit consultation 'with a view to reaching an
agreement', instead of negotiation. Since something less than negotiation is
envisaged, there is no necessity for trade union representation to be the exclusive
channel of representation for both processes. In other European countries it is
common for legislation to require consultation with forms of employee representation
at workplace level, such as works councils. It can be argued that consultation duties
which derive from the UK's obligation to implement the EC Directives may benefit from
a broader application than the one given under the UK law at present. With a small
°NUGSAT v. Aiburj Bros. Ltd., [1977] I.R.LR. 173, 175 (EAT.).
1Joshua Wilson & Bros. Ltd. v. USDAW, [1978] I.R.LR. 120 (EAT.).
USDAWv. Sketchley Ltd., [1981] I.R.LR. 291 (E.A.T.).
NUGSAT v. Albuiy Bros. Ltd., [1978] I.R.LR. 504 (C.A.).
Earty drafts of the Directive envisaged negotiations with a view to reaching an agreement ((COM. No.
75) 429 final (25 July 1975), and (COM. No. 74) 351 fInal (21 June 1974)).
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but significant change of emphasis it will be possible to extend consultative
mechanisms. Such a move will enhance the possibilities of worker participation, and
at the same time follow trends which can be perceived in current British industrial
relations practice. There are signs that employers are moving away from collective
bargaining towards joint consultation and direct communication with employees; a
growth in consultative machinery has been a general phenomenon. 5
 Forums
incorporating union as well as non-union worker representatives have been established
and centrally-formulated union policy is no longer the only expression of employee
needs.
UK legislation, in addition to restricting consultation rights to recognised trade
unions, provides employers with a broad defence which may allow them an escape
from the duty to consult. To be relieved from the obligation, a transferor or transferee
has to show that "there are special circumstances which render it not reasonably
practicable for the employer to comply'? The aspecial circumstances N defence is
identical to the defence provided for in redundancy situationsY 7 In that context the
Court of Appeal has indicated three steps which an employer has to go through to
comply with the defence. The first two steps involve establishing that there were
special circumstances and that these circumstances rendered compliance with the
consultation duties not reasonably practicable. Finally, it has to be shown that, in the
circumstances, the employer took such steps as were reasonably practicable.
"Special circumstancesu were defined in one case as "something out of the ordinary
run of events, such as, for example, a general trading boyc N269 Included in the
definition were events such as a sudden disaster, physical or financial, causing a
shutdown. According to another case, circumstances which were "neither sudden in
onset nor unforeseeable" did not qualify as "special" 27° Accordingly, an employer's
failure to consult was found to be justified in cases of insolvency due to the withdrawal
NeiI Millward and Mark Stevens, British Workplace Industrial Relations (The DE/ESRC/PCl/ACAS
Surveys)(Aldershat 1986).
TUPE 1981, Regulation 10(7).
7EPA 1975, sec. 99(8).
The Bakers' Union v. Clarks of Hove Ltd., (1978] IR.LR. 366 (CA).
ld. at 366.
270Angus Jowett & Co. v. NUTGW, (1985] I.R.LR. 326 (E.A.T.).
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of a prospective purchaser27' or inablility to obtain a Government loan.2	The
TURER amendments now specify that failure of a person controlling the employer to
provide information to the employer, will not constitute special circumstances.273
Although this narrows the defence somewhat, the potentially wide application is cause
for concern, especially since no such exception is authorised by the Directive.274
The hesitancy with which the law extends a limited amount of employee
influence becomes more evident when it is considered that legal intervention in the
procedural aspects of the consultation process is confined to the consequences of a
transfer rather than over the transfer itself. It is only when measures in relation to
conditions of work or employment are envisaged that a transferor or transferee is
under a duty to consult. 275
 This restricted ambit moderates the influence which the
law can have as a measure of industrial democracy. The legal sanctions for breach
of the duty to consult do not help to make it more effective. The Directive does not
provide for a specific sanction for breach of this duty, but leaves it to be determined
by Member States, subject to the usual requirement that the sanction be an effective
one.276 In the UK, the amount of compensation payable to affected employees is
limited to a sum which the tribunal considers just and equitable having regard to the
seriousness of the employer to comply with the duty, but with a maximum of four
weeks' pay in respect of any employee.2
271 1JQAW v. Leancut Bacon Ltd., [1981] I.R.LR. 295 (E.A.T.).
2 Hamish Armour (Receiver of Bany Staines Ltd.) v. ASTMS, [1979] I.R.LR. 24 (E.A.T.).
273TURER 1993, sec. 33(2)(c).
2746ob Hepple and Angela Byre, The Application of EEC Labour Law in the United Kingdom 15
(September 1988)(Study commissioned by the Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and
Education of the Commission of the European Communities).
275Directive Art. 6(2); TUPE 1981, Regulation 10(5). The duty to consult a recognised trade union when
the employer envisages taking any measures in relation to employees has been amended so that the
consultation must take place with a view to seeking their agreement to measures to be taken (TURER
1993, sec. 32(6)).
276Von Co/son v. Land Nord-Rhein-Westphaiia, [1984] E.C.R. 1891 (E.C.J.); Harz v. Deutsche Tradax,
[1984] E.C.R. 1921 (E.C.J.).
277TUPE 1981, Regulation 11(11) as amended by TURER 1993, sec. 32(7)(b). The provision which
allowed the compensation to be set off against any payment made as compensation for failing to consult
on redundancy was removed by TURER sec. 32(7)(a). Similarly, compensation for failure to consult over
collective redundancies can no longer be offset against payment made in respect of the protected period
representing damages for breach of contract or some other sum due under the contract (TURER sec.
33(3)). A protective award will, therefore, no longer be decreased because an employer has paid
compensation in regard to other matters.
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The fact that the consultation requirement in the UK has been toned down by
the absence of a legally backed recognition procedure, ineffective and individualistic
sanctions and a broadly formulated escape clause which has been given a wide
interpretation by the Courts,278 detracts from the ideal of participation and industrial
democracy.
Information
Whenever an employee may be affected by a transfer, the employer is under
a duty to provide information to representatives of a recognised trade union. 279 The
Regulations provide some detail as to the content of the information but other
particulars are shrouded in vagueness. The information to be given must encompass
the approximate date of the transfer, the reasons for it, the legal, economic and social
implications of the transfer for the affected employees, the measures which the
transferor or transferee envisages to take in relation to the employees, and, according
to recent amendments, the proposed method of calculating the amount of any
redundancy payments to be made (other than statutory redundancy pay) to affected
278Many scholars have remarked on the need for an overhaul of the Court system and the possible
need for Labour Courts, for 'in real life rights exist only in the decision of the Courts which enforce them.'
(Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, 'The Social Charter in Britain - Labour Law and Labour Courts, 54 Mod.
L Rev. 1, 18 (1991). See also K. Ewing, 'Rights and Immunities in British Labour Law,' 10 Camp. Lab. U.
1,35 (1988); W.E.J. McCarthy, 'The Case for Labour Courts,' 21 Indus. Rel. J. 98, 110(1990)). Proponents
of specialist Courts to administer and enforce individual rights at work and collective labour law are usually
aware of the tremendous risks, dangers and difficulties involved in their proposals, (Lord Wedderburn at
26) and the dilemma of countering the 'powerfulness of the opponents of change.' (B. Hepple, 'Labour
Courts: Some Comparative Perspectives,' 41 Current Legal Probs. 169, 186 (1988).) A difficult question to
decide is whether existing labour tribunals could be reformed or whether they should be replaced by Courts
of a different breed with extended scope. Possible functions of a new type of Labour Court include the co-
ordination of individual employment rights to ensure a balanced system; promotion of different forms of
negotiation between collective parties; (Lord Wedderburn at 28) recognising the authority of the parties to
collective bargaining and the complexities involved in the process of conciliation. (See, e.g., M. Weiss, S.
Simitis and W. Rydzy 'The Settlement of Labour Disputes in the Federal Republic of Germany' in Industrial
Conflict Resolution in Market Economies 102 (1. Hanami & R. Blanpain eds., Deventer 1984); E.
Blankenburg & A. Rogowski, 'German Labour Courts and the British Tribunal System,' 13 J.L & Soc. 67,
82 (1986)). A Labour Court could be composed of lay members, legal judges with specialised training, or
a mixture of judges and industrial members in a bipartite or tripartite structure. It could impose remedies
of an interim or final nature, which differ from the traditional relief in that it requires steps such as negotiation
or conciliation. Another central issue concerns the appellate machinery which would exert final control and
determine the relative autonomy of a Labour Court.
All these questions can only be briefly registered here and the list could be expanded to include
many more. The important point is to note that there is a pressing need to include resolutions to such
questions in an adequate programme for reform to give meaning to a discussion of a framework of positive
rights for employment protection and possible restructuring of collective labour law. Adequate procedures
and sanctions, and the bodies to administer them are essential for the effectiveness of labour laws and the
need to attain industrial justice.
279TUPE 1981, Regulation 10(2).
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employees. 280 Various aspects relating to the timing of the information are unclear.
The Regulations state that a trade union must be informed of "the fact that the relevant
transfer is to take place" and specify in general terms that information must be given
"long enough before a relevant transfer to enable consultations to take place". It has
already been mentioned that consultations are only required when measures are
envisaged in relation to employees and do not concern the transfer decision itself.
However, the duty to consult has been amended so that the consultations with union
representatives must take place "with a view to seeking their agreement to measures
to be taken." 28 ' Within this enlarged scope for consultation it is arguably incongru-
ous to interpret the Regulations to allow information to be given at a stage when the
transfer has been completed or almost compIeted. 2 The stated purpose of
information, "to enable consultations to take place," must now be read to include the
possibility that information can enable employees to prepare in other ways for changes
which may affect their job security and that they may need time, for example, to look
for other jobs.
Although the Government managed to limit the procedural aspects of employee
consultation to the extent outlined above, it could not avoid conferring significant and
substantive individual rights on workers. The Regulations introduced major changes
to the existing law in which the idea of the personal non-transferable nature of the
employment relationship had prevailed for a long time.
Conclusion
The introduction of legislation to regulate business transfers has brought about
a change of direction and opened up new avenues for employees who come into
contact with changes of employer; it has undoubtedly altered the balance between the
economic demands of business and the social demands of workers. The case for the
protection of employees' rights is advanced by the jurisprudence of the European
Court of Justice and its close attention to the aim of the Directive. Courts in the UK,
280TURER 1993, sec. 33(2)(a).
281 TURER 1993, sec. 32(6).
2 The statements of the Court in Institution of Professional Seivants v. Secretaiy of State for Defence,
[1981 LR.LR. 373 (Ch. Div'l Ct.)(decided under the Dockyard Services Act 1986 which re-enacts TUPE
Regulation 10 without any material changes) - "long enough before" a transfer excludes mere hopes or
possibilities and means "as soon as measures are envisaged and if possible long enough before the
transfer - have to be read in the light of the latest amendments.
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following the principle of purposive interpretation, have an obligation to pay attention
to the European Court of Justice cases and their underlying philosophy.2& The
tempering effect which this principle has had makes it unlikely that the attitude of the
Courts will be a major obstacle in the way of safeguarding employees' rights in the
event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses. Therefore the
need to look seriously at the Courts which interpret the legislation is not as pressing
in this area as it is in areas which are not so closely tied to Community law.
However, employees would be mistaken to think that the law can be strong
enough to stem the tide of privatisation to which the UK Government is fully
committed. In its pursuit of this major policy objective, the Government has tried to
make light of the impact of Community law and the Transfer Regulations, and has
suggested that the recent legal amendments have little legal significance. It is
clear that privatisation and the threat of erosion of employees' terms and conditions
of employment will continue. Courts continue to have sizable leeway in interpreting
the circumstances of the transfer and the economic, technical or organisational
reasons given by an employer for a dismissal. In addition, employees can experience
deterioration of their rights through the normal operation of domestic law, because
employees who are affected by a transfer have no greater rights than they enjoyed
before the transfer took place. 2 This means that the normal principles of contrac-
tual variation apply, sometimes allowing manipulation to masquerade as agreement.
This principle was developed in Litster v. Forth Estuary Engineering Ltd., (1989] I.R.LR 161 (H.L).
At the level of the European Communities Maileasing SA v. La Comercial Intemacionai do Aiimentacion
SA, [1992] 1 C.M.LR. 305 (E.C.J.) created a general duty to construe domestic law in compliance with
Community law. The principle was then applied in Webb v. EMO Air Cargo (UK) Lid., [1993) I.R.LR. 27
(H.L) but with the qualification that Marleasing could not be used to defeat the clear wording of a UK
statute.
Brian Napier, CCT, Market Testing and Employment Rights: The Effects of TUPE and the Acquired
Rights Directive 11 (Streatham 1 993)(publication sponsored by the Institute of Employment Rights).
2esThe doctrine of partial harmonisation implies that it is only the protection which employees have
under their own systems which is transferred in the event of a relevant transfer. In Rask and Christensen
v. 158 Kantineservice A1S, (1993] I.R.LR. 133, 136 (E.C.J.) the E.C.J. reasoned that insofar as in cases
other than on a tranfer of an undertaking it is permissible under the national law to after the employment
relationship to the employees' disadvantage, particularly as regards the wage terms, such a change is not
prevented merely because the undertaking has been the subject of a transfer in the meantime and the
contract is consequently concluded with the new owner of the undertaking.
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CHAPTER 4
THE PROTECTION OF WORKERS IN THE CASE OF BUSINESS TRANSFERS:
SOUTH-AFRICA
Introduction
The many statutory changes which have been brought about in South African
labour law in recent years have not touched upon the common law consequences of
a change in ownership of a business. Sanctity of contract is the abiding rule in the
case of changes in ownership of the employing enterprise, and the pervasiveness of
this doctrine has made it more difficu't for the Courts to be innovative or creative in this
area than in many other areas of labour law.
When the unfair labour practice definition was introduced into South African
labour law,' and the Industrial Court was given a very wide discretion to do justice
according to the "notion of fairness," 2 the idea was to substitute fair employment
guidelines3 for the common law's right to be arbitrary about substance and pro-
cedure. As a result of these legal changes termination of employment is no longer
regulated by legal rights in accordance with the common law -- Roman Dutch law with
strong English influence -- but by principles of fairness. The definition of an unfair
labour practice has been wide enough to encompass cases of unfair dismissals and
retrenchments, a far-reaching concept which is understood to encompass the
dismissal of one or more employees for purposes of work-force reduction due to a
number of causes, such as plant closure, rationalisation or decreased production
resulting from economic decline. 4 In the context of retrenchments, the Court derived
general principles of fair retrenchment from diverse sources and evaluated the
1 The definition of "unfair labour practice" in sec. 1 of the Labour Relations Act was inserted by sec. 1(1)
of the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act 94 011979.
. The Master Cutters' Association of SA, (1982) 3 I.LJ. 87, 113H (l.C.). See aiso the recent
descnption of the term "unfair labour practice" as "a mixture of social justice, common sense and labour
law - far removed from the ordinary principles of common law ordinarily dealt with by the [C]ourts."
(SACCAWU v. Minister of Manpower, (1993) 14 l.LJ. 909, 911 (T)).
3See Report of the Commission of Enquiry' into Labour Legislation Part 1 RP 47/1979 IV para. 4.28.5.2-
4.
4See Consolidated Frame Cotton Corporation v. The President, Industrial Court, (1986) 7 I.LJ. 489,494
(A.D.), and M.S.M. Brassey, E. Cameron, M.H. Cheadle & M.P. Olivier, The New Labour Law 279 n.1 (Cape
Town 1987).
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circumstances of particular retrenchments in the light of these principles. Reliance on
these principles was justified in terms of the unfair labour practice definition's reference
to practices that TM unfairly affected or NprejudicedI an employee's work security, and
on the ground of the promotion of Nsound labour relations.5
Although the Court's guidelines on retrenchment have been applied in transfer
situations, the application has been piecemeal and has mostly affected procedural
aspects of a transfer. Without a sound basis for intervening in cases concerning a
change of employer, it has been possible for the Court to hold that the common law
can provide all the substantive intervention that is required. The authority of the
common law, which has stymied novel interpretations of the open-textured unfair
labour practice concept in transfer situations, appears to stem from the deeply
ingrained and widely accepted view that the Court cannot make a contract for the
parties. 6 This understanding is not likely to change without intervention by the
legislature.
The common law doctrine has an equitable foundation; its autochtonous
premises were developed to provide protection for employees faced with a change of
employer. Yet, in most instances it operates so as to discriminate against employees.
The discriminatory effect of the common law is obvious in most transfer situations,
including those which also involve business closures or insolvencies. In the next
section, the shortcomings of the common law with regard to transfers of businesses
will be pointed out. It will be shown that even in circumstances where the transferor
and transferee are in some way connected to each other, the harsh concequences of
the common law can only be overcome with great difficulty. Following that, a brief
exposition of the position of employees in the case of insolvent undertakings will
follow. In the final section of this chapter the inadequacies of arrangements for
participation will be considered. In general, this chapter will expose the dilemma of
employees who are confronted with structural business changes, and will call attention
to areas of confusion which require intervention by the Courts and the legislature.
The common law position
At common law there is no automatic conhtinuity of employment when an
5GumecIe v. Richdens t/a Richdens Food/met, (1984) 5 l.LJ. 84, 91 (IC.).
6See, e.g., Lathe v. Impala Holiday Flats, (1993) 14 I.LJ. 1074, 1082 (P.C.).
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undertaking is transferred. Because of their personal nature, contracts of employment
cannot be transferred by way of cession to a new employer, but can only be renewed
with the consent of all the parties involved: the old and the new employer, as well as
the employee.7 The transfer normaily results in the termination of the employees'
original contracts of service,8 even if it involves an offer of re-employment by the
transferee. Change of employer will amount to a dismissal which will be lawful as long
as there is compliance with the terms of the contract and the termination is preceded
by the requisite notification or notice. In the case of contracts which were entered into
for an indefinite period, due notice will render the termination lawful; no notice, short
notice or any other breach of the contract will be regarded as wrongful, giving rise to
a claim for wrongful dismissal against the transferor. Where the contract was entered
into for a fixed period, unilateral termination can only occur in exceptional circum-
stances when there is a serious breach. Transfer of employment without the
employee's consent usually amounts to a repudiation of the contract. As long as the
contract continues, an employer is obliged to pay an employee wages against a
tender to serve, regardless of whether the employee have done any work. A mere
willingness to work is sufficient. 9
 An agreement which may be arrived at will normally
be enforced by the Courts, but in the absence of an agreement, the common law's
concern is to avoid the automatic transfer of contracts of employment.
The rule as to the non-transferability of contracts of employment originated as
a protection for the individual employee to preserve the employee's freedom of choice,
as the following remarks in the English case of Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated
Collieries Ltd. 1 ° illustrate:
[AJ free citizen, in the exercise of his freedom, is entitled to choose the employer whom
he promises to serve, so that the right to his services cannot be transferred from one
employer to another without his assent.
In the case of Nokes, a colliery worker was accused by his apparent employer, the
transferee, of breaking his contract of employment. The Court found that a workman
was justified in refusing to allow his contract to be transferred to another company and
that there was therefore no contract in force. In defending the inalienable right of an
7See R.H. Christie, The Law of Contract in South Africa 464 (Durban 1981).
8Ntuli v. Hazelmore Group f/a Musgrave Nursing Home, (1988) 9 LU. 709, 713 (l.C.).
9Johannesburg Municipality v. O'Sullivan, 1923 A.D. 201; and see M.S.M. Brassey, E. Cameron, M.H.
Cheadle & M.P. Olivier, The New Labour Law 133 (Cape Town 1987).
10Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Colliones, 1940 App. Cas. 1014, 1020 (H.L).
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employee to choose an employer, the Court refused to let the company's interests
outweigh the importance which employees may attach to the identity of the particular
company with which they deal. The protective function ascribed to the common law
in Nokes has, however, not been able to shield employees from harm or injury in
similar cases. Notwithstanding the obvious concern for the employee which led
originally to the avoidance of automatic continuity of service, the common-law
contractual principles concerning transfer of employment have in most instances been
manipulated to operate against the interests of employees.
In the first South African case which dealt extensively with the consequences
of the transfer of an undertaking, it became clear that employees' right to choose an
employer does not compensate for the risks and serious problems resulting from a
transfer. In Ntuli v. Hazelmore Group f/a Musgrave Nursing Home' 1 the services of
the entire staff of a nursing home were terminated after the sale of the business to a
new proprietor. The main reason for their retrenchment was the introduction of a new
NrotaN system which would have created transport difficulties for some of the
employees. The employees indicated, however, that they would have worked the new
shifts despite the difficulties if it meant that they could have retained their employ-
ment.12
The applicant employees submitted that there was no break in their service as
a result of the change of ownership of the nursing home and complained that the
transferee did not follow the proper procedure regarding retrenchment. The Court
rejected the employees' submission on the ground that the common law granted a
transferee freedom to choose which employees to engage in the acquired undertaking,
in addition to the freedom to rearrange the business operations. In this case, the
transferee had taken all reasonable steps in retrenching the employees and the Court
accepted that the selection of employees had not been arbitrary, but had been based
on business or operational considerations. An important factor which the Court took
into account to absolve the transferee of all responsibility towards the employees, was
the fact that the engagement of the staff was conditional in law since the transferee
had informed the employees that their engagement was subject to the proviso that a
number of staff would be retrenched at the end of the first month after the transfer.
"(1988) 9 I.LJ. 709 (I.C.).
at 711-12.
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The Court stated that, in equity, the respondent did not engender any reasonable
expectation that the employees could rely on the security of their tenure beyond the
first month.13
A transferee will only incur liability for compensation in circumstances where
the employees have been offered security of tenure and subsequently retrenched. In
these circumstances the transferee would be expected to compensate the employees
for their whole period of service in the undertaking, including their period of service for
the transferor. 14
 However, if the transferee does not retain the employees for a
reasonable period, they have to look to the transferor for relief. A reasonable period
is described as None sufficiently lengthy to have eliminated the problems relating to
staff which often accompany a change in management.N5 Moreover, a reasonable
period should not be too lengthy so that the transferor experiences uncertainty as to
his contingent liability for possible retrenchments.
The underlying reason for imposing liability on the transferor is that the
employer who has had the benefit of the services of the employees should bear the
brunt of any compensation to which they may be entitledN.le This reason was
considered by the Court to be fair to the transferor under the circumstances. Fairness
to the employees, however, received only scant attention and the Court refrained from
spelling out the harsh consequences of the common law.
Employees who are subject to a change in the identity of employer suffer a
range of undesirable consequences. First, a transfer generally amounts to a dismissal
by the transferor employer, leaving employees with no security of employment.
Second, a claim for compensation for the loss of their jobs has to be made against
the transferor, who is not necessarily financially in a position to comply with a
compensation order, particularly in the case of the transfer of a moribund business.17
Third, a transferee can be entirely selective when it comes to retaining employees and
may engage employees on any set of terms and conditions. There is no obligation
at 718.
' 4Ici. at 719-20. This of course begs the severance payments debate. See discussion below.
' 51d. at 720.
' 61d. at 721.
' 7The issue was addressed in the case of Lathe v. Impala Holiday Flats, (1993) 14 I.LJ. 1074, 1080
(I.C.). See eisa SACCAWU v. Steers Fast Food, (1993) 2 Lc.D. 125 (LA.C.).
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to respect terms and conditions which existed prior to the transfer. In the fourth place,
there is no foundation upon which employees can insist that acquired rights be taken
up by the transferee and they may lose all seniority or continuity of employment.
Finally, a transferee has the option to retain employees who were employed by the
transferor for a probationary period, during which they can be dismissed with impunity.
In the case of such conditional employment there seems little basis on which to
require that the guidelines which normally apply in the case of retrenchments be
followed. However, even if the Court required compliance with the guidelines, as the
judgement in the Ntuli case intimated, this requirement would have little strength
considering the scope of the freedom granted a transferee to orchestrate changes in
the undertaking.
In short, a transfer of an undertaking wipes out all continuity of employment
unless a new owner elects to employ the employees of the transferor and agrees to
maintain their terms and conditions of employment. Continuity of service is therefore
based on the subjective choice of the transferee, the 'assumption of responsibility for
the welfare of the employees by the transferee after the lapse of a reasonable period
of time. "8 In support of its conclusion which invoked continuity of service after the
lapse of a reasonable period of time, the Court referred to the Basic Conditions of
Employment Act 3 of 1983 and stated that 'the concept of continuity of employment
is not unknown in our statutory labour law." 9 These statutory provisions oblige an
employer to grant an employee annual leave, to remunerate the employee for that
leave and to remunerate the employee in respect of accrued leave. For the purpose
of these provisions, 'employer' includes the new owner in the case of a transfer of a
business but only if the new owner of the business continues to employ the employee
of the former owner.2°
These concessions to the expectations of employees who continue to be
employed in the same job and the same working environment, but with a new
employer, grants employees limited rights on transfer of employment. However, many
aspects of the concept of 'continuity of employment' have never been addressed in
18NIi v. Hazelmore Group Va Musgrave Nursing Home, (1988) 9 l.LJ. 709, 720 (l.C.).
191d. at 721. The Court did not refer to the only other statute which appears to provide for limited
continuity of employment The Manpower Training Act 56 of 1981 sec. 22(5)(a) provides for an automatic
transfer of contracts of apprenticeship entered into with a partnership in the event of the partnership
dissolving and the business being continued by a new person or partnership.
20Sec. 12 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 3 of 1983.
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South African law and the obligations of a transferee who chooses to retain employees
of the former employer for longer than a reasonable period of time have barely been
dealt with. A transferee's liability can extend to the payment of retrenchment benefits,
according to the Court in Ntuli, and to remuneration for leave, according to the Basic
Conditions of Employment Act. The continuation of many other acquired rights of
employees are, however, uncertain and many questions remain unanswered. Is the
transferee under an obligation to respect seniority rights of the employee? Can claims
which arise from the employment relationship with the transferor, such as for
commission or bonuses, be made against the transferee after the lapse of a
reasonable period of time? Can the transferee be expected to observe terms and
conditions collectively bargained with the transferor? Does re-engagement of the
work-force by the transferee imply preservation of the legal status and function of
employee representatives? Does the concept of continuity of employment only apply
to a takeover of a business as a going concern, or also to a takeover of assets which
are used in a slightly different business, but with employees doing the same work?21
Strong arguments can be made to give positive answers to most of the above
questions but while the uncertainty persists it can only harm sound labour relations.
Transfer - piercing the corporate veil
In Ntuli the Court did not find it necessary to consider transfers other than
those concerning a sale Nlock stock and barrel. Moreover, in Ntuli the Court dealt
with a transfer of a company from a transferor which was not associated with the
transferee. However, the responsibilities of the transferor and the transferee of an
undertaking towards the employees in circumstances where the former and new
proprietor were in some way connected to each other, have been addressed in other
cases. The Court has expressed itself in favour of taking a common-sense and
equitable approach to the determination of the real employer of the employees and
has come to the aid of employees in situations where there was evidence of sham
21 is to be hoped that the restrictive approach taken in EngJish law in cases such as Woodhouse v.
Peter Brntherhood Ltd., [1972] I.C.R. 186 (C.A.) and Melon v. Hector Powe Ltd., (1980] I.R.LR. 477 (H.L)
can be avoided.
Ntuli v. Hazelmore Group f/a Musgrave Nursing Home, (1988) 9 LU. 709, 721 (l.C.).
The Media Workers Association of SA v. Facts Investors Guide (P4'.) Ltd., (1986) 7 I.LJ. 313 (I.C.) per
Fabricius A.M.
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transfers or gratuitous transfers. In SMWU v. Contract Installations (P4'.) Ltd.,24
'lifting the corporate veil' revealed a position where a private company was in a hand-
in-glove situation with a close corporation. The Court summarized the factual position
as one in which the two companies were 'in mind and management ... one and the
same' and held the close corporation responsible for the unfair retrenchment of the
employees of its associate which had gone out of business. The Court also
enquired into the identity of the 'real employer' in Roshanlall v. Design Three. In
this case employees were transferred to a private company, without consultation or
consent, and later dismissed. The transferor company was owned and managed by
a sole trader, who was also sole director and shareholder of the private company. The
Court found that the dismissal was unfair and issued a reinstatement order.27
Similarly, in a case where the evidence disclosed that the 'closure' of one company
and 'opening' of another amounted to a stratagem to get rid of a portion of the work-
force so as to avoid compliance with fair employment and bargaining practices, the
Court made a finding of unfair retrenchment. The Court accepted that the second
business was in all material aspects the same as the first, that its address, buildings,
management structure, financing and customers remained unchanged, and that the
goodwill remained vested in the same director.28
N Piercing the corporate veil' was considered once more in SACWU v. Chemco
Laboratories (P4'.) Ltd. & Delta Distributors (P4'.) Ltd., a case which concerned a
company's rationalisation programme resulting in the formation of several separate
v. Contract Instailations (Pt','.) Ltd., (1988) 9 l.LJ. 112 (l.C.).
ld. at 114-15.
Roshanla1! v. Design Three, (1989) 10 l.LJ. 1162 (l.C.).
27The Court indicated that the order could be complied with by employing them in the transferor
company, or by 'causing them to be employed in the transferee company. Similarly, in De Vnes v.
Lanzerac Hotel, (1993) 14 l.LJ. 1460, 1465 (LA.C.), a reinstatement order was made against a partner in
a body which managed a hotel. The Court was of the opinion that if this partner had no work for the
reinstated employees, it might subcontract them to the partnership or transfer their contracts of service to
the partnership.
SACWU v. Toiletpak Manufacturers (Pty.) Ltd., (1988) 9 lU. 295 (IC). A similar finding was reached
in Paper Printing Wood & Allied Workers Union v. Lane N.O. as Trustee of Cape Pallet C.C. (in liquidation),
(1993) 14 l.UJ. 1366 (l.C.). But in Lathe v. Impala Holiday Flats, (1993) 14 lU. 1074 (l.C.), even though
the employees believed that the change in ownership was not a real change, the Court considered it to be
a case of retrenchment.
SACWU v. Chemco Laboratories (Pt,'.) Ltd. & Delta Distributors (P4'.) Ltd., Unpublished judgement
of the Industrial Court, Case No. NH 11/2/1688, 23-25 October 1989.
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corporate entities. The restructuring was a bona fide rationalisation process directed
at better focus and financial control in the business. Although many of the new
entities had existed in some form as part of the larger company before the
rationalisation, the reorganisation brought about changes in the scope of their
operations. To provide for the particular focus of the various companies, interests and
assets were sold to them by the original holding company. The re-apportionment of
functions necessitated a re-assignment of staff to the new companies. Employees,
although they continued with substantially the same functions performed at the same
premises, were assigned to new employing entities.
The Court had little difficulty in finding that the group of companies involved in
the matter could be described as one 'economic entity', a term which implied that the
separate legal entities of the various holding and subsidiary companies in the group
could be disregarded for certain purposes. 3° Support for this finding was gained
from the fact that the separate legal entities remained one business, operating for the
benefit of the shareholders. Since the different companies formed part of the
economic unit represented by the constituent group, the actions of management had
to be judged in the wider context of the business.
The facts of this case can best be summed up in terms of the adage that the
more things change, the more they remain the same. Similarities and changes
resulting from the process of corporate restructuring led to the bafflement of the
employees; it also left the Court in a quandary. Despite the changes brought about
by the restructuring, management intended to continue with the employment of the
employees and it was never the intention to retrench existing personnel from the
business. However, the same managerial officials, acting in a dual capacity for both
the previous and the future employer, gave the employees first notice of termination,
and subsequently offered them employment in the new company. The employees
were confronted with a situation in which they were to perform their duties at the same
place and in substantially the same way, yet they learned that their future employer
would be a new legal entity. Since the employment was offered on terms and
conditions which were less favourable than those which persisted in their employment
with the previous employer, they refused to accept these terms, and as a result lost
their jobs. For the employees, the enterprise was characterised more by the
similarities which they perceived in the continuum of the employing enterprise, the
3°Id.
187
work environment, plant, machinery, supervisors and management than by the identity
of the legal proprietor alone and they expected their working conditions to continue.
The Court was faced with the dilemma of reconciling, on the one hand, the
formation of a separate corporate entity to perform operations which had previously
been within the scope of another company and, on the other hand, the fact that both
these companies formed part of one 'economic entity.' Between Scylla and
Charybdis, the Court found it difficult to avoid one peril without running into the other.
While steering this complicated course, in an attempt to tide it over the difficulty, the
Court devised a cumbersome construction. It distinguished between two components
in the employment situation, the contractual relationship between employer and
employee as evidenced by the service contract, and the labour relationship.31
According to the Court, the cancellation of the contractual relationship did not
immediately result in the extinction of the labour relationship, which might continue
until the other party had accepted the finality of the separation or exhausted all the
rights in terms of the Act to seek reinstatement of the contractual relationship. The
Court found first that there had been a retrenchment; the employees had become
redundant to the requirements of the transferor company which no longer had posts
for them in its organisational structure. However, since the labour relationship
continued, the Court accepted that there had 'not really been a retrenchment' and
found the transferee guilty of the unfair unilateral amendment of the terms of
employment.
A second case presented the Court with facts almost identical to those in the
Chemco Laboratories case. In Young v. Life gro Assuranc&2 the Court, faced with
a merger situation between two associated employers, held that the dismissal of an
employee, subject to and coupled with an offer of employment on the same terms and
conditions by the transferee, did not constitute retrenchment. The similarities between
the two cases are striking. In Lifegro, like in the Chemco Laboratories case, the
intention of management was at all times that the employees should remain 'on
board', and not that they should become redundant. In both cases the exercise was
clad in a 'dismissal/re-employment by a third' format and from this it ostensibly would
31 See also BHT Water Treatment (P4'.) Ltd. v. Maritz N.O., (1993) 2 LC.D. 184 (LA.C.). But ci. the
decisions in Borg-Warner S4 v. N..4AWU, (1991) 12 I.LJ. 549 (LA.C.) and SACTWU v. S4 Clothing
Manufacturers, (1991) 12 I.LJ. 1066 (I.C.).
Young v. Lifegro Assurance, (1990) 11 I.LJ. 1127 (I.C.).
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appear to be a matter of retrenchment. The finding of the Court in both cases was
that there was no retrenchment; in Chemco Laboratories this finding was to the
employees' advantage, but in Lifegro the employee was hit with the brutal operation
of the common law rule. The facts in Lifegro show that, while employees who were
not offered re-employment were formally retrenched and received severance pay, the
employee who refused an offer of re-employment could not claim retrenchment
benefits, mainly because the employee was not made redundant in the sense that he
lost his job permanently. Perhaps the most severe aspect of the decision relates to
the Court's failure to consider all the implications of the common law rule which grants
employees the fundamental freedom to choose an employer. The Court certainly had
no justification for condoning the employer's disregard of his right to consent to the
transfer of his employment. Inherent in the common law principle which dictates
against the automatic transfer of employment, is the assumption that an employer
cannot transfer the right to demand an employee's services without the consent of the
employee. This assumption alone requires a process of consultation regarding the re-
employment of the employee. Not to allow an employee any say in his future
employment is to force upon him the worst outcome under a regime in which the
common law is the sole ruler.
The procedural requirement of consultation in the context of business transfers
will be discussed in detail later in this chapter. Apart from procedural questions, cases
such as those discussed above which all deal with transfers between associated
employers, raise the interesting question whether the harsh substantive consequences
of the common law, which usually results in the termination of the employees'
contracts of employment, can be overcome by piercing the corporate veil. Can a
transferor company in merger situations be substituted ex lege as employeri As
much as one would like to give a positive answer to this question, it is not always
possible to escape the common law contractual consequences. The common law
framework frees a transferee of any obligation actually to hire a transferor's employees.
The transferee is normally able to establish its own starting wages and working
See the remarks which were made in NUMSA v. Spinmet (P4g.) Ltd., (1993) 2 LC.D. 36 (LA.C.);
'[U]nder our common law such a transfer is ineffective without the consent of the employee ... [C]ontracts
of service are considered to be of a personal nature, so that an employer is not entitled to call upon his
employee to serve another employer in his stead.'
See Andrew Breitenbach, 'Aspects of the South African Law on Retrenchment in the Light of English
Labour Standards, 11 lndus. U. 1193, 1210 (1990) where he refers to LC.B. Gower, Modern Company
Law 201 (3d ed. London 1969).
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conditions and to offer them to all job applicants, including the employees working for
the transferor. There is no sound basis on which the courageous attempt by the
Industrial Court in the Chemco Laboratories case to overcome these consequences,
can be justified, and until the South African law introduces provisions similar to the
British Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations of 1981 the
inescapable conclusion seems to be that the transfer of an undertaking results in the
termination of the employment relationship and the retrenchment of the employees.
Insolvency
The common law considered an employer's insolvency to be a breach of
contract. An employee whose services were terminated by a trustee or 'iquidator had
a concurrent claim for damages against the insolvent estate. In terms of statute,
the sequestration of the estate of an employer terminates any contracts of service
between the employer and the employees. Any employee whose contract has
been so terminated may claim compensation from the former employer's estate for
any loss which may have been suffered by reason of the termination of the contract
of service prior to its expiration. Such a claim is merely a concurrent one but the
employee has a preferential claim for salary or wages for a period not exceeding two
ln as far as the Labour Relations Act imposes a duty to bargain, this duty arises in respect of future
changes in the terms and conditions of employment. It is submitted, however, that if a transferee wants
to retain all or almost all the employees of the transferor without mentioning changes in the terms governing
the transferor's employees, such employees have a legitimate expectation that new initial terms of
employment will not thereafter be declared unilaterally. The failure of a transferee to announce clearly an
intention to set a new set of conditions prior to employing former employees can be seen as an implicit
assumption of an obligation to honour previous terms and conditions of employment.
The same problem pertains to the decision of the Industrial Court in SAC1WU v. Bellcanto Nominees
No. 2 Ltd. t/a Lansdowne Textile Industries, ( 1993) 2 LC.D. 87 (l.C.), which involved the sale of a company
which had been placed under provisional liquidation. After the employees had been working for the
purchaser for three weeks, they were presented with new contracts of employment. They refused to accept
these contracts without first negotiating about the terms of the contract. As a result of their refusal to sign
the contracts, the employer terminated their employment. The Industrial Court found that the employees
could not prove a strict contractual relationship with the new employer, but stated that the parties were
parties to an employment relationship, and found that the termination of the employment of the employees
had been unfair.
37These regulations were designed to implement the EEC Directive on the Acquired Rights of Workers
on Transfers of Undertakings.
See Clark v. Denny, 1884 E.D.C. 300.
Sec. 38 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. See, in general, E. de Ia Rey, Mars, The Law of Insolvency
in South Africa 159 (8th ed. Cape Town 1988); Catherine Smith, The Law of Insolvency 164-65 (3d ed.
Durban 1988).
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months prior to the date of sequestration of the estate, within certain limits. 40 The
claim ranks immediately after funeral and death-bed expenses, costs of sequestration
and execution, workmen's compensation and contributions to pension, unemployment
and other funds. Moreover, if on the date of sequestration any leave is due to the
employee, the employee is entitled to salary or wages in respect of the period of leave
due, for a certain period and within certain limits. 4' To obtain the benefit of the
preference, the employee need not prove the claim formally, but the trustee may
require an affidavit in support of the claim.42
Insomuch as the sequestration of the estate of an employer terminates the
contract of service with employees, it appears incongruous for the Industrial Court to
have held that the Court might not be precluded from reinstating a dismissed
employee, even though the contract of employment could have been terminated by
the provisions of the Insolvency Act. 43 However, in ordering reinstatement, the Court
relied on a section of the Labour Relations Act which determines that a reinstatement
order made by the Court 'shall prevail over any contrary provisions in any law...'."
In addition, the Labour Relations Act indicates that 'reinstatement' does not
necessarily have to be physical. 45
 It is possible to reconcile these provisions of the
Labour Relations Act with a section of the Insolvency Act which specifies that an
employee is not deprived of a claim for compensation for losses suffered as a result
of the automatic termination of his or her employment. 40 What the reinstatement
40Sec. 100(1)(a) of Act 24 of 1936. The list of preferential claims contains no reference of claims such
as a long service bonus or redundancy pay. However, two possible bases exist for regarding such claims
as preferent claims. It is possible to argue that these payments can be construed as a form of wages which
are due to an employee. Alternatively, it can be argued that, if the running of the company is taken over
by a liquidator upon liquidation and the employees are re-employed by the liquidator, employees' wages
and other outstanding payments to employees should be treated as administration costs.
4 'Sec. 100(2) of Act 24 of 1936.
42S 	 100(3) of Act 24 of 1936.
'SA Boilermakers, Iron & Steelworkers, Shipbuilders & Welders Society v.S4 Cutler,' (Pt,'.) Ltd., (1988)
9 I.LJ. 1106 (l.C.).
"Sec. 43(6) of Act 28 of 1956.
45Sec. 43(7). See SA Boilermakers Society v. SA Cutleiy, (1988) 9 l.LJ. 1106 (l.C.); Zipp v. Trac X
Spares, (1989) 10 I.LJ. 1137 (l.C.) and Zipp v. TracXSpares, (1990) 11 I.LJ. 408(l.C.).
40Sec. 38 of Act 24 of 1936.
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order therefore amounts to is compensation which ranks as a concurrent claim.47
The principles regarding sequestration of an employer's estate do not apply to
all instances of insolvent companies. However, these principles do apply in the case
of the liquidation of a company whose liabilities exceed its assets, and which is unable
to pay its debts!' In order to determine whether a company is unable to pay its
debts, it has to be established that the company is in a state of commercial
insolvency, which implies that it is unable to meet the day-to-day or current demands
upon it in the ordinary course of its business. 49 Applications to wind up companies
on the ground of their commercial insolvency are often opposed on the basis that they
are in fact solvent, having assets exceeding their liabilities and the Court in such cases
has a discretion to refuse a winding-up order.5°
Forms of liquidation other than those concerning companies unable to pay their
debts, do not automatically terminate the contracts of service with employees, but a
liquidator has to elect whether or not to continue with such executory or partially
performed contracts.5' Should the liquidator decide to terminate the contract, the
normal procedures with regard to dismissal or retrenchment must be followed and the
employee has a concurrent claim for damages against the estate. This is the case,
47lt has, however, been questioned whether reinstatement can have the effect of swelling the claims of
the company's concurrent Creditors in this way. See Michael Blackman, The Employee and the Insolvent
Company, 14 Indus. U. 543, 546 (1993).
Sec. 339 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 and see Woodley v. Guardian Assurance Co. of SA Ltd.,
1976 (1) S.A. 758, 763 (W.). The decision to wind up a company can be voluntary (made by the members
by special resolution - sec. 346) or compulsory (ordered by the Court on the application of a member or
a creditor of the company . sec. 346(1)(b)). If an employee qualifies as a creditor (even a contingent or
prospective creditor - sec. 346(1)(b)), he or she will have a ground for seeking compulsory winding-up if
the company owes him or her at least RiCO, the debt is due, payment has been demanded, and for three
weeks the company has neglected to pay (sec. 344(t) read with sec. 345(1)(a)); or, having obtained
judgement against the company, insufficient disposable assets are found to satisfy the debt (sec. 344(t) read
with sec. 345 (1)(b)). Ahernatively, an employee will have to establish either that the company is in fact
unable to pay its debts when they fall due (sec. 344(t) read with sec. 345(1)(c)), or that 75% of its share
capital has been lost or has become useless for the business of the company (sec. 344(e)). See, in
general, H.S. Cilliers & M.0 Benade, Corporate Law 4.48 (Durban 1987), and Michael Blackman, The
Employee and the Insolvent Company, 14 Indus. U. 543 (1993).
49Rosenbach & Co. (Ply.) Ltd. v. Sin gh's Bazaars (P4'.) Ltd., 1962 (4) S.A. 593, 597 (D.). Sec. 38 of the
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 is rendered applicable to such companies by sec. 339 of the Companies Act 61
of 1973.
50Sec. 342(1) of the Companies Act provides that in every winding-up the assets are to be applied in
the payment of the creditors' claims as nearly as possible as they would be applied in the payment of
the claims of creditors under the law relating to insolvency (secs. 97 -102 of the Insolvency Act).
5'Biyant& Flanagan (Ply.) Ltd. v. Muller, 1977 (1) S.A. 800 (N.) (which was confirmed on appeal at 1978
(2) SA 807 (A.D.)); Cohen NO. v. Verwoerdburg Town Council, 1983 (1) S.A. 334, 352 (A.D.).
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for example, where a company is wound up by a Court on the ground that it appears
just and equitable to do so. 52 This ground for liquidation is based on a broad
conclusion of law, justice and equity and may be applied when a deadlock in the
management of the affairs of the company has arisen from internal disputes. Usually
a Court will not intervene if mechanisms exist by which the dispute can be resolved,
unless it can be shown that the deadlock renders it impossible to carry on the
business of the company. Considering the procedures in the Labour Relations Act
for the resolution of industrial disputes and the aim of the Act to achieve industrial
peace, the Courts will be likely to investigate carefully before granting a winding-up
order on just and equitable grounds in the event of a dispute between employer and
trade union or employees. However, winding-up may be justified when there is proof
of a dispute which upsets the personal relationship of confidence and trust between
members who are responsible for the management of the company's affairs, TM and
arguably, in exceptional circumstances, between management and employees.
This ground for the liquidation of a company may be applicable with regard to firms
which, due to their smaller size or nature, depend on friendly co-operation between
management and employees to function.
What is the effect of liquidation on collective agreements? Unlike contracts of
employment, they do not terminate automatically in the event of liquidation.
Moreover, the liquidator has no power to cancel an agreement unilaterally. If the
liquidator wishes, he or she can terminate the agreement lawfully by observing the
terms of the agreement; an unlawful termination will amount to a repudiation which will
Sec. 344(h) of Act 61 of 1973 and see Rand Air (Pty.) Ltd. v. Ray Bester Investments (P4'.) Ltd., 1985
(2) S.A. 345 (W.).
H.S. Cilliers & M.L Benade, Corporate Law 458 (Durban 1987).
54Moosa v. Mavjee Bhawan (P4'.) Ltd., 1967 (3) S.A. 131 (1.); Erasmus v. Pentamed Investments (P4'.)
Ltd., 1982 (1) S.A. 178 (W.); Hart v. Pinetown Drive-In Cinema (P4'.) Ltd., 1972 (1) S.A. 464 (D.).
Courts have granted winding-up orders on grounds analogous to those for the dissolution of
partnerships, in the case of companies having only a few members, as long as there was proof of a dispute
which upset the personal relationship between members. See, e.g., Moose v. Mavjee Bhawan (P4'.) Ltd.,
1967 (3) S.A. 131 (1.).
The reason is that where none of the provisions of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 apply, winding-up
does not automatically terminate an executory or partly performed contract, and the liquidator must elect
whether to perform or render the company liable in damages. See Michael Blackman, The Employee and
the Insolvent Company, 14 Indus. U. 543, 545 (1993) and B. Jordaan, Transfer, Closure and Insolvency
of Undertakings, 12 Indus. U. 935, 957 (1991). There is no basis for the decision in CWIU v. Indian
Ocean Fertilizers, (1988) 9 l.LJ. 1092 (l.C.) in which the argument was accepted that the liquidator could
terminate a recognition agreement with the union unilaterally.
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give the other party the choice to either cancel the agreement or to hold the liquidator
to it. Since one is dealing with an insolvent employer, the latter choice will not
necessarily result in specific performance of the contract. If the liquidator decides
within a reasonable time not to perform in terms of the contract, the creditor may end
up having a concurrent claim for the monetary equivalent of performance.57
In addition to dismissals which take place in the context of the winding-up of
insolvent companies, employees may be dismissed when a company is placed under
judicial management. The purpose of judicial management is to enable companies
suffering a temporary setback due to mismanagement or other special circumstances,
to become successful concerns once more. To achieve this aim, the judicial
manager has the duty to conduct the management in the manner most economical
and which most promotes of the interests of the members and creditors. The
protection of the interests of creditors during the process of judicial management
implies that employees' interests may suffer, and that employees can be retrenched
or dismissed in the course of the procedure.6°
Employees apppear to bear the brunt of the risk of business failure, while the
law of insolvency provides disproportionate protection for the interests of shareholders
and creditors. To address this imbalance, it is necessary at least to give serious
consideration to the introduction of a guarantee fund for the protection of employees'
arrear wages in the event of winding-up or judicial management.
Obligations of the transferor
1.	 Collective bargaining theory
Introduction
Collective bargaining within the South African legal framework is based upon
57See, in genera!, E. de a Rey, Mars, The Law of Insolvency in South Afnea 143 (8th ed. Cape Town
1988).
H.S. Cilliers & M.L Benade, Corporate Law 431-43 (Durban 1987).
Sec. 433 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973.
60Michael Blackman, The Employee and the Insolvent Company, 14 Indus. U. 543, 560(1993) points
out that a judicial management order does not affect employment contracts but that judicial management
entails great risks for the employee since the success rate is very low. It is only if the employee is a creditor
that he or she can apply for a judicial management order, get information about the company's state of
affairs (secs. 427(2), 430 and 431 of Act 61 of 1973), and have any right to be informed and consufted (sec.
433(h)). Employees who are not creditors have no right to be informed about the risks involved or to
renegotiate the terms of their contracts.
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the same premises as that of the United States and the United Kingdom. The law
gives the employer the right to manage the enterprise6' and imposes few constraints
on the employer's wide managerial discretion. However, a degree of industrial
democracy has been introduced in areas which concern fundamental business
decisions, primarily through legislative changes and judicial interpretation of labour
legislation.
Collective Bargaining and the Labour Relations Act
It has become a commonplace to state that the object of the Labour Relations
Act62 is to promote industrial peace, principally through the mechanism of collective
bargaining. The aim of achieving industrial peace in South Africa through the
process of collective bargaining was first expressed in the Industrial Conciliation Act
in 1924, eleven years before this goal was given statutory recognition in the United
States with the passing of the Wagner Act. Subsequent South African labour
legislation shared the commitment to collective bargaining as the preferred means for
dealing with industrial conflict, although for many years the statutory scheme excluded
black trade unions. An increase in the number of strikes in the 1970's led to the
realization that it was imperative to open voluntary collective bargaining institutions to
blacks. It was furthermore realized that to avoid disruption, it would sometimes be
necessary for a Court to adjudicate on industrial disputes. The Commission of Enquiry
into Labour Legislation TM recommended that an Industrial Court be established with
the power to hear cases
of irregular and undesirable practices such as unjustified or unfair changes in the
established labour pattern of an employer or other actions which threaten industrial peace
or lead to dissatisfaction, [and] of unfair dismissal, inequitable changes in conditions of
employment, underpayment of wages, unfair treatment and other cases of griev-
ances..es
The Government accepted these recommendations and an Industrial Court was
established with two important powers, namely to make status quo orders and to
°'M.S.M. Brassey, E. Cameron, M.H. Cheadle, M.P. Olivier, The New Labour Law 74 (Cape Town 1987).
Act 28 of 1956. All references are to sections of the Labour Relations Act unless stated otherwise.
See, e.g., Larcombe v. Natal Nylon Industries, Pietermaritzburg, (1986) 7 I.LJ. 326, 332 (IC.);
Bissessor v. Beastores f/a Game Discount World, (1986) 7 l.LJ. 334, 339 (l.C.).
64professor Wiehahn was the chairman of the Commission of Enquiry into Labour Legislation, the
reports and recommendations of which gave rise to many of the key amendments to the statute in 1979.
65Report of the Commission of Enquir)' into Labour Legislation, Part 1 RP 47/1979 IV para. 4.28.5.2-4.
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make unfair labour practice determinations. 	 In 1988 the power to grant urgent
interim relief was added.67
All three powers of the Court are aimed at constraining and correcting unfair
labour practices. Both the status quo remedy and urgent interim relief allow for the
temporary reversal of unfair unilateral action by one of the parties to the employment
relationship. Irrespective of whether urgent interim or status quo relief has been
granted, a party may obtain final relief by referring a dispute to the Industrial Court for
an unfair labour practice determination.
It was clearly not intended that the Industrial Court should regulate emp'oyment
matters to the exclusion of the parties themse'ves. For one thing, the title of the Act
provides for "the regulation of terms and conditions of employment by agreement",
thereby indicating a pivotal role for the collective bargaining process. 7° The
importance of the institution of collective bargaining is confirmed by the whole
structure of the Act. The unfair labour practice jurisdiction of the Industrial Court is
Sec. 17(11 )(f) read with sec. 43 (status quo orders) and sec. 46(9) (unfair labour practice
determinations).
67Sec. 17(11)(a), introduced by the Labour Relations Amendment Act 83 of 1988. The 1991 Labour
Relations Amendment Act inserted the requirement in sec. 170 that notice be given to the other party.
The Labour Relations Amendment Act 9 of 1991, which came into effect on 1 May1991, reintroduced
an open-ended unfair labour practice definition, similar to the one that existed prior to 1 September 1988.
The definition reads as follows:
"unfair labour practice" means any act or omission, other than a strike or lock-out, which has or may have
the effect that -
(i) any employee or class of employees is or may be unfairly affected or that his or their employment
opportunities or work security is or may be prejudiced or jeopardized thereby;
(ii) the business of any employer or class of employers is or may be unfairly affected or disrupted
thereby;
(iii) labour unrest is or may be created or promoted thereby,
(iv) the labour relationship between employer and employee is or may be detrimentally affected
thereby.
The definition excludes any reference to strikes and lock-outs, with the result that the Court cannot
interdict such actions on the basis of unfairness. The Court may, however, in terms of section 17(11)(aA)
interdict strikes and lock-outs on the basis of unlawfulness, i.e. non-compliance with the provisions of
section 65.
69The power of the Court to issue Status quo orders is formulated in general terms to include any order
which the Court "deems reasonable in the circumstances" (sec. 43(1)). Accordingly, a wide variety of interim
orders may be granted to suspend or reverse an unfair labour practice. In circumstances which call for a
more urgent remedy, the Industrial Court has been given the power to grant urgent relief which Will reverse
an unfair labour practice until the grant of a status quo order (sec. 17(11)(a)). Sec. 17D places certain limits
on the bringing of applications for urgent interdicts.
70"Agreement is defined in sec. 1(1) of the Act to include agreements concluded by parties to an
industrial council or a conciliation board as well as agreements entered into between an employer, on the
one hand, and a trade union or group of employees, on the other. The definition covers a variety of
agreements such as recognition agreements, or agreed retrenchment procedures.
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indirect and can only be exercised if a dispute has first been referred to an industrial
council or conciliation board. 71 A proper reference of an unfair labour practice
dispute to a council or board is treated as a prerequisite for the assumption by the
Court of jurisdiction unless the parties have agreed to omit the conciliation phase!7
Industrial councils are permanent bodies established by employer parties and trade
unions73 in any undertaking, industry, trade or occupation"74 (excluding state,
farming and domestic employment). 75 The duties of an industrial council are to
prevent disputes from arising by the negotiation of agreements, to settle industrial
disputes and to regulate matters of mutual interest. Where there is no industrial
council, the Act requires that the parties to a dispute apply for the establishment of a
conciliation board to consider and, if possible, settle the dispute. 7° The agreements
concluded by these bodies acquire the force of delegated legislation when they are
published by the Minister of Manpower in the Government Gazette! 7 These
agreements may deal with virtually any matter of mutual interest to the parties, which
means that these agreements may, for example, regulate the transfer of rights of
employees in the undertaking in the event of a takeover. While industrial councils and
conciliation boards are both collective bargaining forums, 7° the Act leaves the parties
free to regulate their collective relations in private agreements. Invocation of the
statutory machinery usually only precedes litigation or industrial action.79
71 Secs. 43(2), 46(9)(a) and (b).
72Sec. 46(9)(d).
Sec. 18.
74Sec. 1.
75Farmworkers are covered by the Agricultural Labour Act 147 of 1993; domestic workers work under
certain minimum conditions granted to them by the Basic Conditions of Employment Amendment Act 137
of 1993; certain public sector employees are accommodated in the Public Service Labour Relations Act 102
of 1993.
76Secs. 35 and 36(1).
Sec. 48 gives the Minister of Manpower the power to promulgate industrial council agreements and
to extend their operation to non-parties within, and on some occasions even outside, the councirs
registered jurisdiction.
78See Zuke v. Minister of Manpower, (1985) 6 l.LJ. 193, 200 (D.); SAAME v. Minister of Labour, 1948
(1) S.A. 528, 538 (T.).
79Edwin Cameron, Halton Cheadle and Clive Thompson, The New Labour Relations Act 20 (Cape Town
1989).
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The Labour Relations Act advances collective bargaining as the favoured
means of resolving industrial disputes. With the object of institutionalising conflict in
the economy, it sanctions freedom to belong to trade unions, 8° to establish collective
bargaining forums such as industrial councils 81
 and conciliation boards, and to
engage in collective action. It is essential to keep in mind that the statutory
advancement of collective bargaining and the liberalisation of the process, have also
brought restraint through a significant change in the common law. Under the common
law little protection was offered against arbitrariness and the party with the greater
bargaining power was allowed to extract any bargain, no matter how oppressive.TM
This meant in fact that the institution itself could be undermined through the exercise
of power. The Labour Relations Act, without rejecting the premise that the outcome
of collective bargaining will reflect the parties' own understanding of their interests and
their relative strength, guards against the erosion of the process, mainly through the
unfair labour practice jurisdiction.
The unfair labour practice jurisdiction has been called "supple and open
ended in the extreme due to the fact that its interpretation revolves around the
notion of "fairness". The Court has stated that "the concept of an "unfair labour
practice" involves much more than pure law"; 81 the Court, in fact, has to pass •a
moral judg[e]ment on a combination of findings of fact and opinions. Supplement-
ing legal considerations with economic, social and moral concerns in the adjudication
of industrial disputes may be desirable and even essential at times, but there is no
denying that a completely open-ended approach regarding the ephemeral notion of
80Secs. 66, 78 and 79.
8l< 18 and 19.
82Sec. 35.
Secs. 65 and 79.
84M.S.M. Brassey, E. Cameron, M.H. Cheadle & M.P. Olivier, The New Labour Law 5 (Cape Town
1987).
Edwin Cameron, Halton Cheadle and Clive Thompson, The New Labour Relations Act 21 (Cape Town
1989).
UAMAWU v. Fodens, (1983) 4 I.LJ. 212, 224 (I.C.).
87MAWU v. Natal Die Castings Co., (1986) 7 I.LJ. 520, 544 (IC.).
Media Workers Association of SA v. The Press Corporation of £4 Ltd., (1992) 13 I.LJ. 1391, 1400
(A.D.).
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fairness can easily lead to enduring chaos. This danger is intensified by the Industrial
Court's lack of power to lay down guidelines by judicial precedent. Within it's wide
jurisdiction it is possible for each officer to adhere to an ad hoc approach in deciding
what is fair. While a degree of elasticity and flexibility may be required in an industrial
relations situation in a state of flux, and while the Industrial Court should be allowed
the opportunity to play 'itS role as an evolutionary catalyst of proper labour relations,
especially in the determination of unfair labour practices' the dangers inherent in
this situation and the need for criteria to harmonise decisions have been recognised.
Accordingly, it has been proposed that the proper approach should be for the Court
to follow a policy of abstention in the area of economic disputes, but to use its
adjudicative powers to intervene in disputes of right.90 The distinction between
disputes of right and disputes of interest has been explained as follows:
"Conflicts of rights (or 'legal" disputes) are those arising from the application or
interpretation of an existing law or collective agreement (in some countries of an existing
contract of employment as well), white interests or economic disputes are those arising
from the failure of collective bargaining, i.e. when the parties' negotiations for the
conclusion, renewal, revision or extension of a collective agreement end in deadlock."91
As a theoretical yardstick this explanation has much to recommend it; as a
practical measure to be applied in specific situations it is less valuable, mainly due to
the area of overlap between disputes over rights and conflicts over interestsY The
extent of coincidence between these types of disputes is aggravated by the uncertainty
regarding the existence or non-existence of rights, given the wide definition of an unfair
labour practice in the Act. Almost any dispute may be brought under the commodious
wings of the definition of an unfair labour practice. For example, the restructuring,
relocation or sale of a business may have the effect that an employee's employment
opportunities or work security are unfairly prejudiced or unfairly jeopardized, or that the
relationship between employer and employee is detrimentally affected. It is widely
MAWU v. Natal Die Castings Co., (1986) 7 I.LJ. 520, 544 (l.C.).
90Edwin Cameron, Hafton Cheadle and Clive Thompson, The New Labour Relations Act 100 (Cape
Town 1989).
91 lntemational Labour Office, Conciliation and Arbitration Procedures in Labour Disputes 5 (Geneva
1980).
See Benjamin Aaron "Settlement of disputes over rights,' in Comparative Labour Law and Industrial
Relations 337 (R. Blanpain ed., 3d ed. Deventer 1987) where he observes that "the line between disputes
over rights and conflicts over interests is not always an impregnable wail; rather, it sometimes is more
analogous to a semi-permeable membrane, through which disputes that are nominally of one type pass
and are handled under procedures usually reserved for disputes of the other type.'
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accepted that an unfair labour practice claim involves a determination of rights
which depends in the first instance upon an interpretation of the Act. However, for
the Court to seek out Nthe true intention of the legislature as expressed in the Act"
is no easy assignment, especially since the Court's task involves much more than
answering a question of law.N The Appellate Division has described the Court's
function as follows:
The position then is that the definition of an unfair labour practice entails a determination
of the effect or possible effects of certain practices, and of the fairness of such effects.
And, when applying the definition, the (Court] is again expressly enjoined to have regard
not only to law but also to fairness. In my view a decision of the [C]ourt pursuant to
these provisions is not a decision on a question of law in the strict sense of the term.
It is the passing of a moral judg[e]ment on a combination of findings of fact and
opinions."
The ambiguity of the unfair labour practice definition and the vague demarca-
tion between disputes over rights and disputes over interests permit a variety of
interpretations depending upon different values and assumptions. South African
labour law, like that in many capitalist societies, has been influenced by pluralist
policies which have delineated the province of worker participation and determined the
relationship between collective bargaining and managerial authority.
Pluralist model
Ostensibly, statutory regulation of employment relations in South Africa has
increased the opportunies for worker participation in industrial decision-making. The
Labour Relations Act unquestionably asserts and encourages collective bargaining and
procedural safeguards have been introduced to increase employees' prospects of
influencing decisions that may affect their well-being. The unconfined nature of the
status quo and unfair labour practice remedies has made it possible for the Industrial
Court to apply conceptions of fairness to industrial disputes and to recognise a
measure of job security for employees. In deciding cases, the Court has taken heed
Edwin Cameron, Halton Cheadle and Clive Thompson, The New LabourRelations Act 97 (Cape Town
1989). But see the criticism which was expressed in Raad van Mynvakbonde v. Harmony Goudmynmaat-
skappyBpk., (1993) 14 l.LJ. 183 (I.C.).
Human v. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, 1956 (2) S.A. 461, 484 (T.).
R. v. Hi/dick-Smith, 1924 T.P.D 69, 81.
Media Workers Association of SA v. The Press Corporation of SA Ltd., (1992) 13 l.LJ. 1391, 1400
(A.D.).
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of international standards 97 and, on the whole, has been commended for its even-
handedness. Workers have seen the advantages which can be gained through the
Industrial Court in the pursuit of claims against their employers.
Despite the progress which has been made through labour reforms, workers'
opportunities to shape the work environment through meaningful participation are
limited in significant respects. Notwithstanding the recognition of the collective
bargaining process, expression of union needs and participation with management in
decisions affecting workers have been limited in accordance with prevailing pluralist
assumptions. Pluralist values have influenced the judicial view of collective bargaining
relationships and led to an acceptance of the idea that the employer's power is
inherent in its control of the production process and that the employer can lay
down the norms and standards of the enterprise.
In the battle between capital and labour, the legislature maintains an apparent
neutrality and one commentator has argued that the unfair labour practice jurisdiction
is not intended to confer a benefit or advantage on one or the other side. More
specifically, it has been argued that is it not the function of the Court to redress the
bargaining imbalance that exists between employees and their employers. 100 The
same commentator recognises that the parity between capital and labour is a mere
formal one and that employees are often in a weaker bargaining position and have to
take what the employer is prepared to give 101 , but ascribes that to the nature of the
employment relationship. He describes the employment relationship as one Nm which
the employee makes over to the employer his capacity to work and produce. The
corollary is that the employer can deploy that capacity as he sees fit". 1 °2 Building
on the commodity status of labour,103 this description suggests the worst outcome
97NAAWU v. Pretoria Precision Castings, (1985) 6 I.LJ. 369, 378A-B (I.C.).
M.S.M. Brassey, E. Cameron, M.H. Cheadle & M.P. Olivier, The New Labour Law 13 (Cape Town
1987).
See Kahn-Freund's Labour and the Law ch. 1 (P.L Davies & M. Freedland eds., 3d ed. London 1983).
' 00M.S.M. Brassey, E. Cameron, M.H. Cheadle & M.P. Olivier, The New Labour Law 63 (Cape Town
1987).
'°'ld. at 62-63.
1 °21d. at 65.
' 03For an analysis of this term, see Richard Hyman, The Political Econon'r of Industfia! Relations 20
(London 1989).
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of a pluralist collective bargaining relationship in which employee interests are
rendered insignificant in comparison to dominant employer concerns. Moreover, it
goes against one of the most widely accepted justifications for labour law and labour
legislation, which is uto counteract the inequality of bargaining power which is inherent
in the employer-employee relationship.'104
The main problem with this exposition is that while it recognises the inevitable
constraints of collective bargaining - the fact that the results necessarily reflect the
concentration of power between workers and employers - it fails to assess the
implications of statutory intervention. In particular, the proposition of Government
neutrality acts as a subterfuge to evade the active encouragement of collective
bargaining. Government neutrality is not supported by the evidence. On the contrary,
the range of constraints in the Labour Relations Act testifies to Government
intervention; the Government's role as economic manager is corroborated by statutes
such as the Factories Act,'°5
 the Shop and Offices Act'°6 and wage boards
established under the Wage Act. 107
 It is clear that the South African Government's
function involves more than support and assistance; the state itself has a forceful
interest in the functioning of the labour market and the process of collective
bargaining. The statutory mandate to protect collective bargaining requires that its
scope and effectiveness should not be restricted and that every interest should be
given due weight. The interests of trade union members, the concerns and difficulties
of their working lives are as important as managerial problems and aspirations.
The labels of 'voluntarism' and uindustrial self-goverment' are too often used
as a mask for non-intervention by the law and the state machinery and for the
reinforcement of undemocratic and authoritarian labour relations, contrary to the
demands of the statute. Not only is the distinction between the 'private' and upublicu
aspects of industrial decision-making analytically weak; it is also politically unsustain-
able. As much as intervention in the collective bargaining relationship has to be
justified, the state's non-intervention needs justification. Without this abstention can
too easily represent support for the stronger party in the employment relationship and
104FAWU v. Spekenham Supreme, (1988) 9 I.LJ. 628, 637 (IC.).
1 Factories, Machinery & Building Work Act 22 of 1941.
'°6Shop and Offices Act 75 of 1964.
101wage Act 5 of 1957.
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operate in favour of the employer who exercises authoritarian control over employees
and every aspect of the work environment. There is judicial decree in abstention as
well as in intervention, and an insistence on voluntarism can subvert the entire
bargaining institution. This danger has lurked in the Court's approach towards
imposing a duty to bargain. Considering the statutory penchant for collective
bargaining it is ironic that, in the area of bargaining rights, the law has not assisted
trade unions sufficiently.
2.	 Application of collective bargaining theory In general
Duty to bargain
Worker participation in workplace decision-making has been hampered by the
initial ambivalence of the Industrial Court to impose a duty upon employers to bargain
with unions representing their employees. This gave rise to a fundamental uncertainty.
While the decisions in a number of cases promote a duty to bargain, in other cases
the Court has refused to introduce such an obligation and has stressed the voluntarist
nature of the collective bargaining relationship.
The Labour Relations Act excludes express reference to a duty to bargain.
Where the Industrial Court has imposed a duty to bargain, it has done so on the basis
of the unfair labour practice jurisdiction. In UAMAWU v. Fodens 108, the Court found
that an employer's refusal to bargain constituted an unfair labour practice and the
employer was ordered to Ncommence negotiations in good faith with the applicant
union. The Court noted that the policy of the Act was to encourage collective
bargaining, and inferred Nthat where the majority of the employees should elect to be
represented by a registered trade union, the employer could fairly be expected to deal
with that union in connection with matters concerning the relationship with its
employees.1
Subsequent cases were unwilling to infer a duty to bargain from the policy of
the Act. In the case of BCAWU v. Johnson Tiles' 1 ° the Court refused to make an
order that a party is to negotiate in good faith, on the basis that the Act went no
108UAMAWUv. Fodens, (1983)4 I.L.J. 212 (I.C.).
1091d. at 226.
110BC.4WU v. Johnson Tiles, (1985) 6 I.LJ. 210 (I.C.).
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further than to encourage collective bargaining." 1 This approach was affirmed in
MAWU v. Hart.' 12 The Court declined to find that an employer's refusal to bargain
at plant level was an unfair labour practice and stated that "negotiations should always
assume a voluntary character in order to be effective."1'3
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to pronounce on the issue of a
bargaining duty in Natal Die Casting v. President, Industrial Court.' 14 Without
empahsising the policy considerations underlying this most important issue, Kriek J.
held that the "failure of an employer to negotiate in good faith on [employment]
matters ...can...have the effects envisaged" in the definition of an unfair labour
practice," 5 especially those of promoting or creating labour unrest, or detrimentally
affecting the employer/employee relationship." 6 After this pronouncement, the
majority of Industrial Court decisions have indicated a willingness to impose bargaining
obligations in appropriate circumstances, to accept the necessity for the parties to
attempt to resolve their mutual disputes, and to cast aside the ill-fitting notion of
voluntarism in this context." 7 An incisive statement in the case of FAWU v. Speken-
ham Supreme sums up the broader concerns: I do not believe that voluntarism has
any further right of existence in a system which is principally intended to combat
' H Id. at 213.
"2MAWU v. Hait, (1985) 6 I.LJ. 478 (I.C.).
1131d. at 489.
' 14Natal Die Casting v. President, Industrial Court, (1987) 8 lU. 245 (D.).
1151d at 255.
" 61n Sentraal-Wes (Ko-op) Bpk. v. FAWU, (1990) 11 l.LJ. 977 (LA.C.) Goldstein J. rejected the
argument that an employer's refusal to enter into recognition negotiations was not an unfair labour practice
because there was no evidence that the negotiations would have been fruitful. According to the judge, the
intention of the Act is to ensure that negotiations take place and to demand evidence of what such
negotiations would have achieved would be to negate this important aim of the Act" (at 995A).
1 ' 7See, e.g., MAWU v. Stobar Reinforcing, (1983) 4 I.LJ. 84, 89-90 (l.C.); Themba v. Nico van Rooyen
Taksiderrnie, (1984) 5 I.UJ. 245 (l.C.); Marievale Consolidated Mines v. President, Industrial Court, (1986)
7 l.LJ. 152, 160 (F.); NUM v. Marieveie Consolidated Mines, (1986) 7 l.LJ. 123, 149 (l.C.); MAWU v. Natal
Die Castings Co., (1986) 7 l.UJ. 520, 453 and 456 (l.C.); Bissessor v. Beastores, (1986) 7 l.LJ. 334, 339
(l.C.); UAMAWU v. SGI Caps Industries, (1986) 7 l.UJ. 405 (l.C.); MAWU v. Transvaal Pressed Nuts, Bolts
& Rivets, (1986) 7 I.UJ. 703, 709 (l.C.); NU1Wv. Cape Produce Co., (1986) 7 I.LJ. 749, 753 (l.C.); FBWU
v. Transvaai Atlas Wholesale Meat Distributors, (1987) 8 I.LJ. 335 (l.C.); Ntsaba v. Eastern Province Textiles,
(1987) 8 I.UJ. 470, 478 (l.C.); MWU v. African Products, (1987) 8 LU. 401, 412 (l.C.); S4CWU v. Control
Chemicals, (1988) 9 lU. 606, 618 (l.C.); MAWU v. Transvaal Pressed Nuts, Bolts & Rivets, (1988) 9 l.UJ.
696, 701-2 (l.C.); Luthuli v. Flortime, (1988) 9 l.LJ. 287 (l.C.) and Ngiba v. Van Dyck Carpets, (1988) 9 l.LJ.
453 (l.C.). In Buthelezi v. Labour for Africa, (1991) 12 I.UJ. 588 (IC.) the duty was referred to as
"incontrovertible. See also decisions of the Labour Appeal Court, e.g. Sentraal-Wes (Ko-op) Bpk. v. FAWU,
(1990) 11 l.UJ. 977 (UA.C.); Macsteel (P4'.) Ltd. v. NUMSA, (1990) 11 I.LJ. 995 (LA.C.).
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industrial unrest.' In this case the Court had regard to the overriding consideration of
'fairness' in South African labour relations and found it 'unfair for an employer not to
negotiate bona fide with a representative trade union'."8
While the issue of the duty to bargain can probably now be regarded as settled,
the ensuing question regarding the scope of the bargaining agenda is still open to
debate. A disturbing tendency has developed to make a distinction between
mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining, and to exclude the latter from the
bargaining agenda. Mandatory subjects have been defined as 'issues that arise in the
course of employment and have a direct effect on some aspects of employment,'
while permissive issues have 'an indirect effect on the employment relationship."9
Not only are permissive issues regarded to be within the domain of the employer, but
the employer is allowed to be the sole arbiter in this matter: 'The choice whether or
not to submit a permissive issue to collective bargaining remains solely with the
employer.' 120 The unilateral introduction of changes in employment conditions
which the employer claimed had a commercial rationale, has as a result been
condoned as falling within management prerogative.121
There is no justification for making this kind of distinction between bargaining
subjects. Considering that the duty to bargain, in all fairness, can contribute towards
industrial peace, any unilateral amendment of the terms of employment of an
employee or employees should constitute an unfair labour practice. Unilateral
amendment refers to change made without the consent of the other side.' Hence,
it will be an unfair labour practice for an employer to change the terms of employment
of an employee without bargaining about it first. The denunciation of unilateral
changes in the terms of employment of employees has far-reaching implications
regarding management's traditional insistence on a 'right to manage'. A refusal to
negotiate on what are defined as 'management prerogatives' may be considered
" 8FAWU v. Spekenham Supreme, (1988) 9 I.LJ. 628 (I.C.).
119 Society of Bank Officials v. Standard Bank of SA Ltd., (1993) 14 I.LJ. 706, 715 (I.C.).
' 20SA Society of Bank Officials v. Standard Bank of SA Ltd., (1993) 14 I.LJ. 706, 715 (I.C.).
'Food & General Workers Union v. Sundays River Citrus Co-operative Company Ltd., (1993) 2 LC.D.
56 (I.C.).
1 Edwin cameron, Halton Cheadle and Clive Thompson, The New Labour Relations Act 30 (Cape
Town 1989).
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unfair if it results in changes to terms and conditions of employment.' 23 Without
stating it in clear terms, the only inference which can be drawn is that the South
African legislature has adopted the principle of negotiation before introducing changes
to work organisation and has thus enhanced the prospects of employees to influence
decisions affecting them. Unilateral reorganisation which results in changes in terms
and conditions of employment, will only be fair if preceded by bargaining in good faith,
a process which has to be approached with the necessary sensitivity to the material
interests of both parties.
Workers are not allowed the same degree of participation with regard to all
changes in employment terms. With regard to issues concerning retrenchment, for
example, the Industrial Court, taking into account international norms, has developed
guidelines which only require consultation.' 24 The requirement in South Africa that
employers involved in retrenchments have to consult with employee organisations,
grants some recognition to the interest that employees have in the future of an
enterprise, and challenges the assumption that the employer should be the sole judge
of the economic destiny of his property. Consultation implies that employers do not
enjoy unlimited rights to decide unilaterally on collective termination, that entrepre-
neurial contror is no longer sustained by state force and that employees are allowed
some participation in the decisions that drastically affect their lives.
Employee participation is limited, however, by the fact that consultation, as
opposed to negotiation, is required in the case of retrenchments. In international
context the distinction between consultation and negotiation has been explained as
follows:
[C]onsultation conveys the notion that the employer seeks the advice, and views of his
employees, but retains the final decision. Negotiation on the other hand is in general a
method of joint decision-making involving bargaining between representatives of
workers and of employer(s), with the object of establishing mutually acceptable terms and
conditions of employment. Negotiation implies an effort to reach agreement by the
parties concerned.1 5
Consultation as a participatory procedure does not guarantee that employees will be
1231n earlier cases terms of employment were regarded to mean the same as conditiona of
employment. See OK Bazaars v. Madeley N.O., 1943 T.P.D. 392, 401; Muehlendoif v. Rand Steam
Laundries, 1945 T.P.D. 317, 323.
124The law on retrenchment during the period between 1988 and 1991 was governed by a codified
unfair labour practice definition (Labour Relations Amendment Aot 83 of 1988). With the repeal of the
codification (Labour Relations Amendment Act 9 of 1991), the law is based again on the guidelines which
the Industrial Court has developed.
T. Hanami & R. Blanpain, Industrial Conflict Resolution in Market Economies 4 (Deventer 1984).
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able to influence the final decision; indeed, the employer is not bound to follow their
views. As far as consultation in general is concerned, it is usually stated that the
decision need not proceed from or be congruent with the parties' proofs and
arguments. 1 The process allows great flexibility and the employer has consider-
able freedom to implement a policy decision based on subjective experience or
preferences.
However, to the extent to which the above explanation suggests that
consultation leaves employers the final choice without involving any form of
agreement, it does not adequately convey the function and purpose of the process.
The aim of consultation is for the parties to agree on certain aspects, including
alternative measures to retrenchment, selection criteria and a proposed timetable.127
With a fine borderline between the processes of consultation and negotiation, and
agreement featuring in the nature of both, the prerogatives of control, command and
management have been remodelled to allow for a degree of industrial democracy.
Disclosure
A crucial element of the consultation and negotiation processes concerns the
disclosure of relevant information. Unions usually regard information as essential to
make a realistic assessment of their position in relation to that of the entire enterprise.
Employers, on the other hand, are reluctant to concede to any invasion of their privacy
and prerogative. The Labour Relations Act, recognising that rational negotiation
requires well-informed unions, provides for the supply of information to registered trade
unions, through industrial councils, when negotiating an agreement. The function of
an industrial council is to attempt to formulate agreements at industry level. In order
to arrive at the most suitable agreement, considering the demands of both employers
and employees, the industrial council is authorised to procure the necessary
information. The Act allows the industrial council to subpoena any person, who in its
opinion may be able to give material information concerning the subject of an inquiry,
to be interrogated and to produce any book, document or thing relating to such an
MeIvin Aron Eisenberg, Tarticipation, Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process: An Essay for
Lon Fuller, 92 Hasv. L Rev. 410, 414 (1978).
127Ein Cameron, Halton Cheadle and Clive Thompson, The New Labour Relations Act 126 (Cape
Town 1989).
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inquiry.128
A difficulty with the provision governing disclosure in the Act concerns the fact
that an industrial council consists of equal numbers of representatives from employers
and registered trade unions.
	
Any decision to hold an enquiry requires the
concurrence of no less than two-thirds of the representatives present at the meeting
at which the decision is taken.' 3° It has been pointed out that this means in effect
that the release of information requires the consent of a potential party to a dispute
and that it is unlikely that employers will vote to permit an inquiry into their own or
other employer's affairs.131
There are no statutory provisions relating to the disclosure of information during
collective bargaining which takes place outside the industrial council system.
However, in cases where the Industrial Court has indicated that it has no fundamental
objection to the imposition of a duty to bargain, it has regarded the disclosure of
information as part of negotiation in good faith. In determining a party's bona fides,
the Court has enquired whether the party provided sufficient information to enable the
other party to understand and discuss the issues. In MAWU v. Natal Die Castings
the Court endorsed the view of Kahn-Freund that negotiation does not deserve its
name if one of the negotiating parties is kept in the dark about matters within the
exclusive knowledge of the other which are relevant to the agreement.'
The broad principles associated with possible conflict between disclosure and
the need for confidentiality apply equally to cases outside the labour field and to those
which concern collective bargaining. That implies that uthe [C]ourt should try and
strike a proper balance between conflicting interests of the parties...[T]he [CJourt
should endeavour to impose suitable conditions relative to the inspection of
documents...so as to protect the respondents as far as may be practicable, whilst at
128S 	 30(1).
129Sec. 21(1)(a).
130Sec. 27(7).
' 31 John Brand and Nazeer Ahmed Cassim, uThe Duty to Disclose - A Pivotal Aspect of Collective
Bargaining, I Indus. U. 249, 255-56 (1980).
1 MAWU v. Natal Die Castings Co., (1986) 7 lU. 520 (l.C.).
ld. quoting Kahn-Freund's Labour and the Law 110 (P.L Davies and N. Freedland eds., 3d ed.
London 1983).
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the same time affording applicant a reasonable opportunity of achieving its pur-
pose'.1
3.	 Application of collective bargaining theory - business transfers and
redundancies
Duty to consult
Considering the lack of substantive protection of acquired rights of employees,
the main issue in almost every case dealing with a business transfer involves the
application of the guidelines on retrenchment, with prior consultation and compensa-
tion being central concerns. Since every transfer involves a new arrangement which
requires the consent of all the parties involved, the Industrial Court has accepted in
most cases that the guidelines should apply.' It does not matter, therefore,
whether the object is to retain the employee's services. If this is the object, the
arrangement with the employee can take either the form of a novation of the contract
or an offer of re-employment. In either case, the employee's consent is required. The
Court explained in NU1W v. Braitex 1 that, when a transfer is intended, an employer
is obliged to inform the employees well in advance and to consult with them. From
the perspective that the guidelines ought to apply in all transfer situations, it is
necessary to take a closer look at the origins and substance of these guidelines.
On the basis of the unfair labour practice definition which made indirect
reference to practices that unfairly affected or 'prejudiced an employee's work
security, the Industrial Court developed general principles or guidelines pertaining to
dismissals for operational reasons, which took account of industrial practice,
English137 and comparative labour law, and international labour standards.	 As
1 MouIde4 Components and Rotomoulding SA (P4'.) LId. v. Coucoukrais, 1979 (2) S.A. 457,466 (W.).
But ci. CSFWU v. Aircondi Refrigeration, (1990) 11 l.LJ. 532 (l.C.) and TGWU v. City Council of die
City of Durban, (1991) 12 l.LJ. 156 (l.C.).
NU1W v. Braitex, (1987) 8 l.LJ. 794 (l.C.).
1371n Britain, the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act of 1978 consolidates the previous statutory
provisions relating to redundancy. The protection against unfair retrenchment is pafl of English unfair
dismissal law.
Applicable Recommendations and Conventions of the International Labour Organization indude
Convention No. 158, 1982 (Concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer) and
Recommendation No. 166,1982 (Concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer),
International Labour Organization, Geneva See Edwin Cameron, Halton Cheadle and Clive Thompson,
The New Labour Relations Act 120 (Cape Town 1989).
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a result employees have been offered a measure of protection which compares well
with international standards. Retrenchment is normally used in a generic sense to
indicate the dismissal of one or more employees for purposes of work-force reduction
which may be due to, for example, plant closure, rationalisation following upon a
merger or a drop in production caused by an economic slump. 1 The term
"retrenchment" was defined by the Appellate Division in Consolidated Frame Cotton
Corporation v. The President, Industrial Court 14° as meaning "to cut down, to reduce
the numbers of the work-force because of redundancy - a superfluity of employees in
relation to the work to be performed." Recent attempts to draw a distinction between
retrenchment and redundancy, with the implication that the employer's duty is greater
in cases of "redundancy" than in cases of "retrenchment", are potentially confusing141
and have no real advantages other than in determining an employer's liability for
compensation. With regard to the application of the guidelines which the Court has
developed for fair retrenchments, it is submitted that the best approach is to accept
that "there is no difference between retrenchments in general and those that follow on
the closure of an operation."142
Specific conditions which have to be met in the event of termination of
employment on grounds other than disciplinary action include prior notice of
termination of employment; consideration of ways of avoiding or minimizing
retrenchment; prior consultation with the employee or recognised representative trade
union or body; and reduction of the number of employees in accordance with
reasonable criteria with regard to the selection of such employees. A general condition
1 M.S.M. Brassey, E. Cameron, M.H. Cheadle & M.P. Olivier, The New Labour Law 279 n.1 (Cape
Town 1987).
140Conso!idated Frame Cotton Corporation v. The President, Industrial Cowt, (1986) 7 l.LJ. 489, 494
(A.D.).
141 1n Hlongwane v. Plastix (P4'.) Ltd., (1990) 11 l.LJ. 171, 175-76 (l.C.) the distinction was explained
as follows: "Retrenchment is when the employer terminates employees' employment as they have become
superfluous due to an economic downturn. The employees consequently lose their jobs, but not
necessarily on a permanent basis. Once there is an economic upswing they might possibly get their old
jobs back. Redundancy on the other hand means that an employee becomes redundant as a result of, for
example, the introduction of new machinery or technology or the restructuring of the business. In the case
of redundancy the employee loses his job permanently." In TGWU, Wilson Nene v. Durban Transpoit
Management Board, NHN 11/2/2038 (unreported) the Court stated: "to retrench is to reduce one's
expenditure or operations. This management response may in some cases be the result of redundancy
and may in others be the cause of it. Either way, retrenchment may end up in the loss of jobs, but not
necessarily so." See also Andrew Breitenbach, "Aspects of the South African Law on Retrenchment in the
Light of English Labour Standards," 11 Indus. U. 1193, 1195 n.6 (1990).
142 p,,yj v. Aircondi Refrigeration, (1990) 11 l.UJ. 532, 544 (l.C.).
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relates to the rationality of the decision to retrench.
In the first place, fair retrenchment requires prior notification of termination.
This requirement incorporates the common law position in terms of which notice is a
condition for lawful termination of the contract.' However, in cases involving
retrenchment the Industrial Court has gone further than the common law requirement
and has always required NsufficientN notice to allow for proper consultation to take
pIace." ISufficientu notice can be inferred from the condition that prior consultation
in regard to termination take place. Meaningful consultation requires advance
notification of the intention to retrench an employee.
This approach implies that the period of notice must leave adequate time to
satisfy the second condition: discussion of, and agreement upon, alternatives to
minimise retrenchments. Since certain alternatives have to be implemented timeously
to have any effect, for example a moratorium on hiring new employees, the training
or retraining of employees to perform jobs of a different kind, or the implementation
of an early retirement scheme, the period could be substantial. In keeping with this
approach, the Industrial Court held that it was not sufficient to give notice to the union
on the day on which the retrenchments were to be carried out; 145
 nor was retrench-
ment within a day of giving notice regarded as sufficient.'
Third, retrenchment requires proper prior consultation. Consultation connotes
dialogue, deliberation and debate with the aim of seeking information or advice. In
essence a two-way process, consultation can be seen as one of a series of
interactions between employer and trade union or employees, distinct from true
bargaining or negotiation, but involving an exchange of views. Unlike negotiation,
consultation does not involve the same efforts to find a compromise solution between
two parties, each of whom fiercely protects its particular interests, but it serves a
valuable purpose NtO enable the worker representatives to bring their influence to bear
in good time on management decisions so that afternative measures might be
Edwin Cameron, Halton Cheadle and Clive Thompson, The New Labour Relations Act 124 (Cape
Town 1989).
1 "NUTW v. Sea Gift Surfwear Manufacturers, (1985) 6 I.LJ. 101 (LC.); Simelane v. Audell Metal
Products, (1987) 8 LU. 438 (l.C.).
145NUTW v. Sea Gift Surfware Manufacturers, (1985) 6 I.LJ. 101 (I.C.).
1 Paper, Printing, Wood & Allied Workers Union v. DeIrna (P4'.) Ltd., (1989) 10 I.UJ. 424, 433 (I.C.).
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considered to deal with the underlying problems."' 47
 Agreement may in fact be
needed to effect an alternative to retrenchment, for example, the working of short
time', temporary lay-off or the transfer of employees to lower-paid jobs. 149 The
Court has mentioned that "consultation can rarely be successful without the co-
operation of those persons or institutions which must be consulted.'°
In almost every retrenchment case, the failure to consult has been a key issue
and the need for consultation has been described as the "cOrnerstone" of the
retrenchment principles. 15' Building on this basis the Court has erected a substan-
tive edifice, which has provided room for tripartite consultations in the event of
business transfers.' 52
 In one case the Court concluded that the failure to consult
deprived the union of an "opportunity of suggesting a compromise by accepting, for
example, alternate work at reduced wages".' In another case the failure to consult
was seen to constitute an unfair labour practice because it was conceivable that the
union may have influenced the employer -- the Minister of Agriculture who took the
decision to privatize the meat inspection functions of his department -- to place
pressure on the new company to offer employment to all affected empIoyees.
The Court has emphasized that "employees should not be ignored or dealt with in a
high-handed manner".'
	
The question is whether the employer acted fairly in
147 E. Yemin, Workforce Reductions in Undertakings 10 (International Labour Office, Geneva 1982).
1 Edwin Cameron, Halton Cheadle and Clive Thompson, The New Labour Relations Act 126 (Cape
Town 1989).
149GWU v. Dorbyl Marine, (1985) 6 LL.J. 52, 58 (I.C.); Kebeni v. Cementile Products (Ciske,), (1981) 8
I.LJ. 442 (I.C.); NU7W v. Braitex, (1987) 8 I.LJ. 794 (I.C.); FAWU v. Ameens Food Products & Butchers',
(1988) 9 l.LJ. 659 (iC.).
150BCAWU v. Masterbilt C.C., (1987) 8 lU. 670, 679 (l.C.).
' 5 'Hadebe v. Romatex Industrials Ltd., (1986) 7 l.LJ. 726, 734-35 (Ic.).
See NUMSA v. Metkor Industries (Ply.) Ltd., (1990) 11 I.LJ. 1116 (I.C.); NUTW v. Braitax, (1967) 8
I.LJ. 794 (l.C.); Kebeni v. Cementile Products (Ciske,) (P4'.) Ltd., (1987) 8 I.UJ. 442 (l.C.).
1 GWU v. Dorbyl Marine, (1985) 6 LU. 52,58 (l.C.).
1 NEHAWU v. Director-General 0/Agriculture, (1993) 14 I.LJ. 1488, 1501 (I.C.).
Paper, Printing, Wood & Allied Workers Union v. Kaycraft (Ply.) Ltd., (1989)10 I.LJ. 272, 281 (l.C.),
quoting NUTW v. Braitex (P4'.) Ltd.. (1987) 8 l.UJ. 794, 799 (I.C.). See also Ellenne Holdings Ltd. v. Du
Randt, (1992) 13 I.LJ. 611, 617 (LA.C.) in which the Court emphasized the importance of correct and
proper procedures in curtailing or eliminating discord in labour relations and in promoting the peaceful
resolution of conflict in that field. The employer's cavalier behaviour towards the employee was regarded
as "so high-handed and grossly insensitive that [the employee] was entitled to substantial compensation
for this."
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particular circumstances. The dictates of fairness have been explained as follows:
•Even when a business is genuinely transferred or closed one would expect in all fairness
that [the employer] should consider the interests of the work-force as human beings who
have families to support..."1
With regard to the meaning of "consultation' the Court in Hadebe v. Romatex
Industrials Ltd.' 57 stated:
"It is clear that "consultation' does not mean merely affording an employee or his
representative an opportunity to make a comment upon, or express an opinion about,
a decision already made and which is already in the rocese of being implemented."
The Court added:
"It is of crucial importance that any discussions on the subject of the proposed
retrenchments should be as exhaustive as possible and not be sporadic or superficial
Consultation involves not only the canvassing of views and suggestions but also the
careful, serious and proper consideration of those views before a final decision is
reached."1
Consultation must therefore take place before the final decision is taken.
This requirement suggests that consultation should take place as soon as the
possibility of retrenchment arises, and that an employer must have an open mind to
'discuss the measures which are to be taken to protect the interests of the employees
and the preservation of the employment relationship".' 6° An employer can never be
sure that he has considered all alternatives until he has heard the views of the
employees, both regarding ways of avoiding terminations of employment and, if that
proves to be unavoidable, ways of minimizing the effects of termination.161
The main weakness with regard to the consultative procedure, which has not
been addressed adequately in retrenchment cases, concerns the lack of explanation.
As a result, unions have started to demand that employers give proper reasons for
1 SACWU v. Toiletpak Manufacturers, ( 1988) 9 I.L.J. 295, 305H (l.C.).
''Hadebe v. Romatex Industrials Ltd., (1986) 7 I.LJ. 726 (I.C.).
ld. at 737.
'See, e.g., NUMSA v. Atlantis Diesel Engines (Ply.) Ltd., (1993)14 l.LJ. 642, 650 (LA.C.) and Davie
v. Punch/me Columbia Training Ltd., (1993) 2 LC.D. 299 (l.C.). But ci. TATU v. Spoornet, (1993) 2 LC.D.
323 (l.C.); Aura/i v. Sopex Importers and Exporters (Ply.) Ltd., (1993)2 LC.D. 296 (l.C.) and National Union
of Leather Workers v. Olympic Footwear - A division of Olympic Flair (Ply.) Ltd., (1993) 2 LC.D. 313 (l.C.).
' 60Nluli v. Hazelmore Group f/a Musgrave Nursing Home, (1988) 9 LU. 709, 714 (IC.). But see the
decision in Karbusicky v. Anglo American Corporation of SA Ltd., (1993)14 l.LJ. 166 (l.C.) that it was not
necessary for the employer to consult with the employee before making a decision to retrench, since the
decision was taken as a purely commercial one, and the object of consultation should not be to reconsider
the commercial aspects of the management decision but rather to consider ways and means to avoid the
consequences of the management decision.
161 NUMSA v. Atlantis Diesel Engines (Ply.) Ltd., (1993) 14 I.LJ. 642, 650 (LA.C.).
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retrenchments, and have resolved to fight retrenchments which do not relate to
genuine economic problems. The media officer of the Congress of South African
Trade Unions was quoted as saying: NWe are aware of situations where employers
simply retrench workers for no apparent reason. They shrink production unnecessarily
instead of finding other ways of adjusting." 1 This remark was triggered by a report
by a labour research organisation which suggested that South African companies
increased dividend payments to shareholders at the expense of jobs. 1 The
explanation given by an employer will not necessarily satisfy workers, nor will the Court
perforce agree with the employer's views. After all, the intention behind explanation
is not to achieve unanimity. What is intended is that explanation will reduce
arbitrariness, will secure an employer's mindfulness in the face of intricate economic
factors, and will assure the Court of the legitimacy and validity of an employer's
standards.
In a number of recent judgements, the Industrial Court has accepted the
argument that prior consultation would not have made any difference. In effect, the
Court second-guessed the employer's decision and found that the lack of procedure
did not result in any injustice. In one case, the Court considered the employer's
evidence that he had to reduce his staff by reason of his financial difficulties and
decided that consultation, being of a highly technical nature, was bound not to make
any difference. 1M Implicitly, the Court required proof by the employer that he or she
would have come to the same decision had the correct procedure been followed,
but by obviously requiring a low standard of proof the Court involved itself in an
unacceptable degree of guess-work and almost completely denied the value of
consultation. A still more insidious attitude was displayed in another case where,
instead of requiring proof by the employer that the procedure would have had no effect
on the decision, the Court stated that the employee must make out a case, not in the
way of onus, but in the sense of an evidentiary burden, that it would have made a
'The Weekt1, Mail, March 1 to March 7 1991, quoting Neil Coleman.
'The report was released by the Cape Town-based Labour Research Service, 1991. According to the
report, the top 100 companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange increased their dividend
payouts by an average of 21,3 percent but only increased employment by 0,1 percent.
1MCCAWU of SA v. George's Cafe, Case No NH 11/2/2617 (unreported).
'See Sandra Fredmari & Simon Lee, Natural Justice for Employees: The Unacceptable Faith of
Proceduraiism, 15 Indus. U. 15, 18 (1986).
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difference had the guidelines been applied to him. 1 This remark was made without
any substantiation and in a fundamental sense denounced the pivotal role of
procedural justice in industrial relations. 167
 The procedure of consultation provides
a degree of protection for employees against the arbitrary use of private managerial
power. 1 And, more important, consultation, like collective bargaining, introduces
an element of participatory democracy into the workplace and the Court's role is to
enforce upon employers the duty to consult with regard to all appropriate subject
matters.
In NUMSA v. Metkor !ndustries 1 the Court considered the importance of
consultation for employees when it stated:
"I take the view that it is a requirement, that, if it is a consequence that employees'
interests shall or even may be affected (and not necessarily only in regard to retrench-
ment), the employees are entitled to be kept informed, from the earliest possible
reasonable time, to the extent that it is reasonably necessary to enable them to consult
with management in regard only to such matters as reasonably affect them, at the same
time taking into account the lawful, reasonable and fair requirements of management to
preserve security."170
With these statements the Court emphasized the distinct interests of employees who
ought to be included in the decision-making process through consultation, prior to the
conclusion of any agreement of sale of a commercial undertaking. In this way the
Court wanted to ensure that "the agreement of sale reflects as far as possible, insofar
as the employees are concerned, what the employees believe to be in their own
interests." 171 One problem with the decision can be found in the phrase which
limited consultation to "such matters as reasonably affect' employees. This limitation
begs the question of who is to decide the scope of consultation when employees'
Young v. L,Jfegro Assurance, (1990) 11 l.LJ. 1127 (l.C.).
167w the statements of the Court in NUMSA v. Atlantis Diesel Engines (P4'.) Ltd., (1993)14 I.LJ. 642,
651 (LA.C.): "The question is not whether consultation ... would have achieved a different outcome. The
process of consultation is valuable in itself because it contributes to the realization of the primary aim of
the Act, i.e. the preservation of industrial peace ... The so-called "no difference" pnnciple should, therefore,
not find a place in [the] area of [retrenchment]." See also P. Benjamin, 'Condoning the Unprocedurai
Retrenchment The Rise of the 'No Difference' Principle," 13 Indus. U. 279 (1992).
ln Mohamedy's v. CCAWU of 54, (1993) 2 LC.D. 34 (LA.C.) the Court emphasized the value of
consultation to avoid or minimize industrial conflict.
1 NUMSA v. Metkor Industries, (1990) 11 l.LJ. 1116 (l.C.).
at 1123F-H.
171 1d at 1124H.
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interests cannot be clearly separated from managerial prerogative. 1	There is a
clear danger that the aim of participatory democracy will be defeated if management
is to be made the sole arbiter of matters falling within the area of consultation.
The fourth requirement regarding retrenchment demands that retrenchment
should take place according to reasonable criteria with regard to the selection of
employees, including, but not limited to, the ability, capacity, productivity and conduct
of those employees. "Reasonable criteria" suggests the use of objective and fair
selection criteria. 173
 The most commonly accepted criterion is based on seniority,
generally known as "last in, first out" (LIFO), 174 which is determined by taking into
account an employee's entire period of service in a business, including the employ-
ment with a transferor before the sale of the business to a new owner. 175 Other
criteria include attendance records, 176 efficiency and experience. 1 The Court has
stressed the need for objectivity. The Court in Shezi v. Consolidated Frame Cotton
Corporation required "the establishment of criteria for selection which so far as
possible do not depend solely upon the opinion of the person making the selection
but can be objectively checked...". 178 The object is "to ensure that an employer
does not act with improper motive when coming to a decision to retrench".'79
It is submitted that fair selection criteria should be applied within an
undertaking, a term which indicates the whole range of an employer's activities
provided that there is "some evidence of organizational unity, e.g. common accounting
management, purchasing arrangements, insurance.° Selection within a wider
context was what the Industrial Court had in mind when it condemned the selection
172See B: Jordaan, "Transfer, Closure and Insolvency of Undertakings," 12 Indus. U. 935,948 (1991).
173M.S.M. Brassey, E. Cameron, M.H. Cheadle & M.P. Olivier, The New Labour Law 294-96 (Cape Town
1987) and Edwin Cameron, Halton Cheadle and Clive Thompson, The New Labour Relations Act 127-28
(Cape Town 1989).
174UAMAWU v. Fodens, (1953) 4 I.LJ. 212, 230 (I.C.).
175CC4W1J of 54 v. George's Cafe, Case No. NH 11/2/2617 (unreported).
' 76Shezi v. Consolidated Frame Cotton Corporation, (1) (1984) 5 I.LJ. 3, 13 (I.C.).
'ld. at 13.
' 75/d. at 13.
' 79Meyi v. Ovcon, (1988) 9 lU. 672, 673 (l.C.).
' 80 apur v. Shields, [1976] 1 All E.R. 873, 880 (O.B.).
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of applicants at a particular site for retrenchment when there was no investigation of
situations at other building sites. The fair selection of employees for retrenchment
requires an investigation of the employees' productivity, service record and length of
service in comparison to those of other employees in similar positions at other
sites.18'
A final and ubiquitous requirement with regard to retrenchments introduces the
need for good faith and a commercial rationale. Unfortunately, the implications of this
requirement to control potential abuse of managerial prerogative, have not been
realised in full. While concerns for fairness in public law have prompted the Courts to
forge standards of rationality to test the legitimacy of acts of decision-makers, Courts
seem much more reluctant in the sphere of employment to hold employers
accountable for their decisions. What this requirement entails is a clear showing by
the employer that the exercise of power furthered the economic aims of the business
and contributed towards efficiency. The employer's authority vests him or her with the
burden of proof in this instance, and rationality cannot be presumed.' If the
criterion of rationality is applied so as to prevent the potential abuse of power, there
is no basis upon which the Court can accept a presumption in favour of commercial
rationaIe; 1 the difficulties in calculating the saving resulting from retrenchment
arithmetically should not distract from the important principle which makes it
incumbent for the Court to review the rationale for the retrenchment.1M
181 Cele v. Bester Homes, (1990) 11 I.LJ. 516, 526 (l.C.).
'See the statements of the Court in SACTWU v. JatexSA (P4'.) Ltd., (1992)13 l.LJ. 1252, 1265-6 (l.C.):
One of the aspects of any decision [to retrench] is to satisfy the employees that the decision was a bona
fide one ... [hf the employee or the union raises some fact or facts from which an inference ... can be drawn
[that the decision was not bona fide], it may be necessary for the employer to furnish additional information
to allay that suspicion and if it is raised during subsequent proceedings in the industrial Court sufficient
evidence will have to be presented to satisfy the evidentiary burden in this regard.
1 CSFWU v. Aircondi Refrigeration, (1990)11 l.LJ. 532, 546G-1 (l.C.). See also FAWU v. Kellogg SA
(Ply.) Lid., (1993)14 l.LJ. 406, 413 (l.C.): 'If [the employer's] decision has a bona fide commercial rationale,
though not necessarily sagacious, it will be unassailable.' A similar decision was reached in Mobius Group
(Ply.) Ltd. v. Cony, (1993) 2 Lc.D. 193 (LA.C.) when the Court held that, because the bona fides of the
dismissal was not in issue in this case, the employer was not obliged to motivate its decision: 'neither the
Industrial Court nor this Court is equipped to decide issues of economic, business and commercial
rationale.'
' 84The labour Appeal Court in Seven Abel C.C. t/a The Crest Hotel v. HRWU, (1990) 11 l.LJ. 504,
508C-1 (LA.C.) pointed out that the savings resulting from retrenchment could not be calculated simply by
comparing the direct costs of employing the retrenched workers with, as in this case, the costs of
subcontracting the services. See also Mkhize v. Kingsleigh Lodge, (1989)10 l.LJ. 944 (l.C.) for an example
of the Industrial Court assessing commercial rationale. In Ferodo (P4'.) Ltd. v. De Ruiter, (1993) 2 LC.O.
284 (LA.C.) the finding of the Court was that there had been no real commercial rationale for the
(continued...)
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Ultimately it should be kept in mind that the quest for rationality is only
important because it can contribute towards the fairness of the decision. The Court's
function is not merely to determine whether a decision is bona fide and made in a
business-like manner, but to adjudicate fairness: Fairness in this context goes further
than bona fides and the commercial justification for the decision to retrench. It is
concerned, first and foremost, with the question whether termination of employment
is the only reasonable option in the circumstances." The Court has to be
convinced that termination of employment for economic or operational reasons, like
termination of employment for disciplinary and performance-related reasons, is a
measure of last resort.
Severance pay
Severance pay is not listed as a requirement in the definition of an unfair labour
practice and has engendered controversy. Underlying the controversy is the question
whether there is any proper basis in law or equity upon which the loss suffered by
retrenched employees can be recouped from another party. Two possible bases for
imposing a requirement to pay severance pay can be distinguished, one arising from
contract, and the other flowing from the provisions of the Labour Relations Act.
The first source from which an accrued right to severance pay can emanate,
namely a relevant contract, is undisputed. In the face of a de facto assumption of
responsibilities for the payment of severance pay, there can be no further question
regarding an employer's obtigations. As such it can be argued that the matter of
severance pay falls within the collective bargaining arena and should be left to
employers and trade unions to decide for themselves.'° A claim for severance pay
is regarded as a monetary one which, like a claim for an increase in wages, will
depend upon the outcome of the collective bargaining process.' 87 In terms of this
argument, freedom of contract reigns supreme and there is no basis for judicial
'84(coritinued)
employee's retrenchment which had been motivated by an attempt of the employing company to
accommodate another employee.
1 NUMS4 v. Atlantis Diesel Engines (P4'.) Ltd., (1993) 14 I.LJ. 642, 648 (LA.C.).
186En Cameron, Halton Cheadle and Clive Thompson, The New Labour Relations Act 128-29 (Cape
Town 1989).
at 103.
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intervention.
However, the contractual liberty of an employer to dispense or withhold
severance pay is challenged by those who argue that it should be incumbent upon an
employer to compensate an employee for the loss of a •proprietary stake in a
job. lM
 After all, the South African statute does not recognise a proprietary right in
a job to the same extent as the English law and comparisons should be made with
extreme caution. In the UK, redundancy payments are regulated by statute,
specifically with regard to the periods of employment which are required to qualify for
compensation, the amount of compensation and the extent to which redundancy
payments can be recovered from the state-controlled Redundancy Fund. This context
provided the support for the significant statements by Lord Denning in Uoyd V.
Brassey:1 as
A worker of long standing is now recognised as having accrued rights in his job, his
right gains in value over the years. So much so that if the job is shut down he is entitled
to compensation for a job . just as a director gets compensation for loss of office. The
director gets a golden handshake. The worker gets a redundancy payment. It is not
unemployment pay. I repeat 'not". Even if ha gets another job straight away, he is
nevertheless entitled to full redundancy payment. It is in a real sense compensation for
long service."
In a different context, these remarks are not necessarily valid and judgements
which relied on the English law to argue for accrued job rights in South Africa have
been chaIIenged. 1 However, what cannot be ignored are the indications in the
Labour Relations Act that practices which prejudice or jeopardise an employee's
employment opportunity or work security, or detrimentally affect industrial relations,
may be considered unfair. Behind this concern for the relations between employer
and employee and the nebulous recognition of accrued rights in a job, an employer's
responsibilities become visible and may well include the payment of severance pay.
The definition of an unfair labour practice gives recognition to the concerns underlying
the idea of severance pay.
The definition of an unfair labour practice formed the basis for the Court's
finding in Cele v. Bester Homes that the refusal by an employer to pay severance
benefits may be considered unfair. The Court stressed the adverse effect of a failure
at 103-04, referring to Jacob v. Prebullt Products (P4'.) Ltd. (1988) 9 l.LJ. 1100, 1104 (l.C.).
189UOyd v. Brassey, [1969) 1 All ER. 382 (C.A.).
' 90Young v. Ufegro Assurance, (1990)11 lU. 1127, referring to 0.1ev. Baster Homes, (1990)11 l.LJ.
516 (l.C.) and Jacob v. Prebuilt Products (Ply.) Ltd., (1988) 9 l.LJ. 1100 (l.C.).
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to pay severance pay on the relationship between the employer and its retrenched and
retained employees, 191
 and accepted the submission that Nfailure to pay severance
benefits does unfairly prejudice or unfairly jeopardize the employee's employment
opportunity or work security." A serious consideration was the possibility that
TM employees may perceive the failure to pay severance benefits as unfair and that this
could lead to industrial unrest.'
An analysis of the purposes of severance pay reveals a concern for secure
employment, and the payment of severance money is by and large regarded as
good industrial relations practice in no-fault retrenchment situations. The usual
practice which has been followed by TM enlightened employers in this country is to
offer employees severance pay of one or two weeks' pay calculated at the date of
dismissal for every completed year of service. In Cele v. Bester Homes' 96 in
response to a submission that severance pay should be the subject of negotiation at
industrial council level, the Court ruled:
This would naturally be desirable and would set standards for the industry in respect of
severance benefits. Until such time that (sic) the industrial council lays down minimum
payments, if at all, employees adversely affected by the current recession in the industry
can only demand payment of severance benefits by approaching this [C]ourt for
assistance. (And similarly) [t] he quantum (of severance pay] should be left to free and
fair collective bargaining, but in the absence of that this [C]ourt will have to determine the
' 91 CeIe v. Bester Homes, (1990) 11 I.LJ. 516, 528 (l.C.).
!d. at 527.
Id. at 530.
But ci. Young v. Lifegro Assurance, (1990) 11 l.LJ. 1127 (l.C.) for the argument that an employee
has no vested right in a job. Underlying the argument is the daim that such a right would require that an
employee be compensated for any kind of job loss, including constructive dismissal, or even for incidents
of short time or lay-off where such a proprietary right must necessarily be severely eroded. This is not the
case. Moreover, in terms of the contract of employment, an employer incurs no liability for compensation
for loss of job by the employee, as long as the dismissal took place in accordance with the precepts of
the law and in a fair manner.
Ntu!i v. Hazelmore Group f/a Musgrave Nursing Home, (1988) 9 l.LJ. 709, 718-19 (l.C.). It has never
been suggested that a practice which is recognised to be conducive for sound industrial relations need to
adhere to the standards which are used to determine when a custom becomes law, such as the requisites
that such a custom must be reasonable, be long established, be uniformly observed and be certain (Voet
1.3.28,29,31,33; Van Breda v. Jacobs, 1921 A.D. 330; and see Young v. Lifegro Assurance, (1990)11 lU.
1127 (l.C.)). Good industrial relations operate within a sphere not purely determined by legal factors, in
which adaptability and elasticity is of great importance.
196(190) 11 l.UJ. 516 (l.C.).
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question of severance benefits payable."97
Judicial intervention to set minimum Standards for collective agreements can create
a climate conducive to future collective bargaining on severance benefits,1
especially since the standards which the Industrial Court has posited have a wide
application and are not restricted to particular industries or geographical areas. The
Court has declared itself in favour of looking at the general practice in the country and
the total economy."
The most important purpose of severance pay remains the compensation for
the expropriation of an employee's job, and not principally to smooth out the
disruption in the circumstances of the affected employee as much as possible?°'
or to tide him over while he looks for other employment.' 202 This kind of damage
suffered by retrenched employees, should ideally be guarded against by insur-
ance.203 In South Africa the state has always shunned responsibilities in this regard,
as is evident from the inadequacy of unemployment insurance. Similarly, the state has
never borne any portion of the cost of compensation for the loss of an employee's job.
In the absence of state involvement, there is no justification for heaping the entire
burden suffered by a retrenched employee who loses a job without contributory fault,
the employee.204
 A sharing of the burden between employer and employee is
197Cele v. Bester Homes, (1990)11 l.LJ. 516, 530 (l.C.). See also Imperial Cold Storage & Supply Co.
Ltd. v. Field, (1993)14 l.LJ. 1221, 1228 (LA.C.): '[T]here is no reason why an employer might not, for the
reason of cushioning the blow of a no-fault retrenchment, be required in particular circumstances to pay
a fair retrenchment package. If the employer does not do so, his conduct may amount to an unfair labour
practice?
1 See Andrew Breitenbach, 'Aspects of the South African Law on Retrenchment in the Light of English
Labour Standards,' 11 Indus. L.J. 1193, 1213 n. 118 (1990).
1 Cele v. Bester Homes, (1990) 11 LU. 516, 529 (l.C.).
200This is also the view taken by N.F. Rautenbach in his note in Search of the Severance Package,
12 Indue. U. 735, 737 (1991).
201 Young v. LifegroAsssurance, (1990) 11 I.LJ. 1127 (l.C.).
E.M. Mdalose v. BA.C. Services C.C., NHN 11/2/1603 (unreported); see also CCA WIJ oIS4 v. Status
Hotel, (1990) 11 l.LJ. 167, 171 (l.C.); Hlongwane v. Plastix (P4'.) Ltd., (1990) 11 l.LJ. 171 (l.C.).
203Young v. Lifegro Assurance, (1990) 11 l.LJ. 1127 (l.C.).
204N.F. Rautenbach, 'In Search of the Severance Package, 12 Indus. U. 735, 743-4(1991) describes
the employer's advantage and the rationale for compensating an employee for losses caused by termination
as follows: 'One feels instinctively that ... while the employer gains the commercial advantage of being able
to make increased profits, or cut costs, or avoid insolvency; the employee does not gain. Intuitively one
senses that employee feelings of outrage are caused by the loss incurred in circumstances where the
(continued...)
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justified where both enjoyed the benefits of the relationship, with the employer almost
always getting the greater financial benefit from it. On this basis it is submitted that,
regardless of whether a retrenchment is procedurally fair or unfair, severance benefits
should be payable on retrenchment. In addition, in cases of unfair retrenchment
where the unfairness causes damage, the employer may be liable for compensation.
Unfairness will of course be determined with regard to all the circumstances of the
retrenchment and a claim for compensation will not necessarily be appropriate if, for
example, after proper consultation with all concerned, the employer assists the
affected employee in finding an adequate equivalent job, be it with the employer's
successor, or elsewhere.206
A caveat: the denial of a claim in circumstances where an employee has been
offered alternative employment should never be a routine exercise, for two main
reasons. One reason has to do with the meaning of the concept "suitable alternative
employment," the other with the procedure which precedes such an offer. With regard
to the meaning of the words "suitable alternative employment," the Court has pointed
out that the employment should be "suitable" to both the employer and employee.207
To this it has added that "suitable" connotes flexibility and that employment therefore
does not have to be "identical" or "similar; " nor does it have to be "equivalent or
better." The Court has to follow a flexible approach when it considers all the facts and
circumstances pertaining to a particular situation and person. 20° However, the
flexibility with which the concept of alternative employment has to be approached,
does not detract from the importance of demanding adherence to procedural
standards, and a lack of consultation should be enough reason for the Court to
204(...continued)
employer gains commercially ... In the abstract, severance pay balances the commercial rationale of the
employer against the loss of the employee."
206See, e.g., TGWU v. Action Machine Moving & Warehousing (P4'.) Ltd., (1992) 13 l.LJ. 646, 653-4
(I.C.). N.F. Rautenbach, "In Search of the Severance Package," 12 Indus. U. 735, 745 (1991) proposes
that the Court can interfere with the amount awarded by the employer by using an objective standard: "The
[C]ourt must be satisfied, at least, that the employee has been treated unfairly from an objective point of
view in the sense of the effect or impact which the severance pay, or the manner in which it has been
calculated or paid over, has on the employee."
206Young v. Lifegro Assurance, (1990) 11 I.LJ. 1127 (I.C.).
207Stellenbosch Farmers' Winer, (P4'.) Ltd. v. National Union of Wine, Spirits & A/lied Workers, (1992)
13 I.LJ. 1182, 1186 (LA.C.).
2081d. at 1187.
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proceed with great caution before denying a claim for compensation, particularly in a
business transfer situation. 209 It has been pointed out above that the common law
makes it difficult to avoid termination of the employment contract when a business is
transferred; important issues for employees therefore concern the compensation and
benefits due to them in such an event. A Court will often be confronted with the
question whether employees should be entitled to retrenchment benefits regardless
of whether the transferee makes an offer of re-employment on substantially the same
terms and conditions of employment as before. Alternatively, should employees be
entitled to compensation if they elect not to be transferred and prefer that their services
be terminated? The emphasis which the common law places on an employee's
freedom of choice suggests that an employee should have all the benefits accompany-
ing this freedom. And yet, when the employee exercised his freedom of choice in the
Life gro case and refused the offer of re-employment, he did not get the severance
package offered to other employees. Similarly, the Court in NtuIi stated that
employees will not be entitled to compensation if they refuse an offer of employment
on substantially the same terms and conditions as their previous employment, with
'due regard to the existing service and other benefits.' 2 ' o The Court's conclusions
in these two cases might have been correct, but the approach of the Court can be
criticised. In terms of the tenets of the common law, priority should be given to
affording an employee a fair choice, which also means following the correct
procedures. Only after these concerns have been stressed, can the Court give
consideration to the content of the offer of re-employment and the status of the
employer, and make a finding that the circumstances were so exceptional that an
employee who declines an offer of re-employment should not be entitled to
compensation or benefits. This approach was basically followed by the Court in Jacob
v. Prebuilt Products21 ' when it postulated a general rule that employees are entitled
to compensation simply because of a change in the status of the employer, regardless
2091he requirement of consultation was not even mentioned in Memela v. Super-Care Cleaning (Ply.)
Ltd., (1992)13 l.LJ. 172 (l.C.), a case which concerned employees in the service industry who was 'taken
over' by a new contractor when their erstwhile employer lost its contract. Although their new employment
was not significantly different from their previous employment, they were no longer paid a long service
benefit, which they claimed from their first employer in the form of severance pay. Consultation was all the
more important since the Court did mention that efforts to establish an industrial council had failed.
v. HazelmOre Group f/a Mus grave Nursing Home, (1988) 9 l.LJ. 709, 71 9G-H (l.C.). See also
Mderson v. Foseco (P4'.) Ltd., (1993) 2 LC.D. 40 (l.C.).
211Jacob v. Prebuilt Products (P4'.) Ltd., ( 1988) 9 I.LJ. 1100 (l.C.).
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of the content of the offer of re-employment. Although the judgement might have been
too rigid in that it did not allow for any exceptions, it respected the limited right to a
job which the common law grants to employees.
Consultation about effects
The formal distinction between decision- and effects-bargaining, which has
been accepted by the American judiciary, has not been established in South African
cases. However, in applying the requirement of consultation in the event of business
transfers, the Industrial Court in a few cases has separated the decision from the
effects of the decision.212
 Although there is a lack of consistency, the Court has in
these cases followed a two step analysis.
First, in deciding whether a retrenchment is fair, the Court enquires into the
reasons or the underlying motive for the employer's decision and regards it as
important that an employer acts fairly in its relationship with employees. 213 An unfair
labour practice was found in a case where the Court came to the conclusion that the
employer's real reason for retrenchment was one of ridding itself of a particular union
and its members actively involved in union activities.214 Similarly, the Court regarded
it as unfair where it found that the closure of one company and the opening of a
second company was used as a stratagem to get rid of a portion of the work-force so
as to avoid compliance with fair employment and bargaining practices.215
The Court has accepted that employees cannot force an employer to remain
in operation if an employer decides bona fide that it is not an economically viable
proposition to do so.216 For this reason, a decision which the Court regarded as
being based on economic reasons, was accepted as a prerogative of management,
without careful questioning or scrutiny of the validity or relevance of the arguments or
2 ' 2See, in general, Paul Benjamin, 'Condoning the Unprocedurai Retrenchment The Rise of the 'No
Difference' Principle,' 13 Indus. U. 279 (1992).
3Paper, Printing, Wood & Allied Workers Union v. Kaycraft (Ply.) Ltd., (1989) 10 LU. 272, 280 (IC.),
quoting NU1W v. Braitex (Ply.) Ltd., (1987) 8 lU. 794, 799 (l.(.).
2"Simelane v. Audell Metal Products (Ply.) Ltd., (1987) 8 LU. 438 (l.C.).
v. Toiletpak Manufacturers (Ply.) Ltd., (1988) 9 l.LJ. 295 (l.C.).
216Paper, Printing, Wood & Allied Workers Union v. Kaycraft (Ply.) Ltd., (1989)10 I.UJ. 272, 280 (.C.).
See also Karbusicky v. Anglo American Corporation of SA Ltd., (1993) 14 I.LJ. 166 (l.C.); S4 Municipal
Workers Union v. lbhayi City Council, (1993) 2 LC.D. 94 (l.C.); CWIU v. Sopelog, (1993) 2 LC.D. 45 (l.C.);
Durban Integrated Municipal Employees Society v. Tongaat Town Board, (1993) 2 LC.D. 54 (l.C.).
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values supporting the decision. The Court did not show any concern for the dialectical
aspect of the decision-making process. To the same extent as in the United States,
an employer's stated reason for its decision determined the question of negotiation or
consultation. The Court stated that ordinary business logic suggested that a decision
to close was one of policy and therefore a function of management. It explained the
duty to manage as follows:
[l]t is management which has its hands on the controls and its eyes on the instrument
panel, so to speak. Logically, it is for management to react to what the instruments
show"7
In another case "managerial prerogative" was regarded to concern any matter "relating
to an area in which, because of its particular knowledge, expertise and interest, an
employer is peculiarly qualified to make a unilateral decision".218
The analysis proceeds to a second stage in cases where the Court regards the
decision itself to be based upon commercial expediency and therefore a function of
management. In these circumstances the Court, while freeing management from the
requirement of consultation with regard to the decision, requires consultation
concerning the effects.219
It is submitted that the inception of the distinction between consultation over
a decision to terminate the employment of employees and the effects of such a
decision, is not only unwarranted by the statutory requirement of prior consultation but
is also contrary to the way in which the Courts have interpreted this requirement. It
has been reiterated many times that unilateral action taken by an employer is to be
condemned because of its adverse effect on the employment relationship and its
potential to create labour unrest.° The better attitude is reflected in the majority of
decisions of the Industrial Court which have accepted that consultation should concern
217TGWU v. Putco, (1987) 8 l.LJ. 801, 806 (l.C.).
8AmaJgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union of SA v. SBH Cotton Mills (P4'.) Ltd., (1988) 9 I.LJ.
1026, 1031 (l.C.).
219TGWU V. Putco, (1987) 8 I.LJ. 801, 807-08 (l.C.).
°See, e.g., B!eazard v. Argus Printing & Publishing Co. Ltd., (1983) 4 l.LJ. 60, 61 (l.C.); GWIIJ v.
Scottord Mills (P4'.) Ltd., (1986) 7 I.LJ. 45, 53 (l.C.); UAMAWU v. Foderis, (1983) 4 I.LJ. 212 (I.C.); MAWU
v. Transvaal Pressed Nuts, Bolts & Rivets (P4'.) Ltd., (1986) 7 l.LJ. 703 (l.C.); BCAWU v. Masterbilt C.C.,
(1987) 8 l.LJ. 670, 679 (l.C.); Ntsaba v. Eastern Province Textiles (P4'.) Ltd., (1987) 8 l.LJ. 470, 474 and
478 (l.C.).
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changes contemplated by an employer as well as the effects of such changes.1
In Kebeni v. Cementile Products (Ciskei) (Ply.) Ltd. the Court stated that consulta-
tions ought to be in conformity with the spirit of the norms laid down by the
International Labour Organization, in particular Recommendation 166 sec. 20(1), which
reads as follows:
"When the employer contemplates the introduction of major changes in production
programme, organ isation, structure or technology that are likely to entail terminations, the
employer should consult the workers' representatives concerned as early as possible on,
inter alia, the introduction of such changes, the effects they are likely to have and the
measures for averting or mitigating the adverse effects of such thanges."22
International standards require not only consultation with regard to the effects of
business changes but also to the introduction of such changes.
Disclosure
It follows from the duty to consult that the necessary information should be
provided to ensure proper consultation. 4
 With regard to retrenchment, information
should concern matters such as the reasons for the retrenchment, the number and
category of workers likely to be affected and the proposed timetable for retrenchment.
In Kebeni v. Cementile Products (Ciskei) (Ply.) Ltd. the Industrial Court held that an
employer's neglect to disclose relevant and necessary information constituted a failure
"to observe the essential canons of fair play". The Court stated that "parties which hide
relevant information from the other party with the desire to deceive, prolong
negotiations or keep the other party ignorant with the intention to weaken that party,
are not acting in the interests of good industrial relations".
A poignant statement with regard to the disclosure of information was made
221 See, e.g., NUMSA v. Atlantis Diesel Engines (P4'.) Ltd., (1993)14 I.LJ. 642, 648 (LA.C.): "Although
the notion of a two-stage process may be useful to describe the way in which a retrenchment exercise
generally unfolds in practice ... there can be no clear dividing line between the decision to retrench and the
implementation of that decision ... [TI he whole of the retrenchment exercise must be fair...".
Kebeni v. Cementile Products (Ciskej) (P4'.) Ltd., (1987) 8 lU. 442, 449 (l.C.).
3lLO Recommendation No. 166, 1982 on Termination of Employment (Consultations on Major
Changes in the Undertaking).
4The Court stated in NUMSA v. Atlantis Diesel Engines (P4'.) Ltd., (1993)14 l.LJ. 642, 651-2 (LA.C.):
"It is undoubtedly so that meaningful consultations about ways of avoiding or minimizing the impact of
retrenchment can only occur if the trade union is provided with the necessary infonnation ... Sufficient
information must be disclosed to make the process of consultation meaningful."
25Kebeni v. Cementile Products (Ciske;) (P4'.) Ltd., (1987) 8 I.LJ. 442, 450 (l.C.).
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in Hadebe v. Romatex Industrials Ltd. :
•The tendency of employers simply to asciibe their plight to the general economic
problems of the country at any given time, is to be deprecated because there is no way
of knowing how prevailing economic conditions have affected a particular employer's
business, unless he is prepared to make full disclosure of his state of affairs to the other
interested parties.'
To this the Court in Mclaughlin v. GKN Mills added that 'in the absence of such
budgetary details, it is not possible for the [Clourt to conclude that the applicant's
retrenchment was in fact unavoidable."7
The extent to which disclosure has to be made is not subject to hard and fast
rules, but depends on a careful balancing of the conflicting interests of the parties. In
NUMSA v. Metkor lndustries 8 the Court interpreted the requirement of disclosure
so as to allow for management's interest in two ways. First, it was considered just and
equitable that management should 'disclose only such information as would
reasonably enable employees to consider the consequences that that information held
for them.' The Court did not consider it an unreasonable expectation that manage-
ment should have sufficient acumen to enable it to make a decision as to the extent
of disclosure to its employees and a balance was struck on this basis. Second, where
a transaction requires a high degree of security, the Court foresaw the possibility that
an employer could obtain an undertaking of secrecy before consulting with a union.
An employer's licence to refuse disclosure was qualified in National Union of
Metaiworkers of SA v. Atlantis Diesel Engines (P4'.) Ltd. ,229 a well-reasoned and
comprehensive judgement. Although the Court allowed for certain grounds on which
an employer can refuse to disclose information -- availability, relevance, confidentiality -
- it placed the onus on the employer to show that requested information is either not
relevant to avoiding or minimizing the impact of the retrenchment, or harmful to its
business interests. 2 ° In the latter case, the employer, together with the union
should actively investigate ways of making the information available in such a way that
Hadebe v. Romatex Industrials Ltd., (1986) 7 l.LJ. 726, 737 (l.C.).
7McIaugh!in v. GKN Mills, (1986) 7 lU. 721, 724-25 (l.C.).
8NUMSA v. Metkor Industries, (1990) 11 I.LJ. 1116 (l.C.).
'29NUMSA v. Atlantis Diesel Engines (P4'.) Ltd., (1993) 14 I.UJ. 642, 652 (L.A.C.).
230See also Burmeister v. Crusader Life Assurance Corporation Ltd., (1993)14 l.UJ. 1504, 1509 (l.C.)
in which the Court found that, since its area of concern was labour relations and the employment
relationship, it did not have to take into account the personal interests of shareholders, policy holders and
directors or any other third parties unless it could be successfully contended that their interests were such
as to affect the Court's obligation to do what was fair to the employer.
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it excludes or minimizes the risk of harm.23'
Proactive conduct by the union
Collective bargaining agreements may be concluded by parties to an industrial
council or a conciliation board, or more informally between employers, on the one
hand, and trade unions or employees, on the other. The last mentioned agreements
include recognition agreements and agreed disciplinary, retrenchment and dispute
procedures. 232
 Accordingly, agreements which are the product of intentional and
considered negotiation between the parties will be enforced by the Courts. 2 The
Industrial Court will, however, make sure that an agreement was deliberately intended
by both parties to regulate a specific event such as the severance of the employment
relationship. 2 The Court has had the opportunity to pronounce on the effects of
a sale upon a valid recognition agreement in NUMSA v. Metkor Industries (P4'.)
Ltd.2 In such a situation, normal contractual principles apply. According to the
Court, if there is a termination of employment as a result of a sale, a recognition
agreement will not fall away, at least not insofar as any provisions for termination are
concerned; such provisions remain in esse until such time as they have been complied
with or otherwise lawfully been disposed of.
An agreement concluded between a transferee and the transferor or a trade
union may bind the transferee to offer employment to the employees, and in this way
may limit the transferee's freedom to choose which of the employees will be engaged
in the acquired undertaking, 2 or to vary the terms of employment. 7
 There is,
'NUMSA v. Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pry.) Ltd., (1993) 14 I.LJ. 642, 652 (LA.C.).
Edwin Cameron, Hafton Cheadle and Clive Thompson, The New Labour Relations Act 134 (Cape
Town 1989).
2 Assuming the ordinary requirements of the law of contract have been met.
2 See, e.g., BCAWL! v. Masterbilt C.C., (1987) 8 l.LJ. 670, 677 (l.C.) (ft can safely be said that should
a retrenchment agreement be deficient in some respect, i.e. not provide for a certain situation, this Court
will be obliged to seek the applicable rule elsewhere....)
5NUMSA v. Metkor lndusties (Pry.) Ltd., (1990) 11 I.LJ. 1116 (l.C.).
Ntuli v. Hazelmore Group t/a Musgrave Nursing Home, (1988) 9 l.LJ. 709, 713 (l.C.) and Lathe v.
Impala Holiday Flats, (1993) 14 I.LJ. 1074, 1080 (l.C.). But ci. the implications of Borg-Warner SA v.
NA4WU, (1991)12 lU. 549 (LA.C.) (failure to abide not an unfair labour practice).
228
however, no obligation to come to such an agreement and it is unlikely that a
transferee will easily enter into an agreement with a trade union which will limit the
wide ranging choices which the common law confers upon a new employer in a
business transfer situation. The possibility of an agreement between transferor and
transferee is more likely, since this could be reflected in the price which the transferee
has to pay to acquire an undertaking. They can, for example, agree to displace the
burden of the responsibility towards employees by way of an indemnity or other-
wise.2
Considering the serious legal consequences which an employee will usually
have to face in transfer situations, the Court has suggested in several cases that the
transferor is under some kind of obligation to negotiate the fate of the work-force with
the transferee. In one case, the Court made a vague suggestion, on the basis of the
British Transfer of Undertakings Protection of Employment Regulations of 1981,
regarding the existence of some kind of obligation to incorporate safeguards into an
agreement between the parties in the following passage:
"If it is intended to transfer the undertaking and/or its major assets such as plant and
machinery of the employer (transferor) to another party (transferee), safeguards should
be incorporated into the agreement between the parties to ensure that the interests of the
work-force are adequately protected. One of the safeguard clauses could for example
be that all existing contracts of employment would be deemed to have been transferred
to the new employer who would be obliged to retain all existing employees without
discrimination, save that an individual employee may have the option not to continue his
employment relationship with the transferee."
These remarks were, however, of no consequence in this case which, in fact, dealt
with the usual situation where an employer retrenched employees. The transferor was
held liable for the unfair retrenchment of the employees and no responsibility was
attached to the new proprietor as no employment relationship had existed between it
and the dismissed employees.
The lack of agreement between transferor and transferee concerning the fate
of the work-force, in addition to a lack of consultation with the employees, formed the
basis of the Court's finding that the employer had committed an unfair labour practice
7(...continued)
7Ward v. Sentrachem Ltd., (1992)13 l.LJ. 252 (l.C.). The Court found that there was a delegation of
the employment contract from seller to purchaser with the employee's consent. This novation of a particular
kind imposed upon the purchaser an obligation to procure or provide the benefits to which the employee
was entitled in terms of the contract.
NtuIi v. Haze/more Group f/a Musgrave Nursing Home, (1988) 9 I.LJ. 709, 721 (l.C.).
Kebeni v. Cementile Products (Ciskei) (Pty.) Ltd., (1987) 8 I.LJ. 442, 450 (l.C.).
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in Hoogenoeg Andolusite (P4'.) Ltd. v. NUM (1).240 Similarly, in SACCAWU v.
Checkers SA Ltd.,24' the failure of a seller of a business to obtain a firm commitment
from the new owners regarding the continuity of employment of the employees was
taken into account when the Court granted an interdict242
 to enable the parties to
exhaust the consultative process. From these cases it appears that, much as the
Court would like to come to the aid of employees who are treated unfairly and are
seriously prejudiced by a transfer, it cannot force the seller of a business to come to
an agreement with the purchaser, and the relief in the end relates to the process of
consultation with the employees. In terms of current South African law, employees
have no legitimate rights as regards continuation of employment; only as regards
consultation. A fair procedure is all that employees can claim.
The lack of substantive protection perhaps explains the weight which the Court
at times attaches to procedural fairness. The case of NUMSA v. Metkor Industries2
concerned an agreement between a transferor and transferee which provided that the
purchaser would recognise the union and offer employment to sixty percent of the
employees of the transferor, on wages similar to those which had been paid by the
transferor. Moreover, in the event of retrenchment, the purchaser undertook to comply
with certain provisions of the agreement of sale, including those relating to retrench-
ment. In the case of monthly paid workers, there was an undertaking from the
purchaser to the seller that the pension fund payments would, upon retrenchment, be
the same as they had been under the seller's pension fund. When the union
complained about the lack of consultation prior to the disposal of the business, the
seller argued that it had secured certain rights for some employees which were in a
very real sense more beneficial than would have been the case had there simply been
a negotiation of a severance package and retrenchment. The Court refused to accept
240Hoogenoeg Andolusite (P4'.) Ltd. v. NUM (1), (1992) 13 l.LJ. 87, 93-4 (LA.C.).
241MCCAV/U v. Checkers SA Ltd., (1992) 13 l.LJ. 411 (l.C.).
terms of sec. 17(11)(a) of the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956.
243NUM&4 v. Metkor Industries, (1990) 11 I.LJ. 1116 (IC.). See also Lathe v. Impala Holiday Flats,
(1993)14 .LJ. 1074 (l.C.) for an agreement between a transferor and transferee containing a staff clause.
Because the employees were not party to the sale agreement, nor did they know of its contents, the Court
found that the staff clause was not a stipulation for their benefit which they knew about and accepted. They
could not rely on the transferee's obligations towards the transferor under the staff clause. The Court
suggested, however, that had the employees been party to the agreement, there would have been no
difficulty about securing a staff clause which secured continuity of employment for the employees by way
of a delegation of rights and obligations.
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the argument, observing that the approach pre-supposed the legality and fairness of
the conduct of the transferor vis-a-vis the employees from its initiation, and concluded
significantly that
"the benefits that employees might have obtained cannot be compared with or linked in
any way to the employee's right to be heard in his own interests, even if in the final result
he achieves less than otherwise would have been the case."
Although this passage recognises the disadvantages which could result from a
situation in which employees are simply presented with a fait accompli, compared to
the advantages of the consultation procedure in the employment context, especially
if this is genuinely applied as an aspect of participatory democracy, it does not provide
a complete solution to the plight of employees upon a business transfer. Without
legislative intervention to ensure the proper balance between substantive and
procedural rights in a business transfer situation, one can expect the Courts to lean
towards proceduralism in their struggle to find a basis on which to ensure that fairness
is achieved.
Controversy surrounds the question whether the Court will enforce an
agreement which does not measure up to the statutory requirements or the Court's
standards of fairness. Such requirements or standards will generally prevail in the
absence of an agreement. In some cases the Court has regarded it of the utmost
importance to give effect to the rules of a procedural agreement in order to foster the
concept of collective bargaining and the related concept of self-government. 2" It
has regarded the agreement as the foundation of the relationship between the
employer and employees and has stated that "within a certain closed community
the rules made between the employer and organised labour are regarded as having
binding authority".245
 Under this approach, the Court will only intervene if the
agreement shows some defect. For example, should an agreement not provide for
a certain situation which arises, the Court will be obliged to seek the applicable rule
elsewhere.
The strict approach to the enforcement of agreements just outlined, permits
employers to bargain for an agreement which allows them unlimited freedom and
2"BWU v. Masterbilt C.C., (1987) 8 l.LJ. 670, 677 (l.C.).
2451d at 677. See also TGWU V. Putco Ltd., (1987) 8 l.LJ. 801 (l.C.) ("The company had complied with
its obligations in terms of the agreement. The closure of the division and the retrenchment of the
employees accordingly did not constitute an unfair labour practice").
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leaves the employees In no better state than they were without it". 2 What is even
more disturbing is the restrictive way in which the Court has interpreted a clause
contained in a collective agreement. In Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union
of SA v. SB!-! Cotton Mills (Pty.) Ltd. 247 the recognition agreement between the
parties contained a statement to the effect that the company recognised the union as
the collective bargaining representative and undertook to negotiate with it in good
faith.2
 The union's contention that the statement implied that the employer was
bound to negotiate with the union on all matters aftecting the terms and conditions of
employment of the employees and any matter of mutual interest to the employer and
its employees, was rejected by the Court. In the Court's view, the question whether
the employer was under a duty to negotiate was a matter to be determined with due
regard to prevailing considerations of law and/or equity, in the light of the specific
facts pertinent to the dispute in issue. 249 The Court concluded that in accordance
with the dictates of equityu, the employer's temporary closures of its premises fell
within the ambit of management's prerogative about which there was no duty to
negotiate. The disturbing breadth of the Court's holding is that where the statute does
not specifically require negotiation, an employer will be able to renege on an
undertaking to negotiate. On the other hand, even if the statute provides for specific
employee rights, the Court has been willing to ignore these rights, where the contract
between the parties was struck at a lower level of protection for employees.
There can be no doubt that the statute has extended certain rights to
employees. Considering these rights and the overriding concern of the statute for
Nfairnesse the better approach seems to be to regard agreed criteria as prima fade
fairY° Under this approach, the Court has indicated that it will give effect to an
agreement unless it conflicts with the accepted principles of fairness. 1
 Far from
2'See the American case of White v. NLRB, 255 F.2d 564 (5th Cit. 1958) with regard to management
rights clauses.
247Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union of SA v. SBH Cotton Mills (Pty.) Ltd., (1988) 9 I.LJ.
1026 (I.C.).
at 1029.
at 1031.
0Edwin Cameron, Halton Cheadle and Clive Thompson, The New Labour Relations Act 128 (Cape
Town 1989).
1 NUMSA v. Steeledaie Reinforcing and Trading Co., (1988) 9 l.LJ. 674, 677 (I.C.).
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subverting the collective bargaining process, intervention by the Court in this manner
actually promotes it and may effectively redress a skewed collective bargaining
relationship. Furthermore, industrial peace may be promoted by the creation of
uniform standards of employee protection which correspond to accepted principles of
labour relations.252
Conclusion
When a decision is made to transfer a business, sometimes in conjunction with
other strategic business decisions such as a closure or insolvency, the multifarious
repercussions which flow from the managerial centre of decision-making can be
measured in terms of their legal consequences. The particularly harsh results which
such decisions have for employees, create the impression that legal regulation is
inadequate.2 The central position of the contract of employment and its
continued relevance in modern labour law is very clear from the way in which South
African law deals with business transfers. This area of the law is ruled by a variant of
the doctrine of automatic determination which defends the inalienable right of an
employee to choose an employer, and which was developed originally to protect the
employee from being assigned to an obsolete position of serfdom. The important
protective function of the common law is clearly outweighed by the hardships which
it causes for most employees who are confronted by business transfers. The common
law, although ostensibly concerned with the protection of employees' rights, ignores
the substance of acquired rights and only protects their freedom to choose an
employer. The common law also provides little in the way of express procedural
safeguards for employees and allows the unfettered exercise of managerial discretion.
The dilemma of employees caught in the turmoil of business changes, evinces the
inherent tension between the interests of management and labour for which the
common law has not been able to work out a solution. It can be argued that the
constraints of the common law make it impracticable to restate the South African
Andrew Breitenbach, Aspects of the South African Law on Retrenchment in the Light of English
Labour Standards, 11 Indus. L.J. 1193, 1203 (1990).
See the remarks which the couit made in Lathe v. Impala Holiday Flats, (1993)14 I.LJ. 1074, 1082
(I.C.): I find that whichever way it is approached, the matter [of a business transfer) produces some sort
of conundrum which is prima fade insoluble.
See M.R.Freedland, The Contract of Employment 1 (Oxford 1976).
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common law position so as to vest the employee with more rights.
A key to resolving the stress is more likely to be found in the unfair labour
practice definition with its overt concern for fairness. The unfair labour practice
jurisdiction in South Africa has changed the substance of labour relations and has
introduced restraints on the ability of management to make decisions and implement
them regardless of the detrimental effects on employees. And yet, the radical changes
which the law has introduced, have not allowed for the protection of acquired rights
of employees in the case of business transfers. In part this can be ascribed to the fact
that the interpretation of the unfair labour practice concept by the judiciary has always
been subjective and unsystematic. But the main reason for the failure of the statutory
unfair labour practice jurisdiction is not the result of a simple oversight by a generally
conservative judiciary, but is due to a more fundamental misunderstanding of the role
of the Courts in supervising the abusive exercise of managerial discretion. The
concept of fairness has given the Courts an invaluable tool with which to evaluate the
acts of management in the interests of industrial society, but changing structures and
patterns in industry demand a constant reinterpretation of the value of fairness, to the
same extent that this occurs in political debate. This process is inherently threatening
to all parties involved in the labour relationship if the axioms and precepts are not
clear. For this reason, the established principles which should direct behaviour and
guide judicial interpretation in the area of business transfers should ideally be
incorporated in legislation.
General reform which sets out the principles and deals with all the main
problems in a precise manner, can probably only be realised through legislation. An
examination of the model of EC Directives which have been implemented in the United
Kingdom, and which provide a standard for estimating the effects of statutory reform,
can help this process.
Even given its own premises and considering the demise of the doctrine of automatic determination
through judicial interpretation, (see, e.g., Stewart Wrightson (P4'.) Ltd. v. Thorpe, 1977 (2) S.A. 943 (AD.);
NUTW v. Stag Packirsgs (P4'.) Ltd., 1982 (4) S.A. 151 (1.)) it does not seem likely that the common law
position could be restated so as to accommodate the employee's wider interests. There are no compelhng
reasons to cling to the theory of the contract of employment and to encourage its development in time to
keep pace with future demands (see M.R. Freedland, The Obligation to Work and to Pay for Work, Current
Legal Probs. 175, 186.8 (1977)), and it seems preferable to accept that the contract of employment is
incapable of regulating the modem employment relationship adequately (see, e.g. Lord Wedderburn, The
Worker and the Law 843 (3d ed. London 1986).)
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The aim of corporate restructuring is normally the enhancement of the value
of shareholders' equity, but the achievement of this aim frequently places considerable
pressure on the labour market. The brisk winds of an unregulated marketplace leave
employees suffering the consequences of management strategies aimed at cutting the
costs of production (including wages and benefits) and, when management effects
mass dismissals, enduring the experience of being regarded as surplus labour. This
study of the way in which three countries deal with the phenomenon of business
transfers and attendant business changes makes several general claims of which two
are fundamental. The first is that there is a conflict between the economic demands
for restructuring and rationalisation, and the social demands for workers' protection.
The second claim concerns the failure of the traditional voluntarist model of collective
bargaining to strike a satisfactory balance between workers' demands and manage-
ment control.
Based on these claims, the central argument is that legislation can fill part of
the void, which collective bargaining alone cannot fill, by reconciling the divergent
interests which come to the fore during corporate reorganisations and by solving the
tension between managerial prerogative and employees' rights. This task requires the
law to fulfil a dual assignment: on the one hand, it has to offer protection to workers
in the case of business transfers, which implies affording a measure of job security and
the opportunity of meaningful participation; on the other hand, it has to guard the
interests of management in achieving its economic objectives effectively.
What may seem a gargantuan task for labour and employment law - to control
and empower workers and employers in this way - has analogous models in other
areas of the law, most pertinently in administrative law. Employees who experience
the exercise of managerial authority as more imminent, regular, and noticeable than
that of Government authority, feel entitled to fair treatment from management officials,
for many of the same reasons which allow a citizen to be treated fairly in its dealings
with Government. As a result workers demand the respect of employers for values
such as rationality, due process and respect for individual rights. The rights of
employees derive from the importance of work for financial security and for defining
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personal integrity, and also from the contribution which employees make towards the
efficiency and productivity of the enterprise. Regard for employees' rights entails that
employees should not necessarily be expected to shoulder the burden of coporate
restructurings, without having had some opportunity to participate in the decision-
making process, and without being satisfied that the decision was made in accordance
with rational standards. The application of rational standards will indicate circum-
stances under which the protection of employees' rights have to give way to clear
business needs which may be of an economic, technical or organisational nature.
Rational standards, moreover, can designate the measure of protection of employees'
claims vis-a-vis those of other creditors in the case of business insolvencies.
With the introduction of standards of industrial justice into employment law the
ideal outcome is a more equal distribution of power, as well as a more efficient
organisation of the workplace. The widely accepted efficiency of bureaucratic
hierarchies for co-ordinating, supervising, transmitting information and adapting to
changed circumstances suggests the limits of a protective ethical stance of the law.
Far from advising that the imposition of legal standards and review of private
bureaucratic power should overturn an efficient power structure, the argument for legal
regulation allows for effective bureaucratic structures to deal with a variety of problems
and contends only that the exercise of power should take place in accordance with
principles of the Rule of Law and of fairness. By controlling the abuse of power the
law can in fact contribute towards efficiency; it can encourage cooperation for the
success of the joint enterprise of employers and employees, and promote employee
involvement programs such as those adopted by sophisticated employers to induce
the kind of incentive, cooperation and commitment needed to compete in a global
market.
There will no doubt be difficulties in the way of creating an effective system of
legal protection, particularly as regards the definition of the rights, the interpretation
given by the judiciary, and industrial reality. Any attempt to explore effective ways in
which the law can penetrate into the structure of labour relations -- in order to identify
the effect that law can have on the power of the parties to collective bargaining, and
to consider the results of legal regulation for the interests of individual employees -
must recognise the limitations of the law as to its impact and significance as an
element which can influence performance, and must realise that law is only one of the
forces which can act upon the labour market. Powerful economic, social and political
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forces are at work in industrial society, and considerations of socio-economic policy
shape and direct the form of law. Since legislation does not exist in a vacuum, an
effective framework of legal rights should be part of a bold social program, aimed at
recapturing full employment, propagating economic growth, providing for the needs
of workers, and confronting the handicaps and ruthlessness experienced by those who
are in a particularly vulnerable position because of race, sex, age or poverty. An
important concern during this time of recession is the increase in the number of part-
time and casual workers, mostly women and members of racial minorities, who are not
organised and have never qualified for protection. The crisis created by wide-spread
unemployment around the world indicates that labour law should be linked to social
policies and programmess addressed at mass unemployment.' Ultimately, the law
is but one instrument in a broad spectrum of social, economic and political concerns
and its effectiveness depends upon a resolution of the problem of social order and the
issue of the conditions of labour.
An awareness of the law's place in a broader scheme, however, does not imply
that the law has no power to add to the thin cushion of legislative protections and to
achieve some form of distributive justice. The achievement of industrial justice need
not be seen as a misleading myth until supported by a more equitable economy. The
experience with EC-inspired legislation in the UK, as it has developed towards more
effective protection for employees in the case of business transfers, supports the
general argument that with adequate procedures and sanctions, and the bodies to
administer them, effective labour laws can be created to achieve industrial justice.
Industrial justice demands respect for the treasured canons of political society and
their introduction in the workplace; industrial justice concerns standards by which to
control managerial prerogative in public and private enterprises in order to attain a
more equal distribution of power and to demonstrate respect for the individual's rights.
The small but significant area of business transfers illustrates the power of law to
introduce standards of rationality, fairness and respect for individual rights against
which to measure the legitimacy of the exercise of managerial power.
An assessment of the effects of EC-inspired legislation in the UK strengthens
the case for substantial labour law reform and leads to interesting speculation as to
whether similar notions might appear on the political agendas in the USA and South
Wedderburn, R. Lewis and J. Clark eds., Labour Law and Industrial Relations: Building on Kahn-
Freund 219.220 (Oxford 1983).
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Africa in the foreseeable future. Will there be sufficient political tolerance with regard
to the kind of social, moral and economical reasons which have been developed in
this study for more extensive legal protection, to achieve probing labour law reform in
the USA? Considering the factors mitigating against the development of a new legal
setting, one cannot be overly optimistic. Very strongly embedded in the values of the
American political economy is the common aw assumption, based on property and
contract law, that management can exercise the prerogative of deciding the direction
and scope of the enterprise on behalf of shareholders. Against this legal and
economic premise any legal intervention to establish rights for workers and change the
workplace to a more participatory environment will be seen as a momentous step with
unpredictable results for both workers and management. As a consequence one can
expect that even if legislative action manages to secure protective and participatory
rights for employees, the interpretation of such rights will be limited in accordance with
the values of the free market and managerial efficiency prevailing in the political and
legal culture.
The general ambivalence about where to draw the line between labour law
rights for employees and other important values with which they come into conflict can
only be overcome if the community makes the social judgement that protection for
workers and a meaningful employee voice in the workplace can benefit workers and
the broader political economy. On the same basis that the authors of the United
States Constitution created a document to draw disparate interests together, to
establish a common ground and to protect the fundamental rights of all the people,
a strategy of labour law reform could be launched to serve deeper political values. As
citizens of the workplace every American worker is aware of the power which
management wields over a host of issues in his or her life. For most employees who
are committed to a career in a particular firm, and who experience difficulty when
forced to change careers midway, the issues are often more material than those
commonly addressed by municipal councils or other administrative bodies. They can
therefore advance a strong moral claim to enjoy the protection of some basic rights
which correspond to those which are highly regarded in liberal society, such as due
process of law, reasonableness and the opportunity of participation. Participation can
take place through a variety of institutional options, including the kind of employee
involvement programs which have become part of the evolving pattern in human
resource management, or the more traditional larger union that can bargain for
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contract benefits with the employer and help enforce legal rights which the Govern-
ment provides for workers. As far as participation is concerned, legally the first step
should be to provide all employees with a guarantee that a representative, elected and
informed body of workers will be able to serve their interests.
An apppeal to the general public for labour and employment law reform along
the lines suggested in this study, could be strengthened by emphasizing that the
proposed reform concerns the basic needs of workers, not unions. 2 Whatever the
advantages of collective bargaining -- and there are many - one cannot overlook the
significant attrition in union representation in the USA and the estimated fall in private
sector union coverage to less than fifteen percent. In part this decline in union
membership can be ascribed to successful employer resistance to unionization.
Opposition of American business centres around the inflexibility of collective
bargaining and its inability to respond to changes in product and capital markets. At
the same time, the image of a union that persists currently in the public's mind
appears to be one of a large bureaucratic organisation which negotiates long-term
contracts with the employer, without much participation by the small number of
employees which it represents. The union leadership, moreover, is often perceived as
having ulterior, self-interested motives which render the organisation largely
undemocratic and corrupt. While this perception has endured it has become
increasingly difficult to sell collective bargaining as a mechanism for voluntary,
participatory problem solving.
The worst outlook on the future of collective bargaining in the USA is that the
institution will become increasingly fossilized and obsolete. Hence, labour law reform
which focuses on protection for individual workers, stresses their long investment in
their jobs, and exposes the denial of their fundamental rights by powerful corporations,
has more hope of success, even though it will doubtless take a hard and prolonged
struggle to bring about such change.
In South Africa, similarly, it will take considerable toil to effect legislative
changes touching upon the employer's power which is inherent in the control of the
production process. 3 Existing labour legislation which has as its aim the pursuit ol
2The same argument is made by Paul C. Weiler, Governing the Workplace 301 (Cambridge,
Massachusetts 1990) when he proposes a programme of legal reform to change the governance of the
workplace.
3See Kahn-Freund's Labour and the Law ch. 1 (P.L Davies & M. Freedland eds., 3d ed. London 1983).
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industrial peace is premised, somewhat ironically, on the preservation of managerial
autonomy for owners of capital in a free market society. Legislation imposes few
constraints on the common law right of employers both to restructure businesses with
regard only to the shareholders' profits, and to control and intimidate labour by threats
to move or to close a business. Since 1979 voluntary agreements, reinforced by
Industrial Court rulings on unfair labour practices, have considerably transformed the
workplace and introduced standards of industrial justice and due process. But the
power of capital to limit the one aspect of production over which it has historically had
most control -- the labour force -- is rarely challenged. In South Africa the superior
power of capital is reinforced by the degree of concentration of capital, which
according to all reports is considerable. 4 As a result, a key economic and social
phenomenon is the centralisation of siginificant economic decision-making in a few
hands.
This trend toward profound inequality and power imbalances in the workplace,
has coincided with the long-awaited extension of political citizenship to all people in
South Africa, including black people who had been denied their basic rights for
centuries. During this time democratic values and aspirations are taking on new
meaning and establishing themselves more securely in ordinary routine. With the
expectation that democracy will bring solutions to some of South Africa's problems,
the most fruitful strategy for reform of labour and employment legislation appears to
be to stress that industrial democracy essentially complements political democracy.
A democratic culture in both spheres should seek to acitvate and to sustain self-
governance. Industrial citizenship, like political citizenship, entails rights and privileges,
as wefl as duties and obligations. It entails that the behaviour of management be
based on principles of industrial justice in order to restructure the social reality of the
workplace, and to give employees the opportunity to share in the social and economic
heritage of development and industrialization.
At this moment of transition in South Africa, the economic pie, of which many
seek a fair share, is not very big. The deteriorating value of the Rand and the loss of
international markets have given cause for concern among business leaders, and have
added to a general feeling of anxiety about security and survival. Recovery from
anxiety will require a renewed focus on the area of wealth creation for the benefit of
4See,e.g., M. Savage, An Anatomy of the South African Corporate Economy, 7 Indus. Rel. J.S. Afr.
(No.2) 4 (1987).
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everyone. Questions about what policies to pursue to create a healthier economy
have to take into account the suitability of statute law to establish a legal framework
for the labour market. The Labour Relations Act, which has been described as being
akin to a Nindustrial relations constitution monitored by a [C]onstitutional [C]ourt,5
has been effective in setting out fundamental principles of fairness and equity, without
creating patent obstacles in the path of economic prosperity.
A strong argument can be made that a more comprehensive constitution of
working life which sets Out basic principles of industrial justice can assist commerce.
Constraints imposed on managerial decision-making, which on the one hand respect
efficient hierarchical structures of business, managerial skill, competence and expertise
but, on the other hand, acknowledge employees' investment of a career in the
enterprise, and their need for respect, can aid day-to-day performance and productiv-
ity. Widely distributed opportunities to participate in decision-making, supported by
legal provisions, can encourage all parties to recognise their reciprocal rights and
responsibilities for the achievement of sound economic objectives.
Competitive pressures in a global economy call for attention to efficiency and
productivity growth, but at the same time summon individual countries to identify
limitations on industrial democracy and renunciation of workers' rights. Law in the
USA, UK and South Africa has made a significant contribution to the evolution of
contemporary patterns in labour relations and must continuously be revised to meet
new economic, social and moral challenges. Reshaping the substantive rules and
remedies of the law in accordance with standards of industrial justice can redefine
distinctions between labour and management, prevent arbitrariness and conceivably
open up avenues for mutually advantageous benefits.
5M.S.M. Brassey, E. Cameron, M.H. Cheadle & M.P. Olivier, The New Labour Law 259 (Cape Town
1987).
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